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Law's Revolution: Benjamin Austin and
the Spirit of '86
Aaron T. Knapp*
The better the society, the less law there will be . . .. In Hell, there will
be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.'
[T]his devolution of power, to the people at large ... repeals all
positive laws whatsoever before enacted.2
What impact did the American Revolution have on colonial law and
legal systems? Historians have offered different interpretations. Some see
primarily legal continuity after the Revolution rather than dramatic
change-"evolution," not transformation.3 Others find that the
revolutionary conception of "law as the guardian of liberty" produced a
number of modest institutional changes along libertarian lines, such as
extending the trial by jury to cases previously tried by judges,
strengthening criminal procedural protections, and, in the nineteenth
century, disestablishment.4 The more significant post-Revolutionary legal
* Ph.D. Candidate, Department of History, Boston University; J.D., University of Virginia School of
Law, 2002; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1999. The author thanks Gerry Leonard, David
Seipp, Brendan McConville, Charles Capper, Frederick Blumberg, Marcia Li, William Knapp, and the
editors of the Yale Journal of Law & Humanities, particularly Noah Greenfield, for their helpful
comments. This Article is based on my dissertation in progress, Law's Revolution: Dissenting
Traditions in American Legal Thought, 1776-1860 (forthcoming) (Boston University, Department of
History). I dedicate the Article to my grandfather, Raymond Knapp.
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110-11 (1977).
2. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 157 (New York,
William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1765).
3. See, e.g., Bruce Mann, Legal Reform and the Revolution, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 437 (Greene & Pole eds., 1991); J.R. Pole, Reflections on American
Law and the American Revolution, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 123 (1993); see also DANIEL HULSEBOSCH,
CONSTITUTING EMPIRE (2005) (describing continuities in constitutional ideas and practices);
CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND 65, 398-99, 504-06 (2010) (noting continuities in laws and
legal culture surrounding work and slavery). While otherwise downplaying the extent of the
Revolution's legal impact, Bruce Mann does note that the states' efforts to limit the number of capital
crimes and restrict corporal punishment did reflect the "influence of revolutionary ideology." Mann,
supra, at 440.
4. WILLIAM NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE
ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 89, 89-109 (2d ed. 1994). Nelson also emphasizes the
"breakdown" of "ethical unity" in Massachusetts society after the Revolution, but his analysis
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transformation, however, came when a growing fear of mob rule after the
debtor rebellions in the 1780s and a new desire for economic growth in the
early national period transformed the old jury-dominated legal system into
an "Americanized" lawyer- and judge-dominated one that abandoned just
price principles in contract cases and advanced utilitarian conceptions of
property rights. Law thereafter became a "tool" by which the economic
elite could "seize most of society's wealth for themselves and enforce
their seizure upon the losers."s The outcome raises obvious difficulties
here because it suggests reaction and counterrevolution rather than any
affirmative legal influence exerted by revolutionary ideas.'
A more recent approach highlights the pluralistic dimensions of
American law after the Revolution. According to one study, revolutionary
ideology-specifically "the notion that sovereignty no longer came from
the top down"-helped create and sustain highly localized legal systems in
the Carolinas that depended on "the presence and participation of the
people in local communities."' Magistrates in these localized venues
produced "inconsistent rulings aimed at restoring the peace" rather than
protecting abstract individual rights.' For a time localized law stood apart
from and often opposed to state and federal legal systems, which opposed
each other in significant ways.9 Whether analyzing state, local or federal
equivocates on whether the Revolution itself or legal change after the Revolution (or some
combination of both) primarily caused this breakdown. See id. at 2, 5, 109.
5. Id. at 174. Morton Horwitz posits essentially the same outcome in private law. MORTON
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977).
6. Attempts to marginalize the jury, for example, ran contrary to revolutionary republicanism,
which celebrated broad jural power as an expression of community will and the guardian of liberty.
See 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 229-30 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965);
SHANNON STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990). A rich vein in the constitutional historiography beginning with
Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913) sees the
movement for a new Constitution in 1787 in similar counterrevolutionary terms. In the 1980s, Bruce
Ackerman inaugurated a revisionist tradition in American law schools that emphasizes the presence
and influence of the revolutionary ideological heritage in the constitutional founding. See, e.g., Bruce
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures. Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); AKHIL
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION (2005); JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011). This
Article discusses the legal implications of the constitutional founding in Part V.B.
7. LAURA EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE 41, 65 (2009). For another work
emphasizing the significance of local law in the post-Revolutionary decades, see WILLIAM NOVAK,
THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE (1996). Christopher Tomlins proposes that a republican discourse of "police"
with localistic dimensions coexisted with "legal discourse" in the post-Revolutionary years.
CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993).
8. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 7.
9. On conflicts between state, local and federal jurisdictions in post-Revolutionary Virginia, see F.
THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA'S PROVINCIAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1828 (1994). Laura Edwards notes that during the same period in which legal
localism developed, state-level professional reformers "applied Revolutionary ideals" to advance their
own goals often in conflict with local law: namely, to create "a rationalized body of law based on the
protection of individual rights, particularly property rights, and to centralize the operations of
government to regularize the creation and dissemination of that body of law." EDWARDS, supra note 7,
at 8. Edwards's own evidence, however, problematizes her assertion that state law and local law
existed as separate "legal cultures." See Jessica K. Lowe, A Separate Peace? The Politics of Localized
[Vol. 25:271272
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jurisdictions, however, all the foregoing approaches focus primarily on the
law's structural and substantive dimensions in assessing the Revolution's
legal impact, relying heavily on institutional source materials.'o Such
scholarship may reveal how American legal institutions changed or failed
to change after the Revolution, but can offer only narrow glimpses into
how ordinary Americans viewed the law itself.
This Article shifts the frame of reference from legal institutions to legal
culture in evaluating the Revolution's effects. By legal culture, I mean the
publicly expressed values and attitudes that post-Revolutionary Americans
had toward the law and legal institutions." I will suggest here that the
most powerful evidence of the Revolution's affirmative long-term
consequences in American legal history comes not from judicial or
legislative records. We do not find it in the reform of inheritance or
criminal laws, or in the jury's marginalization, or in legal localism. Rather,
the real American revolution in the law occurred in deeper attitudinal
transformations experienced by a broad cross-section of post-
Revolutionary Americans. Legal and constitutional historians have not
ignored this perspective and, indeed, recent work suggests provocative
new turns in this direction.'2 Studies that employ this methodological
frame, however, have converged around some unmistakable trends.
Two canonical statements on early American attitudes toward the law
have structured a certain bias into the way we tell our histories of post-
Revolutionary legal culture: Thomas Paine's proclamation in 1776 that in
America "the law is king" and Tocqueville's later depiction of antebellum
Americans as a society peculiarly infused with legalism and regard for the
law." The pertinent legal historiography accordingly suggests that the
Law in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 36 LAW &. SOC. INQUIRY 788, 799-806 (2011) (reviewing
EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE (2009)). For a recent work on the revolutionary ideological
origins of multi-tiered authority within the American constitutional framework, see ALISON LACROIX,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010).
10. Laura Edwards, for example, bases her study on "extensive runs of court documents" from
localities in the Carolinas, "including magistrates' trial papers, coroners' inquests, and criminal
records from the circuit courts," as well as state court materials. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 22, 26; see
also MILLER, supra note 9 (relying on state and federal cases); NELSON, supra note 4 (utilizing state,
county, and local judicial records in Massachusetts).
I1. See Lawrence Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 29, 34
(1969) (distinguishing legal culture-the "network of values and attitudes relating to the law"-from a
legal system's institutional and substantive dimensions). Laura Edwards's study of local "legal
culture" in the post-Revolutionary Carolinas does not appear to embrace Friedman's distinctions
between a legal system's institutional (or "structural"), substantive, and cultural dimensions, instead
treating all these as facets of "legal culture." See EDWARDS, supra note 7.
12. See, e.g., STEVEN WILF, LAW'S IMAGINED REPUBLIC (2010).
13. Tocqueville's statement that in antebellum America the "language of law" had become "a
vulgar tongue" apparently serves as the conceptual framework for Stephen Wilf's recent book, even as
Wilf himself examines the writings of eighteenth-century Americans. WILF, supra note 12, at 56. Wilf,
Laura Edwards, and Robert Ferguson, among others, place Paine's statement that in America "the law
is king" front and center in their books and by all appearances accept Paine's statement as
unassailable. Id at 2; EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 66; ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 11, 16 (1984); see also FERGUSON at 16 (interpreting Paine's Common Sense as a
2013] 273
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Revolution made Americans into a people who positively embraced law
and looked to law to solve their problems and understand themselves:
"Americans had law; they made law; they inherited law; they used law;
they were subject to law."1 4 Of course, constitutional scholars have
produced an enormous corpus of literature demonstrating Americans'
singular enthusiasm for creating and debating constitutional law during
and after the Revolution. Recent studies find new dimensions of the
Revolutionary-era commitment to law in the eruption of "popular law
talk" around criminal cases that made law itself into a "public sphere,"
helping to "transform[] the rule of law into a dominant cultural feature of
the Early Republic.""
The felt need to find more law and attitudes favorable toward it in early
America has led historians to advance new and expansive definitions of
law to frame their arguments. Rejecting the positivistic notion that law
constitutes the command of a sovereign as too restrictive for their
purposes, historians of American legal culture have in recent years
discovered positive law in many unexpected historical places-in
Revolutionary-era mobs, in customs expressly rebuffed by courts, in
disparate conceptions of the local "peace," in "popular constitutionalism,"
and, indeed, in revolution itself.16 One study purports to locate "law" not
in statutes, case reports, or treatises, but in "actual social relations" within
local post-Revolutionary communities, as well as in the non-legal "body
of knowledge" on which those communities drew, including religion,
popular writings, and cultural traditions." Such broad-reaching
"demand for a country defined entirely by law"). Selectively quoting Paine's remark, without
examining all of what Paine said on this matter, has contributed to misunderstandings of early
American attitudes toward the law. See infra Part V.A.
14. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA 2 (2000) ("[TIhe question 'Why go to law?'
was rarely posed" among husbands and wives experiencing difficulties.); see also EDWARDS, supra
note 7, at 78 (Ordinary people in the post-Revolutionary Carolinas "approached law with an air of
proprietary familiarity, assuming that they could use it. They gave law a respect of a particular kind,"
above all acting "as if law was their 'modality of rule,' a system that should respond to their problems
and could express their own conceptions of justice."); John P. Reid, The Rule of Law, in THE
BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 629, 632 (Greene & Pole eds., 1991)
("It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the legal aspects of the American Revolution could be told
under the title In Defense of the Rule of Law.").
15. WILF, supra note 12, at 1-2, 4. Significantly, Wilf bases his study of American legal history
on non-institutional source materials, including newspapers, pamphlets, and other popular writings.
16. On "lawful" mobs, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE (1977); John Phillip Reid,
In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in Law, and the Coming of the American
Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1043 (1974) [hereinafter Reid, In a Defensive Rage]. On judicially
overruled customs as law, see Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, WIS. L. REV. 899 (1985). On law
as the unpredictable local "peace," see EDWARDS, supra note 7. On popular constitutionalism, see
LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004). On Americans' purported legalization of
revolution after the Revolution, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
17. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 12; Laura Edwards, The Peace: The Meaning and Production of
Law in the Post-Revolutionary United States, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 565, 566 (2011). Edwards does
not explore the tensions between her broad and fluid definition of law and the rule of law. Nor is it
clear from Edwards's evidence that the locals themselves ever thought "actual social relations" or
[Vol. 25:271274
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conceptions of law do render it difficult to imagine a commitment, belief,
or point of contention in early America that existed outside law's reach."
Law, historians tell us, ascended to a "position of supreme imaginative
authority" after the Revolution and, by the eighteenth century's end, its
"sphere of institutional and normative influence appeared unbounded."" It
became "the principle source of life's 'facts."' 20 Indeed, "[i]f one looks
carefully in eighteenth-century America," one recent study concludes,
"law is everywhere."2'
This Article offers an entirely different interpretation of post-
Revolutionary legal culture. In short, it contends that the American
Revolution produced deep hostilities to law, lawyers, and legal institutions
with important intellectual ramifications that the prevailing historiography
elides in its quest to find more law and legalism in American history. My
essential argument is that the American revolution in the law took place in
an attitudinal revolution against the law. The Article investigates the
origins, character, and historical consequences of this revolution using the
writings of Benjamin Austin, Jr., an underappreciated Boston artisan and
prominent early national state politician who wrote prodigiously in the
Boston newspapers after the Revolution. In the spring of 1786, writing
under the pseudonym "Honestus," Austin published a series of influential
essays arguing that neither lawyers nor the common law had any rightful
place in America. The spirit of the times, Austin believed, required their
immediate and permanent "annihilation." The historical question of why
Austin made these audacious claims and what kinds of responses they
elicited, will receive substantial attention in the coming pages. Yet the
Article will also treat Austin as a point of departure, suggesting that the
republican antilegalism that his 1786 writings so powerfully embodied
provides a prism through which to reconceive the history of American
attitudes toward the law from the Revolution to the Civil War.
Part I discusses the immediate context and impact of Austin's writings
and otherwise lays out the Article's conceptual framework. Part II offers a
biographical sketch of Austin. Part III traces the evolution of the
Massachusetts legal profession in the eighteenth century to the point at
"cultural traditions" constituted "law." Finally, recent socio-legal theory problematizes Edwards's
conceptual framework. See John Griffiths, The Idea of Sociology of Law and its Relation to Law and
to Sociology, 8 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 49, 63-64 (2005); Brian Tamanaha, Understanding Legal
Pluralism, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 390-96 (2008).
18. Commentators have recently floated the title "Law As..." (as distinguished from "Law And.
.") for this general strain in the scholarship: "Instead of parsing relations between distinct domains of
activity, between law and what lies 'outside' of it, the objective of historical research about law might
be to imagine them as the same domain: 'law as . . . .' Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon,
Forward: "Law As. Theory and Method in Legal History, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 523-34
(2011).
19. TOMLINS,supra note 7, at 21.
20. Id.
21. WILF, supra note 12, at II (emphasis added).
2013] 275
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which Austin confronted it in the 1780s. Part IV provides a close reading
of Austin's 1786 essays in their proper historical, intellectual and
discursive contexts. The Article's final Part will suggest that Austin and
the post-Revolutionary movement for which he spoke inaugurated an
intellectual tradition within American legal culture that extended into the
early national and antebellum periods. By all appearances, however, that
tradition ceased to find articulate exponents after the Civil War and
consequently dissolved as an intellectually distinct force of change within
American legal culture. Concluding remarks will offer some reflections as
to why this happened.
I. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST THE LAW
When they appeared in the spring of 1786 in Boston's Independent
Chronicle, Benjamin Austin's writings provoked a statewide public debate
lasting well over a year and produced an explosion of popular anti-lawyer
activity across Massachusetts. On May I of that year, based on the
"[m]any complaints [that] have of late prevailed from the pernicious
practice of the law," Roxbury residents authorized their appointed
representative to pursue the legal profession's total abolition.22 Days later,
Stoughton residents also ordered their representative to eradicate "the
pernicious practice of the law as most elaborately and feelingly held up in
public view by some eminent patriot under the signature of Honestus."23
Town meetings in Boston, Lynn, Dedham, Concord, East Sudbury,
Watertown, and Acton responded to Austin's writings with similar
motions in the coming weeks.24 On July 7, 1786, the Massachusetts
legislature enacted the Referee Act, providing for a scheme of arbitration
in lieu of litigation that bore striking resemblances to Austin's own reform
proposals.25 After the outbreak of Shays's Rebellion, at least three county
22. WORCESTER MAG., May 11, 1786, at 71.
23. DANIEL HUNTOON, HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF CANTON, NORFOLK COUNTY,
MASSACHUSETTS 428 (Cambridge, J. Wilson & Son, Univ. Press 1893). Weeks later, Stoughton
residents again demanded that "the order of Lawyers, as they now practice, be entirely annihilated."
Id. at 429.
24. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 215 (1911) (referencing Dedham
town meeting instructions); Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at I (referencing Boston town
meeting instructions); PLYMOUTH J., May 16, 1786, at 3 (referencing Lynn town meeting instructions).
The proposed Boston instructions did not ultimately pass. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at
1. For the Concord, East Sudbury, Watertown, and Acton instructions issued in the spring of 1786 in
response to Austin's writings, see Charles Robert McKirdy, Lawyers in Crisis: The Massachusetts
Legal Profession, 1760-1790, at 259 (June 1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) (on file with Northwestern University).
25. See 1 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 267-68
(Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823); see also HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 151 (The Referee Act
was enacted "[u]nder pressure of radicals like Benjamin Austin."). A number of other reform bills
prompted by Austin's writings and related town instructions stalled in the upper house during this
period. McKirdy, supra note 24, at 131-32. Calls for a statewide convention to consider a major
overhaul of the state constitution ensued. ROBERT J. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE
276 [Vol. 25:271
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conventions sent petitions to Boston demanding either wholesale reform
or annihilation of the legal profession. Thirteen town meetings passed
comparable instructions, including Braintree, which moved in September
1786 to "crush or at least put a proper check or restraint on that order of
Gentlemen denominated Lawyers the completion of whose modem
conduct appears to us to tend rather to the destruction than the
preservation of the Commonwealth."26
Circulating and proving influential in many other states, Austin's
writings gave voice to a powerful resistance movement sweeping through
postwar America.2 7 "[S]ince the settlement of this country, Independence
not excepted," wrote one observer, "there never was a more popular
question agitated than this by Honestus."28 Scathing editorials attacking
lawyers filled the newspapers in other states.2 9 Popularly controlled state
legislatures de-professionalized their judiciaries and simplified
procedures.30 In New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire, among others,
REVOLUTION 136-37 (1954). In the lead-up to Shays's Rebellion, the counties of Worcester,
Hampshire, and Middlesex held conventions in August of 1786 demanding the legal profession's
reform or abolition. See MASS. CENTINEL, Aug. 26, 1786, at 3 (noting Worcester convention); 25
WORCESTER MAO., Sept. 1786 ("Third Week of September"), at 294, 294-95 (noting Hampshire
convention); AM. RECORDER & CHARLESTON ADVERTISER (Charlestown, MA), Sept. 1, 1786, at 2
(noting Middlesex convention).
26. See 2 CHARLES F. ADAMS, THREE EPISODES OF MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY 897 (Boston,
Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1894) (referencing Braintree town meeting instructions); McKirdy, supra
note 24, at 136 n.101, 137 n.102; INDEP. CHRON., Oct. 1, 1786, at I (referencing Marlborough town
meeting instructions). For the renewed petitions produced by the Worcester and Middlesex county
conventions after the outbreak of Shays's Rebellion, see SALEM MERCURY, Oct. 21, 1786, at 2.
27. GERARD GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER 63 (1979); see also NATHAN HATCH, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 26 (1989) (noting that Austin "gained national
reputation in 1786" for his anti-lawyers essays); WARREN, supra note 24, at 219 (remarking that
Austin's essays had "widespread influence"). New York paper reproduced excerpts from Austin's
anti-lawyer essays, which suggests that copies of the essays circulated in New York. See DAILY
ADVERTISER (New York), June 26, 1786, at 2. Published in the crucible of the debate Austin had
provoked, the Roxbury town meeting's anti-lawyer instructions appeared in both New York and
Philadelphia. PENN PACKET, May 19, 1786, at 3 (reprinting a column published in New York). Days
after Austin's last essay installment, the Braintree instructions, supra note 26, to abolish lawyers also
appeared in Philadelphia. FREEMAN'S J. (Philadelphia), June 21, 1786, at 2. Bound copies of Austin's
writings also circulated in Pennsylvania. See LITERARY INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia), May 1, 1807,
at I (advertising one of Austin's pamphlets for sale). Shortly after Austin's last essay appeared,
Connecticut editors included in their stories references to public discontent with the "abuses in the
practice of the law" in Massachusetts. I NEW HAVEN GAZETTE & CONN. MAG. 243, 243 (1786).
Austin's essays appeared or were otherwise known about in New Hampshire. See Old Honesty, ESSEX
J., MASS. & N.H. GENERAL ADVERTISER (Newburyport, MA with circulation in NH), Apr. 5, 1786, at
2 (writing in support of Austin's essays against lawyers); see also I THOMAS C. AMORY, LIFE OF
JAMES SULLIVAN 191 (Boston, Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1859) (noting that "spirit of disorder"
provoked by Austin extended into New Hampshire). Finally, Rhode Island papers referenced Austin's
attempts to regulate lawyers. NEWPORT HERALD, Nov. 8, 1787, at 2.
28. Jus, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 22, 1786, at 2.
29. 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 18-19
(1965); Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Dilemma of the American Lawyer in the Post-Revolution Era,
35 NOTRE DAME LAW. 48, 53-56 (1959) [hereinafter Chroust, Dilemma]. See generally BLOOMFIELD,
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 32-58 (1976).
30. Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 60-62. For a close analysis of de-professionalization in
New Hampshire, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGITIMATING THE LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
7
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legal knowledge seemed the best reason to bar a man from serving in
public office.' Many states would ultimately pass acts prohibiting lawyers
from citing to the common law.3 2 Members of the New Hampshire
judiciary took particularly revealing positions. John Dudley, a yeoman
farmer appointed in 1785 to serve on New Hampshire's high court,
apparently instructed his juries to disregard not only "the lawyers, the
rascals," but also the law: "It is our business to do justice between the
parties, not by any quirks of the law out of Coke or Blackstone, books that
I never read, and never will, but by common sense and common honesty
as between man and man." 33
Shays's Rebellion broke out in Massachusetts but weeks after Austin
concluded his essay series and in the rash of extralegal conventions, town
meetings, and courthouse blockades that ensued in Western Massachusetts
the rebels seem to have made Honestus their muse.34 A contemporaneous
newspaper report purporting to have "penetrated" the "minds of the
insurgents" and appropriately entitled "The Spirit of the Times" quoted one
leading Shaysite's mission statement: "The great men are going to get all
we have, and I think it is time for us to rise and put a stop to it, and have
no more courts, nor sheriffs, nor collectors nor lawyers!"3 ' Austin's
opponents-and many emerged-did not hesitate to conclude that
Austin's diatribes had occasioned the uprisings." Indeed, having closely
followed the controversy for many months, the up-and-coming Bay State
lawyer John Quincy Adams became convinced that Austin and his
followers had "kindle[d] a flame which will subsist long after they are
COMPETENCY [N EARLY NATIONAL NEw HAMPSHIRE 19-39 (2012).
31. Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 60-62.
32. RICHARD ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 115 (1971); WARREN, supra note 24, at 232-36;
David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417,
1426-27 (2006). Some examples include: Act of Mar. 19, 1810, ch. 98, 1810 Pa. Acts 136 (repealed
1836); Act of Feb. 12, 1808, ch. 7, 1808 Ky. Acts 23; Act of June 13, 1799, ch. 821, § 5, 1799 N.J.
Acts 608, 609 (New Jersey law prohibiting treatment of any post-independence English law or
precedent "as law or evidence of the law, or elucidation or explanation thereof').
33. WILLIAM PLUMER, LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 153-54 (Boston, Phillips, Sampson & Co.
1856). The state-level trend of appointing unlearned judges continued well into the nineteenth century.
Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 61. Samuel Livermore, who became New Hampshire's chief
justice in 1782, similarly "attached no importance to precedents, and to quote any would invite his
anger." Charles Corning, The Highest Courts of Law in New Hampshire-Colonial, Provincial and
State, 2 GREEN BAG 469, 470 (1890). Livermore possessed "no law learning himself' and refused "to
be pestered with it . . . . [L]aw books were laughed out of court." JEREMIAH MASON, MEMOIR,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JEREMIAH MASON 28 (1917). Crevecoeur also joined in
the chorus of dissent against the lawyers. CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 196-
97 (Fox, Duffield & Co. 1904) (1782) ("What a pity that our forefathers, who happily extinguished so
many fatal customs, and expunged from their new government so many errors and abuses, both
religious and civil, did not also prevent the introduction of a set of men so dangerous!").
34. Braintree town residents issued their widely publicized petition to "crush or at least put a
proper check or restraint" on lawyers in the middle of the rebellion, as did at least twelve other towns
and three country conventions. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. The Spirit ofthe Times, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 25, 1786, at 2.
36. See, e.g., OfSatan and Honestus, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 20, 1787, at 4.
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forgotten." Adams saw in Austin's writing not just the work of one man
but a manifesto for a movement, an obstreperous spirit in the air that
threatened to destroy established legal systems in all the states. Austin's
"poison," Adams concluded, "has been so extensively communicated that
its infection will not easily be stopped. A thousand lies in addition to those
published in the papers have been spread all over the country to prejudice
the people against the 'order,' as it has invidiously been called.""
Adams took the matter of Honestus quite seriously. Historians have not
shared his passion for this topic. Treatments of Austin's anti-lawyer
writings have typically confined themselves to short passages, usually
relying on sound bite quotations, within larger studies in legal or political
history. Here and there one finds vague references to post-Revolutionary
egalitarianism, colonial "pre-modern" nostalgia or, more often, economic
aggravators as factors that led Austin to attack lawyers and their laws in
1786. But no historian has closely analyzed Austin's essays (together a
short book) in their proper cultural and jurisprudential contexts, let alone
attempted to assess their larger historical significance. None has explored
the link between Austin and Shays's Rebellion or its implications. None
fully explains why this outspoken Bay State firebrand waged such a
ferocious attack on the Massachusetts justice system in 1786, why so
many rallied behind him, or why many others mobilized to discredit him."
37. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, 1787, 1788: DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS 73-74 (1903). Adams went on to note that, despite the popular agitation against lawyers, the
profession's numbers continued to grow. Id. at 74.
38. Only three articles, each rather short, devote themselves specifically to Austin's 1786 essays.
See Frederic Grant, Jr., Benjamin Austin, Jr. 's Struggle with the Lawyers, 25 BOSTON B.J. 19 (1981)
[hereinafter Grant, Jr., Benjamin Austin, Jr. 's Struggle]; Frederic Grant, Jr., Observations on the
Pernicious Practice of the Law, 68 A.B.A. J. 580 (1982) [hereinafter Grant, Jr., Observations]; Sidney
Kaplan, "Honestus" and the Annihilation of Lawyers, 48 S. ATLANTIC Q. 401 (1949); see also Erwin
C. Surrency, The Pernicious Practice of Law-A Comment, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 241 (1969).
Charles McKirdy's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation includes a substantial discussion of Austin's
writings. McKirdy, supra note 24, at 116-28. Thumbnail discussions of Austin's essays within larger
studies include JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 33-34 (1983); BLOOMFIELD, supra note
29, at 45; 2 CHROUST, supra note 29, at 19-20, 57; CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION
MOVEMENT 12-15 (1981); ELLIS, supra note 32, 113-14; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 94 (1973); GAWALT, supra note 27, at 52; ALAN HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN MIND 451, 599 (1966); HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 148; PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE
MIND IN AMERICA 106 (1965); TOMLINS, supra note 7, at 32; WARREN, supra note 24, at 219, 228;
Anton-Hermann Chroust, American Legal Profession: Its Agony and Ecstasy (1776-1840), 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 487, 489-490 (1970); Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 54-55. For studies that suggest
but do not explore the link between the Austinites and the Shaysites, see NELSON, supra note 4, at 69;
DAVID SZATMARY, SHAYS'S REBELLION 42-43 (1980); Ruth G. Matz, Lawyers and Shays' Rebellion,
21 BOSTON B.J. 5, 7-8 (1977). Studies that conspicuously fail to make any mention of Austin include:
DAVID RAY PAPKE, HERETICS IN THE TEMPLE: AMERICANS WHO REJECT THE NATION'S LEGAL FAITH
(1998); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1993); Robert W.
Gordon, Book Review, 36 VAND. L. REV. 431 (1983) (reviewing CHARLES COOK, THE AMERICAN
CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (1981) and discussing antilegalism in post-Revolutionary America).
Studies which situate Austin in the context of party politics in Massachusetts include RONALD P.
FORMISANO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE: MASSACHUSETTS PARTIES, 1790s-
1840s (1983); PAUL GOODMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICANS OF MASSACHUSETTS (1964). For a
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Austin's essays and the responses they elicited ranged over a wide array
of issues and topics, from attorneys' fees to replevin procedures, from the
English common law to classical political history. Forever abolishing the
legal profession in America stood as one of Austin's central objectives-
one that greatly rankled J.Q. Adams and other gentlemen of the bar. The
profession's asserted monopoly on law and the means of knowing it,
Austin maintained, gave lawyers immense unchecked power that ran afoul
of the far-reaching egalitarian spirit pervading virtually every area of
American life after the Revolution. It also enabled lawyers to auction off
justice to the highest bidder, disadvantaging men of lesser means and
rendering the entire legal system venal. To connect with his audience,
moreover, Austin employed an anti-aristocratic rhetoric peculiar to the
post-Revolutionary milieu but never before applied to the legal profession
to conclude that the swelling "order" of Massachusetts lawyers would, if
not immediately "annihilated," evolve into a full-fledged aristocracy and
destroy the young republic.
This anti-aristocratic ideology and the egalitarian premises on which it
rested imbued nearly every aspect of Austin's scathing critiques. But to go
so far still gets only slightly below the surface of the resounding challenge
that Austin issued to the Massachusetts legal system in 1786. For Austin's
essays registered an opposition not just to the bar's aristocratic character
or the "pernicious practice of the law," not just to maldistributed bills of
cost or aggressive property seizures. Austin and his followers insinuated a
far more subversive threat, one that the Bay State legal elite-including
future governors, federal statesmen, and at least one future president-
immediately detected and, as we shall see, countered with every
intellectual resource they could marshal. To begin, Austin did not clearly
distinguish between the lawyers and the law on which they relied-the
common law. And neither did the lawyers themselves.39 Where the
common law existed so too did lawyers, and vice versa. Austin and his
followers therefore insisted that the common law-that is, the one and
only body of procedural and substantive rules and precedents to which
Bay State judges and lawyers in the 1780s could turn for guidance-
perforce had to be jettisoned along with the profession.40 If implemented,
the proposal would have stripped the Massachusetts justice system of both
professional legal advocacy and doctrinal authority-an unsettling
prospect indeed for the Bay State bench and bar.
But Austin and his partisans seem to have taken the line of argument
biographical sketch of Austin, see I JON L. WAKELYN, BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 10- 12 (2004).
39. See A Lawyer, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 26, 1786, at 1.
40. See, e.g., Cousin German to Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1786, at 2 ("The common
laws ... together with the lawyers, must be annihilated.").
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even one step further. Listen: "Legal impositions are the worst species of
tyranny," Austin wrote-the italics his. "Every act which is passed, so far
from relieving the people, serves only as a link in the grand chain of
TYRANNY."41 Austin here appears to have equated law with tyranny
without qualification. Or again: "It is really preferable to be in confusion
for want of law, than to be ruined with law."42 Consider the words of
"Cousin German" writing in support of Austin on March 30, 1786:
To be revenged on those Philistines the lawyers, by their utter
destruction, let us put our shoulders to the great fabric of the law,
on which they are supported, and lay it in ruins .... If, like that
strong man upon record, we should perish with them, we shall
perish in triumph!43
Much to the lawyers' consternation, Honestus and his disciples had trained
their sights on points beyond the legal profession or the common law.
They had commenced a revolution against law itself."
The idea of dispensing with law altogether may seem rather foolhardy to
modem sensibilities.45 But before dismissing the notion as hopelessly
radical, rash, or reactionary-as Austin's opponents did-we must do our
best to understand it seriously and sympathetically in its own time.4 6
Contemporaries could not have viewed Austin's hatred toward lawyers as
entirely unprecedented in New England. 47 The Puritans originally banned
lawyers, as did the Quakers. 48  The seventeenth-century antinomian
controversy arose out of a deep-seated crisis over the legitimacy of law,
41. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
42. Id.
43. Cousin German to Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1786, at 2. The reference is to the story
of Samson and the Philistines in the Hebrew Bible, Book of Judges, Books 13-16.
44. See GAWALT, supra note 27, at 63 (observing "it was the system of law rather than individual
lawyers that aroused animosity"); see also Letter from Christopher Gore to Rufus King (June 25,
1786), in I LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 138 (Charles King ed., New York, G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1894) ("[A]cts against lawyers, or more truly against law, now occupy the time of the
H. of Reps.") (emphasis added).
45. One leading legal historian, for example, condescendingly characterizes Austin and his
followers as "[t]he less thoughtful reformers." NELSON, supra 4, at 69, 71; see also HATCH,supra note
27, at 28 (referring to Austin's essays as "hopelessly naive").
46. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 437.
47. Id at 436-41; AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 19-46. In England during the Civil Wars and
Commonwealth period (1640-1660), a number of radical law reform movements sprouted up, some on
highly antilegalistic platforms, but all disappeared rather rapidly after the Restoration. See STUART E.
PRALL, THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1640-1660 (1966);
DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM, 1640-1660 (1970); THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); see also G.B. Warden, Law and Law Reform in
England and New England, 1620 to 1660, 35 WM. & MARY Q. 668 (3d ser. 1978). For a fascinating
discussion of antilegalism in seventeenth-century England prior to the Restoration, as evidenced in
ballads, songs, and other forms of popular literature, see CHRISTOPHER HILL, LIBERTY AGAINST THE
LAW (1996).
48. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 39 (William H. Whitmore ed., Boston, Order of
the City Council of Boston 1889); 2 THOMAS CLARKSON, A PORTRAITURE OF QUAKERISM 79-80
(London, Longman, Hurst, Rees & Orme 1806).
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human or divine, in Puritan New England.49 New Light ministers during
the Great Awakening detested lawsuits and lawyers. Edwards, Whitfield,
and Bellamy preached that law and Christian religion operated at "cross-
purposes" and that all law would ultimately wither away in the Work of
Redemption.5 o The wide discretion afforded to colonial juries to determine
whether to follow applicable law in a given case represented one of the
most powerful institutional expressions of popular antilegalism in colonial
North America.
The documentary evidence of antilegalism as an intellectual
phenomenon in colonial North America, however, exists in fragments
only.52 Its colonial expressions remain largely inarticulate. One might
argue, therefore, that Austin's writings boast special significance in the
first instance as the first fully developed articulation of this peculiar
dissenting tradition to appear in American history. Actually this would
greatly undersell Austin's larger historical significance, for he and his
partisans did much more than instantiate an existing tradition. They
invented a new one. Austin's critique of the law in 1786 acquired its
distinguishing conceptual features not from colonial practices or beliefs, or
from revivalistic theology, but from the transformative ideological
currents born out of the revolutionary experience-from the nativistic
rejection of the English legal heritage, revolutionary republicanism's ideal
of self-rule, from an across-the-board resistance to established authority
figures and an egalitarian spirit that seemed to know no limits.53 The
49. See generally MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, MAKING HERETICS (2002); THE ANTINOMIAN
CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (David D. Hall ed., 2d ed. 1990). For a
discussion of antinomianism in seventeenth-century England, see HILL, supra note 47, at 214-28. By
the time of the Stamp Act crisis, Virginia had developed its own peculiar brand of antilegalism. There
certain landed aristocrats (the "gentlemen freeholders") opposed the professional lawyer elite based in
Richmond. See A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS 147 (1981).
Waves of itinerant evangelical preachers from the north, who challenged both the lawyers and the
planter gentry alike, created an additional layer of cultural complexity in the Old Dominion at mid-
century. See RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790 (1982). During the same
period, North Carolina regulators staged rebellions against the carpetbagger attorney elite in the
western towns. See James Whittenburg, Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers: Social Change and the
Origins ofthe North Carolina Regulation, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 215, 231-37 (3d ser. 1977).
50. HEIMERT, supra note 38, atl80-82. The ministers' hostility to lawyers, however, arose out of
the fear that lawyers might soon surpass them as authority figures within American society.
51. The historiographical tendency has been to put colonial and revolutionary juries-along with
mobs and crowds-into a legal cast. See KRAMER, supra note 16; Reid, In a Defensive Rage, supra
note 16. For another perspective, we might listen to the seventeenth-century English judge presiding
over Leveller John Lilburne's treason trial. When Lilbume asserted at trial that the jury had the right to
determine law as well as fact, Judge Jermin declared that permitting such discretion to the jury would
"destroy all the law of the land; there was never such a damnable heresy broached in this nation
before." 4 COBBETr'S STATE TRIALS 1381 (London, R. Bagshaw, 1809) (emphasis added). For a study
that finds Connecticut juries losing law-finding power in debt cases well before the Revolution, see
BRUCE MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987).
52. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 19-46; HEIMERT, supra note 38, at 179-82.
Fragmentary expressions of early Quaker antilegalism may be found in 2 CLARKSON, supra note 48, at
79-81.
53. See BLOOMFIELD, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that, to many post-Revolutionary Americans,
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Critical Period's revolution against the law all but shed the theological
frame that marked earlier anti-lawyer critiques.54 As one historian has
revealingly put it, Austin's attack on law and lawyers rested on "a literal
application of the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence."" Thus,
while Austin may have taken positions that echoed those of his colonial
predecessors, he did so based on entirely new and different rationales.
Over and above his critique of the Massachusetts justice system,
moreover, Austin set out an affirmative alternative vision reflecting
important post-Revolutionary changes in American legal culture that
historians focused on institutional source materials have overlooked.
Lawyers have historically not fared very well in revolutions. 6 The
American experience represents a partial exception to this rule-at least in
the early stages. The revolutionary revolt against lawyers came late in the
day on American shores. As part of a process historians have called
"Anglicization" that touched all aspects of colonial society and culture, the
colonial bar developed strong attachments to English law and legal culture
over the course of the eighteenth century.57  At mid-century, an
"lawyers seemed a counterrevolutionary force, blocking the emergence of a truly free republic");
HATCH, supra note 27, at 28 (observing that Austin's radical reform efforts reflect "a moment of
historical optimism, a time when many in politics, law, and religion, flushed with the promise of the
American Revolution, found it reasonable to take literally the meaning of novus ordo seclorum and to
declare a decisive expatriation from the past"); POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 7
(1938) (noting anti-English nativism in post-Revolutionary society, including "hostility to English law
simply because it was English"). For an analysis of these and other ideological ramifications of the
Revolutionary experience, see WOOD, supra note 38, at 229-41. The seminal study on Revolutionary
republican ideology is BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967). See also STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
RADICALISM (1968); J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 4043, 270 (1985) (contrasting
republican and "juristic" modes of eighteenth-century Anglo-American political thought).
54. Nathan Hatch correctly suggests that Austin's reform efforts, rather than embodying or
extending dissenting religious currents from the colonial era, evidenced an anti-authoritarianism
directly related to the American Revolution that provides important background for understanding
subsequent religious transformations. HATCH, supra note 27, at 24-30. For a recent essay suggesting
that Christian antinomianism explains the debates surrounding adoption of the common law in post-
Revolutionary America, see Jay Michaelson, Hating the Law for Christian Reasons: The Religious
Roots of American Antinomianism (Sept. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-2150722. For a study that attempts to split the difference, treating the
"religious dimension of the American revolution" as critical to fully explaining "the intense moral
antipathy" which post-Revolutionary radicals had for the legal profession, see ELLIS, supra note 32, at
253-56 (relying primarily on HEIMERT, supra note 38).
55. ELLIS, supra note 32, at 113 (emphasis added).
56. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN
LAW 19, 293 n.6, 293 n.7 (2007); see also DAVID BELL, LAWYERS AND CITIZENS: THE MAKING OF A
POLITICAL ELITE IN OLD REGIME FRANCE (1994); EUGENE HUSKEY, RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE
SOVIET STATE 33-79 (1986).
57. John Murrin, The Legal Transformation of Bench and Bar in Early Massachusetts, in
COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 540 (Stanley Katz & John
Murrin eds., 3d ed. 1983). For an analysis of Anglicization within colonial material culture, see
BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THE KING'S THREE FACES 146-52 (2006). For analyses of Anglicization in
individual states, see MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004) (Rhode
Island); RICHARD BUSHMAN, KING AND PEOPLE IN PROVINCIAL MASSACHUSETTS (1985)
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increasingly formalistic legal consciousness accompanied this Anglicizing
trend. And yet no sooner had the lawyers finally built a professional
identity on English foundations than an emotionally charged resistance
movement against the mother country began to take shape. By every
appearance, this seemed a recipe for professional disaster. But in fact it
became a professional boon. In a "remarkable shift toward Whiggery," a
number of younger practitioners-Otis and Adams in Boston, the
"Triumvirate" in New York, Dickinson and Wilson in Philadelphia,
Jefferson in Virginia, Dulany in Maryland-successfully assumed
intellectual leadership of the resistance movement and thereafter the
American Revolution, giving the profession a power and prestige never
previously enjoyed.59 The move, however, involved American lawyers in
a number of practical difficulties after independence had finally been won.
As a natural extension of the lawyers' own arguments during the
Revolution, post-Revolutionary Americans began to associate all things
English, including English law, with the perceived vice, tyranny, and
corruption of the Old World."o And yet after Yorktown, as the confetti
settled and the lawyers set about to make a living representing private
clients or legislating, most found they had nowhere else to turn but the
common law." And so in a nation whose independence had predicated
itself on a rejection of English law, accomplished by men who in a
(Massachusetts); MANN, supra note 51, at 93-100 (Connecticut); Eben Moglen, Settling the Law:
Legal Development in New York, 1664-1776 (May 1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale
University) (on file with Yale University); John M. Murrin, Anglicizing an American Colony: The
Transformation of Provincial Massachusetts (Apr. 1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University) (on file with Yale University).
58. See MANN, supra note 51; see also POUND, supra note 53, at 6 (noting that on the eve of the
Revolution American law had become "heavily burdened with the formalism of the strict law").
59. Murrin, supra note 57, at 565, 566; see also DOROTHY RITA DILLON, THE NEW YORK
TRIUMVIRATE (1949); ROEBER, supra note 49, at 159. Despite the bar's political leadership during the
Revolution, tensions did persist, particularly among the ministers. In his famous address to the Yale
graduating class only a few days after American lawyers issued the Declaration of Independence,
Timothy Dwight warned those graduates considering the legal profession of "[tihat meanness, that
infernal knavery, which multiplies needless litigations, which retards the operation of justice, which
from court to court, upon the most trifling pretenses, postpones trial, to glean the last emptyings of a
client's pocket, for unjust fees of everlasting attendance, which artfully twists the meaning of law to
the side we espouse." Extract from a Valedictory Address to the Young Gentlemen Who Commenced
Bachelors ofArts, at Yale College, July 25, 1776, 2 LAW. SCRAP BOOK 141, 142 (1909).
60. Perry Miller, Introduction, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 17 (Perry Miller ed., 1962).
During the 1760s, lawyer-pamphleteers invoked the English constitution and even English case law to
oppose the repugnant legislation flowing out of London. See, e.g., John Dickinson, Letters from a
Farmer, in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies (1768), in I THE WRITINGS OF
JOHN DICKINSON 277-406 (Paul L. Ford ed., Philadelphia, Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1895).
Thomas Paine's Common Sense (1776) rejected even the English constitution, which the Declaration
of Independence arguably confirmed and codified. See I THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE
3-46 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). But see John
Phillip Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE
REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 46, 88 (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981) (arguing that the Declaration of
Independence rested not on abstract natural law but "peculiarly English constitutional dogmas").
61. Miller, supra note 60, at 17 ("The lawyers could hardly conduct a suit without appealing to
the Common Law ... but in the very act laid themselves open to the charge of subversion.").
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previous life had imported English legal culture into the colonies, post-
Revolutionary lawyers proceeded to insinuate English law and legal
culture back into the American system.6 2
In many respects, public-minded Revolutionary-era lawyers helped
articulate an ideological framework that would provide republican radicals
like Benjamin Austin with intellectual ammunition to wage their attacks
on private-minded post-Revolutionary lawyers.6 ' Even so, Austin's
writings heralded an important shift in both popular and professional
orientations toward the law after the Revolution-from an Anglicized
common law paradigm based on formal rules and precedents understood
and applied exclusively by lawyers and judges, to an Americanized
humanistic paradigm or, as Austin put it, a justice system "of OUR OWN,
dictated by genuine principles of Republicanism, and made easy to be
understood by every individual in the community."64 Austin envisioned
extricating the justice system from the formalistic murk of prolix treatises,
writ forms, statutes, and common law case reports that only professional
aristocrats could understand, and reconnecting it to (i) the layman's moral
sense of right and wrong, and (ii) community-specific customs and usages.
Common conscience, level with ordinary understanding, would serve as
the system's monistic base, while diverse customs and usages, applicable
to particular communities (including transatlantic ones), would make up
its dynamic pluralistic superstructure. Neither base nor superstructure
required the assistance of intellectual elites and each rested on lived
human experiences rather than Blackstonian formalities. Lay juries and
community "referees" conversant with the specific subject matter in
question remained best qualified to discern, articulate, and apply these
norms. If parts of this alternative vision recalled practices from the pre-
Anglicized colonial past, Austin's influential writings gave post-
Revolutionary reformers a new forward-looking republican vocabulary
with which to understand and justify those practices against the perceived
threat posed by a professional aristocracy committed to a hostile
paradigm.65
Viewed from one angle, it appears that Austin and his followers did not
enjoy substantial practical success with respect to these proposed reforms.
The Bay State legal profession soldiered on, the common law retained its
authority in many courts, and informal lay-administered arbitrations would
62. Richard B. Morris, Legalism Versus Revolutionary Doctrine in New England, 4 NEw ENG. Q.
195, 195 (1931).
63. Commenting on Shays's Rebellion on March 1, 1787, Dedham-based lawyer and future U.S.
congressman Fisher Ames revealingly observed: "The people have turned against their teachers the
doctrines, which were inculcated in order to effect the late revolution." I WORKS OF FISHER AMES 8,
11 (Boston, T.B. Wait & Co. 1809).
64. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
65. See infra Part IV and Section V.A.
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never supplant adversarial litigation conducted by a professional bench
and bar as Austin had hoped.66 And yet the clear link between the
Austinites and the Shaysites does gesture at the former's larger
significance in at least one respect: The Austinites' revolution against the
law in 1786 helped provoke the movement for a new constitution in late-
1786 and 1787 and thereby served as one key link in the chain of events
leading to the nation's constitutional founding. Indeed, this Article will
contend that understanding Austin and the spirit of the times for which he
spoke explains the motivations behind the movement to frame a new
Constitution, as well as the constitutional framework thereafter created, in
ways that previous historians have overlooked. 67 In linking the Austinites
to the Shaysites, however, we must exercise some caution, for the
prevailing explanations for Shays's Rebellion point to class-based
economic stresses, and historians interested in the topic have applied a
similar materialistic model in explaining the intensified hostilities toward
lawyers that preceded the rebellion.68 Close analysis of Austin's writings
and the responses they provoked suggest that ideological transformations
rather than economic or class interests best explain the Massachusetts
uprising. By the same token, the fighting opposition to Honestus recorded
by prominent members of the Bay State legal elite in 1786 did not arise
out of professional self-interest alone. As we shall see, members of the
Massachusetts legal profession had mapped out a constitutional ideology
that made lawyers critically necessary for the preservation of a republican
form of government. All considered Austin not merely a pesky gadfly but
a fearsome ideological threat going to the heart of the republican
experiment.
But if the Austinites' revolution against law itself did help spur the
movement for a new Constitution in 1787, did the ideas they articulated
survive the counterattack? Or did Publius's new constitutional regime
ultimately render the Austinites intellectually inert curiosities with little if
any enduring historical significance? The new Constitution does create the
66. Reformers' attempts strictly to regulate lawyers' fees ended in failure in 1787. See
BLOOMFIELD, supra note 29, at 55-56. Charles McKirdy suggests that Austin's anti-lawyer tracts gave
the Bay State legal profession a "solidarity" that it did not have before the attacks. Shays's Rebellion
and especially the Federal Constitution "reinforce[d] professional ties." McKirdy, supra note 24, at
182.
67. See infra Section V.B.
68. For the traditional class-based explanation of Shays's Rebellion that views it as a conflict
between eastern creditors and western farmer-debtors, see SZATMARY, supra note 38. Leonard
Richards's less convincing revisionist study replaces eastern creditors with government bondholders
(many legislators themselves) lobbying for higher taxes, and finds rebels emerging from a broader
cross-section of society. Richards's study continues, however, to make economic harm-here in the
form of higher taxes-the primary motivation for the rebellion. LEONARD RICHARDS, SHAYS'S
REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION'S FINAL BATILE (2002). See generally CHARLES BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). For similar
explanations of anti-lawyer sentiment, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 94; Chroust, Dilemma, supra
note 29, at 58; McKirdy, supra note 24, at 138-41.
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impression of law and order emerging triumphant after 1787. Drafted
primarily by lawyers, the document has at critical points a distinctly
legalistic timbre, purporting to "establish Justice" and "insure domestic
Tranquility" by way of laws administered by men "of the learned
profession" and operating, if not "independent of the society itself," then
certainly far removed from the "people themselves."69 One can plausibly
describe American legal history after ratification in a manner that
emphasizes the progressive expansion of law, lawyers, and legalism
throughout American society.70 Once supreme arbiters of law and fact
with discretion to render verdicts "in Direct opposition to the Direction of
the Court, "71 juries increasingly found themselves confined by legal
formality to resolving factual issues only. 72 Legal professionals-lawyers,
judges, and legislators-grew in power and tightened their hold on legal
institutions, legal literature flourished, and, in the end, a persistent
formalism that American law has never since shaken triumphed over any
countervailing "instrumental" currents that may have surfaced during the
antebellum period.7' The crystallization of Classical Legal Thought in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century and extending into the twentieth,
appropriately completes the progressive, legalizing narrative that marks
the historiography in this area. By the turn of the twentieth century, the
"rule of law"-famously appraised by E.P. Thompson as an "unqualified
human good" 74-- had achieved a virtually unassailable predominance
within American legal culture.
This tidy narrative, however, must negotiate with some considerable
contrary tendencies. The radical Jacksonian codifiers come to mind, as
does the image of William Lloyd Garrison burning the United States
Constitution, having adjudged it a "Covenant with Death, an Agreement
with Hell!"76 Historians now recognize, moreover, that a number of
69. U.S. CONST., pmbl.; THE FEDERALIST No. 61 at 122, No. 35 at 234, No. 51 at 322 (Kramnick
ed., 1987); see also ROBERT FERGUSON, READING THE EARLY REPUBLIC 75-76 (2004).
70. For influential works that lend support to this legalizing narrative, see FRIEDMAN, supra note
38; NELSON, supra note 4; TOMLINS, supra note 7; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (1998); Morton Horwitz, The Rise ofLegal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 251 (1975). For works that articulate a similar legalizing narrative in the colonial period, see
DAVID KONIG, LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS (1979); MANN, supra note 51;
Murrin, supra note 57.
71. LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 229-230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). The
exceptional faith afforded to colonial juries arose out of a commitment to native common sense, a
strong streak of localism, and lack of any direct representation in Parliament. See generally SHANNON
STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE
JOHN MARSHALL (1990); David Millon, Juries, Judges and Democracy, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135,
142-43 (1993) (reviewing SHANNON STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW (1990)).
72. See generally NELSON, supra note 4.
73. See Horwitz, supra note 70.
74. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975).
75. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
76. See COOK, supra note 38; PAPKE, supra note 38, at 24-50.
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dissenting groups in the years after 1787 (including both "plebeian" and
"middling" Antifederalists, and radical Jeffersonian Republicans) whose
historical significance scholars had previously discounted, in fact exerted
substantial political and intellectual influence in the early national and
antebellum periods.77 Finding inspiration in this historiographical turn, this
Article will contend that Austin and the popular movement for which he
spoke did not simply expire by the wayside of Madison's constitutional
juggernaut, nor did it quickly yield to legalism's slithering expansion
across the institutional landscape in the nineteenth century. To the
contrary, Austin's powerful critique points to a defining dimension of
post-Revolutionary legal culture whose influence on American attitudes
toward the law would extend straight through to the Civil War.
Our investigation of Austin and the spirit of '86 in the coming pages
will shed important light on the intellectual origins of Antifederalist
thought. 8 Indeed, Austin himself became an influential opponent of the
Constitution in Massachusetts and his writings in this regard drew on
principles articulated in his anti-lawyer essays. And just as the
Antifederalists laid the intellectual groundwork for a "dissenting tradition"
that would continue to play an important role in American public life in
the decades after ratification, 9 so too did the Austinites. Apparently by
popular demand Austin republished his 1786 essays in 1819, noting in his
prefatory remarks that since their original publication the essays had
"retained a peculiar celebrity" through the years.o No wonder.
Unmistakable intellectual affinities linked the Austinites to the radical
Jeffersonian law reform movements that shaped state and, ultimately,
federal politics in the 1790s and 1800s.si One historian finds that Austin's
1786 attack on lawyers and their laws paved the way for the eventual
abolition of common law pleading in Massachusetts.8 2
Further evidence of the spirit of '86's intellectual consequences in
American life after ratification lay, surprisingly enough, in the post-
Revolutionary professional elite's incorporation of antilegalistic ideals
77. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999); ELLIS, supra note 32; MILLER, supra note 38, bk. 11.
78. See infra Section V.B.
79. See CORNELL, supra note 77.
80. See Surrency, supra note 38, at 245.
8 1. See ELLIS, supra note 32 (analyzing radical law reform in Massachusetts, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania).
82. NELSON, supra note 4, at 72. After ratification, John Gardiner would go on to introduce major
law reform legislation in Massachusetts, parts of which resonated with Austin's proposals. GAWALT,
supra note 27, at 83; McKirdy, supra note 24, at 189-92. Nineteenth-century Bay State lawyers
acknowledged that Austin's critiques became "probably instrumental in introducing simple and
economical methods of procedure into the practice of law in Massachusetts, which have served as an
example to other states." I AMORY, supra note 27, at 189. For other reform successes in the
Jeffersonian period, see ELLIS, supra note 32, at 155-56, 183, 229 (describing reformers'
achievements in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts).
[Vol. 25:271288
18
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol25/iss2/3
Knapp
into their reflections on American law and jurisprudence. As laid out in
the last two Sections of Part V, early national gentlemen jurisprudents,
Jacksonian codifiers, establishmentarian antebellum legal writers, and
corporate lawyers all came partially to co-opt and domesticate parts of the
subversive ideology to which Austin had originally given such forceful
expression in 1786. The burgeoning legal system and its professional
lawyer class could survive the American revolution against the law only
by substantially assimilating the rebels' critiques."
Probably the most powerful antebellum expressions of antilegalism
traceable to the spirit of '86, however, came from radical Jacksonian
democrats, reformers, and philosophers outside the legal profession.84
Animated by an unbounded egalitarian commitment to the sovereignty and
perfectibility of the individual, widely read Jacksonian writings
demonstrate irrefutably that the idea of dispensing with law itself, which
defined the spirit of '86, remained a live intellectual option in American
life well into the late antebellum period. The availability of this option,
moreover, may help to explain antebellum Americans' increasing
willingness to consider dispensing with the law that, by some accounts,
made all others possible, the most fundamental law of all: the law of
union.
II. TALE OF A BOSTON WHIG
Benjamin Austin, Jr. was born in Boston on November 18, 1752, in the
revolutionary generation's final brood. Austin's father enjoyed notable
success as a merchant and provincial councilor." The senior Austin
befriended Samuel Adams in the 1760s and Benjamin Jr. apparently found
himself rubbing elbows with Boston radicals from a very young age. 7
After completing his courses at Boston Latin School, Austin chose not to
go on to college, instead joining his father's business. Local political
issues, however, beckoned him shortly thereafter. In 1779, the Boston
town meeting elected him clerk of the market in which capacity Austin
superintended the public market and probably arbitrated related disputes.
In one historian's estimation, Austin ultimately became "perhaps the most
important political force behind mechanic protectionism" in the post-
83. See infra Sections V.D, V.E.I.
84. See infra Section V.E.2.
85. No collection of Austin's papers exists, and he has received very little biographical attention
from historians. The lion's share of his published writings are either specifically cited or referenced
herein. The author is in the process of finding and compiling unpublished materials for publication in a
single volume. Unless otherwise noted, the general biographical information set out in this Part comes
from I WAKELYN, supra note 38, at 10-12, and Edward W. Hanson, Benjamin Austin, AMERICAN
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, http://www.anb.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
86. 1 AMORY, supra note 27, at 188.
87. 4 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, 1778-1802, at 132-33 (Harry A. Cushing ed., 1908).
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Revolutionary period." In this connection, however, Austin stood opposed
to the "bulk of Boston's mechanics," who would eventually affiliate with
the Federalist Party.89
Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, Austin displayed a certain
"fearlessness in assailing whatever was opposed to his particular views of
public policy." 90 He went on to serve in the state senate in 1787, from
1789 to 1794, and again in 1796. He vociferously opposed ratification of
the Constitution, and affiliated with the Jeffersonians in the 1790s and
1800s, first moving among the more radicalized contingent then,
following Jefferson himself, apparently moderating his views. Under the
name "Old South," Austin criticized the Federalist party in a number of
newspaper essays later compiled in a pamphlet entitled Constitutional
Republicanism in Opposition to Fallacious Federalism.9' He continued
publishing essays in the Boston papers on a variety of political issues well
into his sixties, his assertive and piquant style never failing to stir up
hornets' nests. 92 No one stood "more universally and more deeply
despised [by the Federalists] than Austin." 93
Although he published a great deal more during his lifetime, Austin's
historical legacy rests mainly on the thirteen essays he published between
March 9 and June 22, 1786 in the Boston Independent Chronicle, which
he collectively titled "Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the
Law."94 Historians who mention Austin usually reference these essays, but
88. LAWRENCE PESKIN, MANUFACTURING REVOLUTION: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF EARLY
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 86 (2003).
89. Id. For the brief correspondence between Austin and Thomas Jefferson on the issue of
protectionism (one letter each), see NATIONAL UTILITY, IN OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL CONTROVERSY:
ADDRESSED TO THE FRIENDS OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES (Boston, Rowe & Hooper 1816).
90. 1 AMORY, supra note 27, at 188.
91. BENJAMIN AUSTIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM, IN OPPOSITION TO FALLACIOUS
FEDERALISM (Boston, Printed for Adams & Rhoades 1803). During this period, Austin advocated "a
full range of reforms, from rotation of offices to expunging the national debt" and "himself benefited
from the concept of rotation of offices when President Jefferson appointed him commissioner of loans
for Boston in 1803." Hanson, supra note 85.
92. Austin came to have increasing influence over the editorial decisions at Independent
Chronicle, Boston's only republican newspaper, as the early national period proceeded. While Thomas
and Abijah Adams served as the Chronicle's main proprietors, Austin would ultimately become the
Chronicle's "chief writer and financial benefactor." JEFFREY L. PASLEY, "THE TYRANNY OF
PRINTERS": NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 108 (2003); see also id. at 217.
93. Letter from Christopher Gore to Rufus King (Mar. 26, 1806), in 4 LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 511 (Charles King ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1897).
During the first decade of the nineteenth century, Austin's mouth almighty drew him into some
explosive controversies with tragic outcomes. In 1806, he became embroiled in a conflict with the
Federalist Thomas Selfridge, after calling Selfridge a "damned Federalist lawyer" in the papers.
Selfridge rejoined with verbal retaliations and, in response, Austin's eighteen-year old son Charles,
defending his father's honor, caned Selfridge one day on State Street. Whereupon Selfridge pulled out
a pistol and shot the younger Austin dead, producing great controversy and a highly publicized trial. A
jury acquitted Selfridge at trial, which presumably did nothing to improve Austin's view of the
Massachusetts justice system. See TRIAL OF THOMAS 0. SELFRIDGE, ATTORNEY AT LAW (Boston,
Russell & Cutler 1807).
94. Shortly after Austin published his last essay installment, the Independent Chronicle printers
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two factors have led to misunderstandings of them. First, a number of
historians have relied on a "corrected and amended" version of the essays
published in 1819, compiled and edited by Austin over thirty years after
the event itself.95 In this edited release, Austin not only softened his
rhetoric, but also deleted entire paragraphs and discussions, many quite
revealing.96 To truly capture the thrust and significance of Austin's
arguments, we must return to the original sources that so many
professional historians have managed to overlook: the newspapers
themselves. The peculiar stylizations liberally employed in these original
prints-primarily italics and capital letters-conveyed important emphasis
and meaning, and will therefore be retained here.
Second, historians have almost invariably treated Austin's writings as
monological pronouncements when, in fact, they operated within a larger
debate in the Boston public sphere.97 Austin's critique of law and lawyers
in 1786 proved remarkably controversial, provoking strong editorial
responses on all sides of the issue. The record reveals a number of colorful
pseudonymous characters and diverse viewpoints popping up in the
Independent Chronicle, The Massachusetts Centinel, and other Boston-
area papers, opposing, championing, or otherwise commenting on
Honestus's writings. We cannot understand the importance of Austin's
writings or why he wrote what he did without also understanding the
larger context within which he operated, including to whom and to what
claims his arguments responded. Not surprisingly, Austin's primary
antagonists in these newspaper debates made the law their vocation. Those
debates therefore reveal as much about post-Revolutionary Bay State
lawyers as they do about the popular revolution against them. Neither can
be properly understood, however, without first becoming familiar with the
Massachusetts bar's professional evolution over the course of the
eighteenth century.
collected and reprinted the essays in pamphlet form with no noticeable changes. See HONESTUS,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW: As PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston, Adams & Nourse 1786).
95. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 152 n.24; ELLIS, supra note 32, at 350; HORWITZ,
supra note 5, at 317-18; WARREN, supra note 24, at 219 nI. The revised essays are reprinted in
Surrency, supra note 38.
96. For example, he omitted paragraphs excoriating the lawyers' use of replevin procedures to the
detriment of "honest" creditors, and a controversial discussion of a bill of costs that he reproduced in
his June 1, 1786 essay in the Independent Chronicle. Compare, e.g., Surrency, supra note 38, at 249-
52, 292-96, with Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2, and Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., June 1,
1786, at 2.
97. One exception is Charles McKirdy's Ph.D. dissertation, which analyzes many of the lawyers'
responses to Austin. McKirdy, supra note 24, at 157-87. McKirdy, however, does not analyze the
writings of Austin's supporters. Other exceptions are Fredric Grant's short but excellent articles. See
Grant, Jr., Benjamin Austin, Jr.'s Struggle, supra note 38; Grant, Jr., Observations, supra note 38.
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III. MASSACHUSETTS LAWYERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Fewer than a hundred lawyers existed in Massachusetts at the time
Austin lodged his attacks in 1786. That these practitioners wielded legal
power incommensurate with their numbers seems clear enough. Any
power that the profession had acquired, however, had come out of a long
historical struggle dating back to the founding of Massachusetts Bay. The
Puritans had so distrusted lawyers that the General Court initially banned
them entirely." The brief reigns of Dudley and Andros resulted in
qualified acceptance of lawyers under the new charter, but in 1701, in an
act testifying to the persistence of the old Puritan hostilities, the General
Court expressly permitted litigants to represent themselves and to seek the
assistance of non-lawyers. It also set an uncomfortably low cap on
attorneys' fees.99
Against such headwinds, the profession could only grow slowly and
haltingly in the early eighteenth century. The low fee cap sent the best-
trained men looking for other sources of income, leaving the day-to-day
practice to the pettifoggers. By 1730, however, a number of new arrivals,
all London-trained barristers, began quickly ascending through the
provincial ranks to royal officialdom. Their examples demonstrated that,
notwithstanding the low fees, the "conscientious practice of law" could
serve as a stepping-stone to royal favor.' 00 Patronage gave the profession a
sense of dignity and public respect it had never before experienced, which
in turn attracted many more practitioners into its folds. An extraordinary
process of Anglicization ensued.'o' By mid-century, helped along by the
conferral of titles and positions, Suffolk County lawyers had attained a
strong enough sense of professional identity to begin a concerted
campaign of excluding those men they deemed unqualified or unworthy
from representative participation in court proceedings. The Suffolk
County Bar Association, created in 1758, implemented more rigorous
admission and apprenticeship requirements. Many running within the
nascent legal elite agreed not to participate in any cases brought by non-
lawyers.' 02
Anglicization became more conspicuous after mid-century. The
profession, for example, began formally distinguishing between
"barristers" and "attorneys," along the lines established in England. The
new Chief Justice of the state's high court, Thomas Hutchinson, faced
98. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 48, at 39.
99. 1 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY, 1691-1780, at 467 (Boston, Wright & Potter 1869) [hereinafter MASS. ACTS AND RESOLVES].
100. Murrin, supra note 57, at 550.
101. Id. at 550-67. Historians employ the term "Anglicization" to refer to the importation of
English culture and ideas into the North American colonies. See supra note 57.
102. GAWALT, supra note 27, at 13.
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with a bar divided over his controversial appointment, decided in 1762 to
curry favor by "cloak[ing] the entire profession in exterior dignity ...
requiring distinct gowns for judges, barristers, and attorneys."o 3 By all
accounts, the lawyers lapped it up and, on the eve of the Stamp Act crisis,
we find a bar in Massachusetts composed primarily of Tories (with a few
"regime Whigs" 0 4) donning wigs and gowns, captivated by English
common law formalities, writ procedures, manners, and cultural
distinctions. And yet from the very first moments of the resistance
movement, many in the younger brood began nimbly moving into
positions of intellectual and political leadership.'0o The Stamp Act crisis
caused a remarkable libertarian transformation among these
practitioners.'0o More than a few began to appropriate radical Whig
rhetoric to advance the colonial cause. A similar turn occurred among
lawyers in New York, Maryland and Virginia.'o7
In the short-term, the Revolution seems to have given the profession a
popular and political clout that it had never before experienced on
American shores. The legal system itself, however, suffered a number of
significant setbacks during the Revolution. At the precise point at which
Massachusetts lawyers sat at the apex of their political prestige they faced
major practical challenges. Books of business shrank substantially due to
court closures.' Sizable losses in loyalist defections and general attrition
dramatically decreased the bar's numbers.'0 9 But those lawyers that
remained continued the work of consolidating and distinguishing the
profession. By 1768, the Essex County Bar Association had enacted its
own minimum fee schedule in contravention of unrepealed state law. In
1780, the Suffolk Bar Association began charging law students a
minimum fee for their required three-year apprenticeship, which the Essex
and Middlesex associations followed in 1783.110
Beginning in 1780, legal business started to increase substantially and,
by 1783, a virtual litigation explosion had commenced in the state of
Massachusetts."' Mounting debt, both public and private, fueled the
litigation fires. As the war wound down, France and Britain inundated the
103. Murrin, supra note 57, at 562.
104. POCOCK, supra note 53, at 216.
105. Anglicized to their core, many in the older generation remained loyalists and most fled the
country. See Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 48-50.
106. Murrin, supra note 57, at 568.
107. See DILLON, supra note 59; ROEBER, supra note 49.
108. From 1774 to 1780, the so-called "Berkshire constitutionalists" in Western Massachusetts,
unwilling to submit to a government that did not have the people's express constitutional sanction,
protested the provisional state government by forcing the closure of many courts. The constitutionalist
movement ended with the adoption of the state constitution in 1780. See TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 4,
75-101.
109. See Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 48-50.
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state with their manufactures, resulting in an immoderate spending spree
and severe trade imbalances, all made worse by inflationary pressures
caused by excessive paper money issuances. Meanwhile, the ballooning
public debt produced crippling taxes." 2 Creditor litigation began to
overwhelm court dockets. To take one particularly dramatic example,
whereas in 1780 the Worcester country Court of Common Pleas had 246
cases on its docket, by 1785 it had nearly 3000.113 The surge in legal
business attracted many new faces into the field-many perceived as
"pettifoggers"-which prompted further efforts by the established legal
elite to restrict admission through heightened educational requirements.
With bench and bar now intermingled (most post-Revolutionary judges
came from within the profession), courts reinstituted the English practice
of elevating some practitioners to the rank of barrister, and new rules
empowered the state's high court to further regulate the admissions of
lawyers to practice. More than a few began to accumulate considerable
wealth.1 14
Enjoying increased institutional power after the Revolution, the state
legislature's lower house stood as the legal profession's most direct threat
in the 1780s, closely overseeing judicial culture and often directly
interfering-in matters normally handled by courts."' Where Tocqueville
would later suggest that the American legal profession provided a needed
check on legislatures, many post-Revolutionary republicans believed the
checking should run the other way."' Consequently, the assembly
generally opposed the profession's moves toward exclusivity and self-
regulation during this period. The lawyers, however, evaded legislative
control with considerable agility in the 1780s. In 1784, the profession
chaperoned a bill through the legislature barring sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs from serving as legal counselors. The Suffolk county bar
reinforced this measure by ordering its lawyers not to solicit any business
outside their offices. Responding to constituents, the legislature sought in
1785 to break the lawyers' growing monopoly, requiring the courts to
permit litigants to plead their own cases or seek the "assistance of counsel
as they shall see fit to engage."ll 7 But the lawyers cleverly thwarted the
law's design by arguing that the term "counsel" as employed in the statute
meant a professional lawyer only, which judges, most lawyers themselves,
happily enforced."' The legislature made further attempts to loosen
112. TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 104.
113. GAWALT, supra note 27, at 29.
114. Id.at44-45.
115. Id.at48.
116. See 1 TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 348-58 (Henry Reeve trans., New York, The
Century Co., 1898).
117. MASS. ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra note 99, at 476.
118. GAWALT, supra note 27, at 60.
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admission standards. Yet the courts continued refusing to admit to practice
those applicants lacking proper training. "9 That the lawyers themselves
had begun to populate the state legislature produced a conflict of interest
that men such as Austin greatly feared.120 By 1786, a legal profession that
purported to uphold the law seemed to Austin and his followers to have
commandeered it for themselves.
IV. AUSTIN AND THE SPIRIT OF '86
The surge in litigation activity increased the lawyers' visibility-and
power. The profession's efforts to monopolize the practice through
rigorous admission standards and private "associations," its privately
legislated fee structures, and its members' adeptness in evading legislation
designed to control them-that all this might have irked a few lay
observers who had lived though the American Revolution remains
unsurprising. Republican ideology and anti-English sentiment, however,
converged to give Americans a new conceptual vocabulary with which to
understand and criticize the profession, its activities, and its laws: the
rhetoric of anti-aristocracy.
Colonial America, to be sure, never had a landed hereditary aristocracy
protected by law as in England.121 Hierarchical social distinctions not
dissimilar to those characterizing English society did exist in British North
America, most prominently the distinction between gentlemen and
commoners. 2 2 A psychology of deference and dependence sustained a
regime of communal hierarchicalism for generations. The revolutionary
experience and the ideas it spawned, however, imported into American
culture a far-ranging egalitarianism that eschewed all outward displays of
superiority or "distinction"-in manner, dress, or other externals-and
rejected deference as an anti-republican mode of social relation.'23
Republican ideology, Gordon Wood writes, "destroyed aristocracy as it
had been understood in the Western world for at least two millennia." By
1780, a new and emotionally charged fault line had emerged in American
society: The "principal antagonists" in this divide, Wood observes, "were
no longer patriots vs. courtiers but had become democrats vs.
aristocrats." 24
119. ld.at60-61.
120. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
121. For a time in the eighteenth century, Virginia may have served as one partial exception. See
Holly Brewer, Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: "Ancient Feudal Restraints" and
Revolutionary Reform, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 307 (3d ser. 1997). Patricia Bonomi takes issue with
earlier historians' characterizations of New York's "great landholders" as an aristocracy in the English
sense. PATRICIA BONOMI, A FACTIOUS PEOPLE 180 (1971).
122. WOOD, supra note 38, at 24.
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Hostility to all things aristocratic thus stands as one of the distinguishing
features of post-Revolutionary American culture, particularly in
Massachusetts. Gradually extending itself to virtually every form of social,
cultural, and political elitism, the concept of an aristocracy functioned
negatively to define the early American identity as categorically distinct
from the English. In this way it reinforced the anti-English nativist
sentiment that marked popular attitudes during the post-Revolutionary
period and would later animate Austin's writings. The final break from
England represented a symbolic break with aristocracy itself. But political
independence did not eradicate the aristocratic menace. It continued to
pose a perceived threat from within. Bostonian fears of a creeping
aristocracy found expression in the outcry against the Society of the
Cincinnati (whose biggest chapter resided in Massachusetts) during the
first half of 1784.125 Boston's Independent Chronicle, in which Austin
would two years later publish his anti-lawyer essays, served as the leading
editorial force against the Cincinnati in New England. In January of 1784,
the Chronicle began reprinting Aedanus Burke's Considerations on the
Society or Order of the Cincinnati, the most widely disseminated attack on
the Cincinnati.'26 This produced an eruption of commentary through the
spring of 1784.127 Commentators feared that the Cincinnati would
ultimately forge a "complete and perpetual personal distinction" between
itself and the "Plebeans."' 28 They worried that members would insinuate
themselves into assemblies through "address, ingenuity, perseverance and
prowess," and thereby organize a "political monster" capable of exacting
large payments of commutation from the public fisc. The "order" thus
needed to be "crushed in embryo."' 29 Even prominent Massachusetts
statesmen-including Elbridge Gerry, Stephen Higginson, and John
Adams-viewed the Cincinnati as a serious threat to republican values, in
Adams's words, "the first step taken to deface the beauty of our temple of
liberty."l 30
But no sooner had public anxiety over the Cincinnati begun to subside
125. Continental Army officers had founded The Society of the Cincinnati-the "first American
patriotic order"-in 1783. Pursuant to the Society's original rules, only the eldest male descendants of
its founders could become members, though it did also permit the admission of "honorary members."
Wallace Evan Davies, The Society of the Cincinnati in New England 1783-1800, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 3,
3(1948).
126. CASSIUS (AEDANUS BURKE), CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SOCIETY OR ORDER OF THE
CINCINNATI (Charleston, 1783). For the reprints, see INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1784, at 1-2; Feb. 5,
1784, at 1-2.
127. INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 18, 1784, at 3; Apr. 1, 1784, at 3; Apr. 8, 1784, at 3; Apr. 16, 1784, at
3; Apr. 22, 1784, at 3; Apr. 29, 1784, at 3; June 3, 1784, at 2, 4; see also Davies, supra note 125, at 8-
11.
128. INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 18, 1784, at 3.
129. Id.
130. Davies, supra note 125, at 11 (quoting John Adams); see also MINOR MYERS, LIBERTY
WITHOUT ANARCHY: A HISTORY OF THE SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI 51 (1983).
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than another aristocratic threat had surfaced. Boston elites apparently
engaged in lavish spending in the early 1780s and had no compunction
about publicly displaying their luxurious lifestyles. By the mid-1780s, as
men of lesser means had begun to suffer under the burden of increasing
taxes and debts, the Boston gentry seemed to "wallow[] in luxury and
amusement.""' Austin and his family friend Sam Adams took particular
umbrage at the establishment of the so-called Tea Assembly or "Sans
Souci Club" in late 1784. Perceived as the "exclusive domain of the newly
parading gentry," the club met every other week for card playing and
dancing. Innocuous enough. But according to Austin (writing as
"Candidus" in 1785), the people considered the club a "very dangerous
and destructive institution" that, while perhaps accepted in the "long,
established Courts of Europe," stood diametrically opposed to the
republican values that, in Austin's view, defined the new nation. In this
public dispute about private card games the American identity itself hung
in the balance. "We, my countrymen," Candidus announced, "have a
character to establish."' 32
A. Law and Aristocracy
Although we find much about the Cincinnati and the Sans Souci in the
Boston papers from 1784 to 1785, very few comments specifically
directed at lawyers surfaced during this time. 33 And yet the sheer number
of lawsuits pending on court dockets in 1785, coupled with increasingly
aggressive litigation tactics, doubtless triggered tensions among litigants
and their friends.' 34 Up until 1787, the law permitted creditors to keep a
debtor in jail indefinitely and, by the time Austin published his first essay
attacking the Bay State justice system, hundreds languished in prisons,
often forced to work to pay off their debts.' 35 Court dockets exploded with
foreclosures, insolvencies, and replevin actions for the recovery of seized
personal property. Historians have asserted that cash-strapped "agrarian
debtors" in Western Massachusetts rose up against the lawyers in 1786 in
131. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 421 (1969).
132. Id. at 422-23 (quoting Candidus); see also Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 27, 1785, at 1.
Austin's good friend Samuel Adams probably helped to compose the essays attributed to Candidus.
133. One commentator in 1784 did, however, make some portentous comments, complaining
about the growing complexity of the property tax code: "a man must have the memory and knowledge
of a lawyer to know when he is wrong and when he is right." INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 30, 1784, at 1. For
other pre-Honestus critical commentary on lawyers in the Boston papers, see Trade, MASS. CENTINEL,
Nov. 16, 1785, at 2; Slap Dash, MASS. CENTINEL Nov. 19, 1785, at 2; Rollin, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan.
18, 1786, at 2.
134. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. That so many lawyers had remained loyalists
probably helped forge a link between the profession and the now-reviled mother country that would
have further exacerbated hostilities. See Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 48-50.
135. Robert Feer, Imprisonment for Debt in Massachusetts Before 1800, 48 MISs. VALLEY HIST.
REv. 252, 255 (1961).
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something like a class war.136 The suggestion, however, that only debtors
as a class felt the lawyers' pinch in the months preceding Austin's essays
does not bear scrutiny. As we shall see, creditors also had good reason to
oppose the profession's litigation practices, and Austin spilled a great deal
of ink discussing why.' 37
Against this volatile background, the newspaper debates over the legal
profession began with a seemingly innocuous comment in a piece
appearing on January 26, 1786 in the Independent Chronicle. A writer
calling himself the "Free Republican"-apparently Benjamin Lincoln-
here recorded a vindication of the legal profession, claiming in a lengthy
piece addressing the need for constitutional checks and balances in a
republican society, that "as the science of the law is intricate and
perplexing, and cannot be obtained but by long and steady application,
professors and practicers of it seem a necessary order in a free
republic."' All other things being equal, this small comment, inserted at
the end of the piece, did not on its face seem particularly provocative or
controversial. But it proved more than enough to antagonize the thirty-
three-year old Austin, who began scribbling out notes and essays to ensure
that the Free Republican did not have the last word on this issue. Austin
had recently assumed a greater visibility within the Boston artisan
community and, throughout 1785, published provocative pieces in the
Chronicle under the names "Candidus" (against the "Sans Souci Club"),
"Friend to Commerce" (on trade matters), and "Brutus" (against the
resettlement of refugee Tories).'39 In the early 1780s, Austin had
attempted to malign local lawyers for colluding with British agents, but
appears to have ended up the object of criticism himself.'4 0 Now
circumstances had changed. The litigation boom had helped produce
renewed hostility toward courts, lawyers, and legal process among
debtors, creditors, farmers, artisans, and merchants alike. Most
importantly, Austin detected some of the same attributes in lawyers that he
had seen in the Cincinnati and the Tea Club-except that the legal
profession, as Austin planned to argue, posed a far more dire threat to the
fledgling republic than did the others.
Observers later made the allegation that one John Gardiner, an English-
136. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 4, at 69.
137. See infra Section IV.C.
138. The Free Republican, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 26, 1786, at 1 (emphasis added); see also William
Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 705 n.59 (1984) (noting that Benjamin Lincoln wrote under the name
"Free Republican"). A politician and officer in the Continental Army, Lincoln later played a
prominent role in suppressing Shays's Rebellion.
139. 1 AMORY, supra note 27, at 188; see Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 27, 1785, at 1; A Friend
to Commerce, INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 1, 1785, at 1, Oct. 20, 1785, at 2; Brutus, INDEP. CHRON., Nov.
10, 1785, at 2, Jan. 12, 1786, at 1; see also WAKELYN, supra note 38, at 10-12.
140. WAKELYN, supra note 38, at 10-12.
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trained barrister whose son the Suffolk Bar Association had rejected and
who had thereafter waged public attacks on all the county bar associations,
originally hatched the idea for a newspaper assault on lawyers. On this
account, Gardiner allegedly relayed the idea to Samuel Adams who, after
working up a few drafts, charged Austin with finalizing and publishing the
essays. Gardiner himself credibly denied the suggestion, even as he
admitted having little veneration for members of the Massachusetts legal
profession.14' Gardiner's well-known indictments of the bar associations
may very well have inspired Austin. But whatever Austin's connection to
either Gardiner or Adams in this regard, no real dispute exists that Austin
himself conceived, wrote, and published the essays appearing in the
Independent Chronicle in the spring of 1786.142
On March 9, 1786 Austin fired his opening shots, arguing that
republicanism, far from necessitating the legal profession, actually
required its eradication. Honestus would accept nothing less than the
profession's total and permanent "annihilation" in Massachusetts.143 "The
cure," he later wrote, "must be radical!"l44 Over the next four months
Austin published twelve additional essays expounding on these themes
and rebutting the claims of his many opponents. Austin's essays caused at
least as much stir as the Cincinnati controversy two years earlier and
resulted in substantial town meeting and convention activity to implement
his proposed reforms.14 5 At the time, readers and respondents invested
Austin's impassioned assault on lawyers with immense legal, political and
historical significance. For them the fate of the nation seemed to hang in
the balance. In the words of "Old Rock," "the cause now before the people
is perhaps as solemn and important as any that has ever been brought
before them." 46 Indeed, at least one respondent suggested that Austin had
a divine sanction: "His pen has been guided by some superior intelligence;
the voice of God, and the voice of the people have been in conjunction." 47
Why did Austin and his choir of supporters consider this matter so
141. Barebones, AM. HERALD (Boston), June 26, 1786, at 3; see also I AMORY, supra note 27, at
188; Grant, Benjamin Austin, Jr. 's Struggle, supra note 38, at 23. Gardiner would go on to introduce
major law reform legislation, parts of which resonated with Austin's proposals. GAWALT, supra note
27, at 83; McKirdy, supra note 24, at 189-92.
142. He apparently even researched court records when preparing his essays. He acquired, for
example, a Bill of Costs ordering a litigation defendant to pay an amount (with court costs) far in
excess of the original debt alleged, even as the court's liability judgment relieved the defendant of over
half that debt. It is possible that Gardiner, an attorney, provided Austin with this document. Austin
later reproduced its contents in one of his essays, infuriating his lawyer opponents. Honestus, INDEP.
CHRON., June 1, 1786, at 2. He redacted the Bill of Costs from the 1819 republication. Surrency, supra
note 38, at 250-54.
143. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2.
144. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1786, at 1.
145. See supra notes 22, 24-27 and accompanying text.
146. Old Rock, INDEP. CHRON., May I1, 1786, at 2.
147. Perseverance, MASS. CENTINEL, June 17, 1786, at 2.
2013]1 299
29
Knapp: Law's Revolution: Benjamin Austin and the Spirit of '86
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
momentous? What nerve had Honestus struck? What exactly did the
Austinites find so profoundly offensive about the Massachusetts legal
profession in the revolutionary spring of 1786?l48 Austin's overarching
contention, and one echoed time and again by his supporters, asserted that
the legal profession had become an unrepublican aristocracy that, wielding
a monopoly on the legal knowledge necessary to prosecute and defend
disputes in the justice system, threatened to destroy the liberties of the
people forever. Interestingly, the "Free Republican," against whom Austin
had targeted his first essay, may have unwittingly planted the link between
lawyers and aristocrats in Austin's head. As noted, the previous writer had
somewhat casually referred to the profession as a "necessary order." A
few weeks later, we find Austin also applying the term to the legal
profession but, in contrast to the previous writer, squeezing it for all its
fearsome anti-republican connotations, repeating it over and again, and
putting it in scare quotes to draw readers' attention to it. The term would
have had considerable resonance for readers of the Boston papers in light
of the controversies over the Cincinnati and the Tea Club-also deemed
anti-republican "orders." Austin knew very well that his audience would
recoil at any suggestion of a distinct "order" boasting social, cultural, or
political superiority. His innovation lay in extending the post-
Revolutionary critique of aristocracy to claims of legal superiority and
suggesting that such claims struck at the taproot of the republican
experiment. "If we are willing to bend under the aristocratical tyranny of
this 'order,"' Austin wrote, "all the boasted acquisitions of our
independence are 'sounds and nothing else."'
1 4 9
Austin's supporters instantly latched on to his anti-aristocratic
conceptual framework, pairing it with foreboding images of English legal
culture. "Root and Branch" worried that if the people did not act quickly,
the lawyer aristocrats would burrow themselves into the Republic's very
foundations. The people, he wrote, should fear "[a]ll orders and
combinations of men ... but when they become so daring, as to set
themselves as an order and are absolutely established by the tacit consent
of the people-farewell the liberties of our republic." Like the Cincinnati,
148. By "Austinites," I mean: (1) the many individuals who published writings in the Boston
papers in support of Austin during the Spring and Summer of 1786 (many of whom have been or will
be cited in the Article); (2) other contemporaneous readers who supported Austin in this regard, the
existence of whom we can reasonably presume based on the intensity of the debates and on the
evidence of anti-lawyer agitation at Massachusetts town meetings and the like (see supra notes 22, 24-
26 and accompanying text); and (3) the Shaysites whom, as set out below, contemporaries linked to
Austin's supporters and whose anti-lawyer sentiments bore clear affinities with Austin's own. As
noted in the Introduction, moreover, post-Revolutionary antilegalist currents did not confine
themselves to Massachusetts; they swept through many other areas of post-war America. See supra
note 27. These other resisters outside of Massachusetts also qualify as participants in the movement to
which Austin gave expression.
149. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
[Vol. 25:271300
30
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol25/iss2/3
Knapp
the profession therefore had to be "annihilated in its infancy."'s Another
Austinite, "Modestus," had the Chronicle reprint a London article
describing a procession of the "Gentlemen of the Black Robe" in protest
against the House of Commons. The image called up the dramatic conflict
between lawyers and the people that Austin's critiques threw into bold
relief. "[A]gainst their annihilation," Modestus editorialized, the
Massachusetts "order" would soon stage a similar "procession."i'
Austin depicted the legal profession as standing ominously apart from
the people and thus outside of popular control. Bay Staters had accused
the Cincinnati of establishing an imperium in imperio and Austin now
indicted the legal profession on the same grounds. The profession, Austin
wrote, "establishes a perpetual power (vastly superior to the Judges .. .)
over which the people have no control: There being no rotation or choice
of members ... in time they become so involved in the very vitals of
government, that it will be out of the power of the people to remove
them." 5 2 Increasingly populated by the lawyers themselves, the legislature
already seemed incapable of restraining the profession's practices.'5 3
Austin drew special attention to the bar associations' evasions of the
maximum fee statute.15 4 "The fee-table is treated like an old almanac," he
complained. "They have so established certain rules among themselves (as
a combined body) that the state may go on to regulate; but the 'order' will
ever find means to augment their Court charges."' The lawyers, as one
respondent put it, functioned as a "self-created Legislature."5 6
Austin feared that the multiplying bar associations would conspire,
secretly in "bar-meetings," to join together and thereby establish a
"combined body" with "perfect aristocratical influence" throughout the
judicial system. This would permit members to "establish any mode of
judiciary process they think proper and, under sanction of law, the vilest
impositions may be practiced."' The result? Enslavement of the people.
With judges and practitioners in cahoots, the lawyers' "STAR CHAMBER
tyranny" would reduce the people to bondage, for "when a people cannot
appeal with safety to the laws of their country, they are absolute
150. Root and Branch, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 2.
151. Modestus, MASS. CENTINEL, June 10, 1786, at 2. Other participants in the 1786 editorial
exchanges similarly referred to the legal profession as the "order of the Black Robe." A Mechanick,
MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 26, 1786, at 2. One writer found the blackness of the lawyers' clothes to be an
"emblem of sin . . . . 'Tis a Picture of what is within!" Question and Answer, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 8,
1786, at 3.
152. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
153. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1; May 11, 1786, at 1.
154. 1 MASS. ACTS AND RESOLVES, supra note 99, at 467.
155. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
156. Barebones, AM. HERALD, June 26, 1786, at 3.
157. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., June 1, 1786, at 2; Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
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slaves."'58 Did imprisoned debtors, laboring away to pay their creditors
(and ultimately the lawyers themselves), not find themselves essentially in
a state of bondage? After their long "struggle for freedom," would the
American people permit themselves to become "SLAVES to the assuming
dangerous power of this 'order'"?1 59
The Austinites also excoriated the lawyers' large fee exactions, which
enabled legal practitioners to amass substantial personal wealth while
most people suffered. Not only had the lawyers commandeered the justice
system. They also purported to put it up for sale, "rendering the laws a
mere business of traffic" and the judicial system corrupt."'o Consequently,
the "order" daily grew rich while the general community "as rapidly"
became "impoverished."l61 The lawyers' fee bounties had placed them on
the "pinnacle of luxury and dissipation."'62 Austin seems to have imagined
the lawyers luxuriating in opulent drawing rooms with members of the
Tea Club. Supporters elaborated on these themes with revealing historical
allusions. Writing in support of Austin, "A Friend to the Publick" linked
law's "fattened" practitioners to the corrosive "luxury" that had destroyed
Rome. In her "youthful state," he wrote, Rome had "lived in credit and
[was] renowned for arms," but she later "fell a victim to luxury, that fatal
disease of the body politick, by not resisting but indulging herself in it."
Sensing a symbiotic relationship between lawyers and debt, the writer
hoped that "by industry and frugality we may be able to wipe off our
national and domestic debt" so as to obviate the need for the "order" and
thus enable men to labor free and secure.163 Writing in support of Austin,
"Old Rock" similarly criticized the profession's acquisitiveness, a quality
rightly condemned, he pointed out, by St. Paul, Homer, Lycurgus and
Socrates. Money, and money alone, this writer sardonically observed,
served as "the noblest principle that actuates the Generality of lawyers, so
noble and 'open-hearted' as to pillage and plunder all their country." The
writer advised Massachusetts legislators to pay heed to Lycurgus, history's
"ablest law-maker," who banished money from his realms for centuries
producing the "grandest and happiest nation recorded in the annals of
mankind.""
Before Austin could write and publish his second essay installment an
organized opposition to his stated objectives had already started to
coalesce. By all appearances most, if not all, of Austin's antagonists
practiced law in Massachusetts, though like Austin they wrote under
158. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., June 1, 1786, at 2; Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
159. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
160. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
161. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2.
162. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
163. A Friend to the Publick, MASS. CENTINEL, May 6, 1786, at 2.
164. Old Rock, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 2.
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pseudonyms. In a way, the lawyers made claims no less daring than
Austin's. Their basic argument asserted that free republics, in order to
exist at all, required lawyers. "Advocates," wrote one, "exist naturally in
free governments." 6 In seeking to demonstrate the republican "necessity"
of the profession, the lawyers also invoked history, highlighting the great
classical lawyer-statesmen. Prominent lawyer, judge, and future Governor,
James Sullivan wrote in this vein under the name "Zenas."l 66 Greece had
the unimpeachable Demosthenes, Sullivan wrote, Rome the estimable
Cicero, and "the liberty of Rome fell but with the lives of her Lawyers."16 1
Sullivan contended that the great Massachusetts lawyers fit squarely in the
tradition laid down by the classical orator-statesmen. Adumbrating the
profession's history in early Massachusetts, Sullivan contended that Bay
State lawyers had ultimately "fought and suffered to establish their
country's liberty" during the Revolution and then, to cap their republican
achievements, masterminded the Massachusetts Constitution. The
professional legal mind, Sullivan insinuated, had stitched itself into the
republic's very architecture. Americans thus had no "power" to abolish
lawyers, he argued, "without overturning the constitution." 68
Pursuing a similar theme, "A Lawyer" spotlighted respected figures
within the Massachusetts bar, including James Otis, Oxenbridge Thatcher,
and John Adams. Could the people reasonably charge these venerable
patriots, intellectual architects of the Revolution, with harming the
country, as Honestus suggested? Perhaps, at the end of the day, the people
needed to look in the mirror. For no set of lawyers could enslave a people
not already politically enervated and therefore susceptible to enslavement,
at which point "no arm can save them" anyway. A people "ripe for
slavery," the Lawyer wrote, "cannot in the nature of things be free."l 69
Austin's adversaries conceded some bad apples, the aberrant
"pettifoggers" in the profession, and indeed, like the barristers and
serjeants at law in England, the recognized leaders of the profession had
historically sought to purge the practice of these perceived hacks. The
lawyers insisted, however, that Austin had immoderately angled to throw
the baby out with the bath water. Writing in the Massachusetts Centinel,
one Austinite cleverly turned the tables: Why should the "Sons of
165. Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1786, at 1.
166. 1 AMORY, supra note 27, at 189.
167. Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1786, at 1.
168. Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 2. Since the lawyers had invoked the Massachusetts
Constitution to justify the profession's existence, Austin cleverly rejoined by arguing that the same
Constitution-namely, Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights-actually required the
the profession's eradication. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1; see also MASS.
CONSTITUTION, Declaration of Rights, art. Xl (1780) ("Every subject of the commonwealth . . . ought
to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without
any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.").
169. A Lawyer, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 26, 1786, at 1.
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Massachusetts," he queried, be made to tolerate the entire profession
simply because a few honorable practitioners exist?'70 History, another
writer insisted, could not redeem the profession, for what relevancy did
the "rude, unenlightened, uncultivated state" of ancient Greece or Rome
have to the "present system of jurisprudence in this country"?' 7' Rome did
not represent any republican golden age, as the lawyers had insinuated.
Indeed, in those ancient times, "any daring fellow had it in their power to
make slaves of the people." 72 Modern-day Massachusetts republicans, on
the other hand, remained "too well informed to be deprived of their dear
bought rights by any daring fellow whatever."173
For his part, Austin expressed alarm that members of the "order" had
publically endorsed the principles of Roman government, whose "Comitia
Centuriata" had ruled that the "richest class should have everything at
their disposal" and that the "PEOPLE SHOULD BE RARELY CALLED
TOGETHER, UNLESS FOR MATTERS OF SMALL MOMENT." 7 4 The
lawyers' historical arguments only confirmed their anti-republican
motivations and aristocratic conceits. If the "order" had its way, "like the
Plebians of Rome, the people will be obliged to choose a PATRON from
among them." 75 Moreover, while Austin did not deny that patriot lawyers
had engaged in "respectable" conduct during the imperial crisis and
Revolution, he maintained that the "practice then and now is so opposite in
almost every instance."' 76 Whatever its history, the profession had become
a "dangerous institution" in the post-Revolutionary years.'77 Recognizing
that republican principles required the profession's immediate and
permanent "annihilation" flowed not from an understanding of "Justinian
or Theodosius" but rather from "the experience of every man within this
State." 78
B. A Disposition Unfriendly to the Law Itself
That Honestus provoked a strong response from Bay State lawyers,
whose very livelihood his essays expressly aimed to eliminate from
society, remains unsurprising. The lawyers, however, argued that Austin's
claims had much broader implications-over and above the legitimacy of
the profession itself. For the legal system to function at all, as Sullivan had
170. A Friend to the Publick, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1786, at 2.
171. Root and Branch, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 2.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 4, 1786, at 2.
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insisted, it required the professional legal mind. 17 9 Responding to the
uproar that Austin had aroused, Caleb Strong-a lawyer and state senator
who would go on to serve as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, a
U.S. senator, and Governor of Massachusetts-concluded that Austin's
essays represented much more than just an animosity toward lawyers. The
assaults on lawyers, Strong wrote on June 24, 1786, "originate more from
a Disposition unfriendly to regular Government and the Law itself than
from the Conduct of those who practice it."' Other lawyers similarly
accused the Austinites of seeking to abolish "law itself.". 1 Passages in
Austin's and his supporters' essays do substantiate this allegation. 18 2
"Legal impositions are the worst species of tyranny," Austin declared at
one point. "Every act which is passed, so far from relieving the people,
serves only as a link in the grand chain of TYRANNY.""' Elsewhere
Austin apparently backed away from these categorical claims.'8 4 In one
essay, he stated that his goal lay in setting the "law" on a more egalitarian
foundation, so that all people, whether rich or poor, could "ever be on an
equality, while they are appealing to the JUSTICE of their country."185
The lawyers made this impossible. Driven not by an honest sense of
justice but by the selfish interests of their clients and, above all, by the
desire to receive "a large reward," the lawyer "warp[ed] the laws to
answer his particular purposes," introducing a "multiplicity of needless
and almost unintelligible words" and "mystical phrases."' 86 The law had
thus become the "mere pageantry of the profession, calculated to perplex
the jury and deceive the wondering crowd."' 8 7
But the plot thickens. For Austin went on to assert that the problem's
crux lay not only in the lawyers' "pernicious practices," but in the fact that
the "order" had introduced the "whole body of English laws" into the
179. Sullivan's claim had a deeper historical basis. In his influential study of the Western legal
tradition, Harold Berman maintains that one of the tradition's principal characteristics lay in entrusting
the administration of legal institutions to a "special corps of people who engage in legal activities on a
professional basis." HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 8 (1983).
180. Letter from Caleb Strong to Nathan Dane (June 24, 1786), in 16 CLIFFORD SHIPTON & JOHN
SIBLEY, SIBLEY'S HARVARD GRADUATES 96, 96 (1972) (emphasis added); see also GAWALT, supra
note 27, at 63 (noting that, ultimately, "it was the system of law rather than individual lawyers that
aroused animosity").
181. See, e.g., A Lawyer, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 26, 1786, at 1.
182. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
183. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
184. Honestus, [NDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at 1.
185. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
186. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1786, at 1, and Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May II, 1786,
at 1.
187. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at 1. Austin made the further claim that, set in the
practical context of Massachusetts debt litigation in which debtors rarely disputed their accounts,
hardly a case existed that "required any material law question to be agitated." The common causes,
which "deferred from term to term," and which "cost so much money[,] are in no respect intricacies of
law." And yet the lawyers made them so. Id.
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American justice system. Laws deriving from England's "aristocratical
institutions" and "applicable to Kings, Lords and Commons," Austin
wrote, had no place in "our young Republic." "We may as well adopt the
laws of Medes and Persians."' 8 The common law seemed to the
Austinites so vast, indefinite, and contradictory that a case for almost any
conclusion could be made through a careful selection of instances. The
"fly art" of aristocrats, the common law thus defied both logic and
common sense. The "grand artillery" of precedents "brought from Old
English Authorities" served to "embarrass all our judiciary causes" by
permitting the lawyers to "cull and select precedents to answer every
purpose: the omnipotence of their laws can reconcile all contradictions."'
Thus, while the common law effectively "perplex[ed] the mind," it could
never "inform the judgment" and, indeed, its "numerous volumes ...
arranged in formidable order" only operated to "batter down every plain,
rational principle of law."' 9 0 Ill-suited to the state's "particular
circumstances," even the ancient liberties set out in Magna Carta did not
perforce apply in Massachusetts.' 9' As Austin viewed it, the common law
could not exist without the lawyers, and the lawyers could not exist
without the common law. The "gentlemen of the bar" had a vested interest
in establishing a legal regime that necessitated the professional legal mind
and thereby precluded ordinary litigants from speaking for themselves.
The "aristocratical" common law effectively achieved both objectives.
Austin had a simpler republican alternative in mind that would render
professional lawyers superfluous and qualify all citizens personally to
participate in the justice system on equal footing. In lieu of the
impenetrable complexity and confusion introduced by the lawyers and
their laws, Austin proposed a regime predicated on "fundamental
principles of law"-a "system of laws of OUR OWN, dictated by genuine
principles of Republicanism, and made easy to be understood by every
individual in the community."' 9 2 But of what did such "fundamental
principles of law" consist? By all appearances Austin used this phrase to
refer to basic "principles of right and wrong" as ascertained by a common
moral sense universally possessed.'93 The phrase "fundamental principles
of law," in other words, served as a proxy for individual conscience and
common-sense judgment. The legal profession, Austin emphasized, "is no
way essential to this knowledge."' 9 4 Lawyers and their laws, for Austin,
had no legitimate purpose in a free republic for "every man of common
188. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at 1.
192. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
193. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
194. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
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abilities can easily distinguish between right and wrong." The trial by jury,
which Austin eulogized at length, grew directly out of the common sense
principle. If the "fundamental principles of law" did not stand "level with
the common understanding," he wrote, then the "trial by jury, which
consists of twelve men taken indiscriminately from the people, is the
greatest absurdity in nature."' 95
Austin's elevation of common sense over common law seems to have
drawn on Scottish ethical philosophy, which had proven quite influential
among members of the revolutionary generation.' Against Locke's
suggestion that all men begin as blank slates, Scottish philosophers such as
Francis Hutcheson had argued that man had an innate moral sense that
pronounced immediately on the character of observed actions, approving
virtue and disapproving vice. Hutcheson's fellow Scot, Thomas Reid,
coined the phrase "common sense," which Thomas Paine later employed
as the title of his influential revolutionary pamphlet. For Reid, certain
basic aspects and relations among things in the world did not fall within
the realm of reason or philosophy, let alone law books; instead, simple
common sense, possessed by everyone, perceived truth or commanded
belief by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse.'97 Reid,
writes one historian, thus "democratized the intellect by insisting that the
ordinary man could be as certain of his judgments as the philosopher
was."' 98 A comparable egalitarian epistemology marked Austin's
conception of so-called "fundamental principles of law," which he
considered an integral part of every individual's moral constitution.
On all the foregoing points, Austin and his followers again ran up
against significant resistance from Bay State lawyers. Writing as "Zenas,"
James Sullivan felt that Austin's alternative jurisprudential vision lacked a
proper understanding of law, legal history, and liberal political philosophy.
One could easily fantasize about a primitive state of nature, where simple
common virtue sufficed to resolve disputes among men. If men were
"angels," Sullivan wrote, then "neither laws nor government would be
necessary."' 99 But reality, not fantasy, should guide men's reasoning on
such issues. While conscience might point men to Justice, their "inherent
195. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1. Austin vigorously defended thejury's "right
to judge both law and evidence in all cases submitted to them." Surrency, supra note 38, at 301.
Indeed, he maintained that "[l]aw and evidence are one and indivisible." Id at 298.
196. For a convincing, though controversial, account of Jefferson's intellectual debt to the
Scottish ethical philosophy as evidenced in the Declaration of Independence, see GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978).
197. See generally I COLLECTED WORKS OF FRANCIS HUTCHESON (Bernhard Fabian ed., 1990); 1
WORKS OF THOMAS REID 141, 147, 148 (William Hamilton ed., 1994). Reid's seminal work Inquiry
into the Human Mind was first published in 1764.
198. ARTHUR HERMAN, HOW THE SCOTS INVENTED THE MODERN WORLD 223 (2001).
199. This came a year and a half before James Madison famously uttered a substantially identical
line. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 69, at 319 (James Madison).
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passions" and "proneness to ambition and avarice" invariably prevent
"voluntary submission" to it. 200 Thus, "men possessing separate property
have found it necessary to establish government for the preservation of it."
"[C]oercive power," Sullivan declared, "must be lodged somewhere to
compel justice. "201 To deny this reality instigated an unwinnable fight with
"the high author of the human race."202 Sullivan here illuminated a key
point of philosophical contention between the Austinites and the
lawyers-their contrasting views of human nature. The Austinites had a
Scottish-inspired faith in the common man's moral compass and his
natural inclination to conform to it without legal sanction or coercion. The
lawyers, on the other hand, shared Hobbes's pessimistic view of human
nature, which they employed to justify centralized coercive legal
authority.
But Sullivan took the argument even one step further. The simplest
justice systems, he continued, far from promoting liberty, as Austin
suggested, usually constituted "the work of a despot." 203 Blackstone had
made the same argument.204 Formalistic legal complexity, Sullivan
asserted, increased in "exact proportion to the quantity of freedoms
enjoyed by the subject."205 Signaling an important post-Revolutionary
intellectual shift among American lawyers that would crystallize in the
aftermath of Shays's Rebellion, Sullivan used the terms "freedom" and
"liberty" to refer primarily to private property. The purchase, ownership,
and transfer of property and credit necessitated a profusion of laws to
correspond to the complexity of the transactions themselves. These
correlative processes, coupled with "the imperfection of language," meant
that most modem laws escaped the intellectual grasp of "illiterate men."20 6
This fact, in turn, necessitated legal professionals who, through long study,
could cultivate an understanding of common law doctrine. In light of these
practical realities, if no men "made a profession in the knowing of the
law," Sullivan queried, how would the "poor man, the weak man, the
widow, the orphan" defend themselves against "the opulent, the cunning
and the strong"? 207 Whatever label society attached to them, "[a]dvocates
exist naturally in free governments." 208 Here again the whole line of
200. zenas, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1786, at 1.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., May 4, 1786, at 2.
204. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 325-30.
205. Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1786, at 1. Writing in the Massachusetts Centinel, "A
Lawyer" echoed this point. English law's "prolixity," he wrote, is an "evil"-but one to which "all
free governments must submit." A Lawyer, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1786, at 1. "A Twig of the
Branch" agreed, suggesting that the "infinitude of private contracts" necessitated a complex legal
framework. A Twig of the Branch, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1786, at 2.
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argument-that liberty in a complex society required complex laws and
therefore professional lawyers to make sense of them-derived from a
passage in Blackstone's Commentaries.209
And, indeed, no other legal writer influenced the lawyers of '86 more
than Blackstone. The Austinites saw the world through an entirely
different cultural prism. If Austin had any knowledge of Blackstone, he
had little regard for it. Saul Cornell may shed some light on the difference
in the distinction he draws between "the Latinate culture of the law" and
the "popular Protestant plain style." 2 '0 For his part, Austin deemed
Sullivan's assertion that freedom and property somehow required a
complex and confusing legal regime almost too fanciful to dignify a
response, the artful argument of a lawyer defending his comrades, not the
truth. Lawyers in particular, rather than society generally, produced legal
complexity, and they did so to serve their own interests, not the people's.
"[W]e may as well say that we can have no merchants without first
introducing an 'order' of stock-jobbers; the fair principles of commerce
are known, without the finesse, 'cunning,' and craft of the Exchange
Alley." 2 11 Lawyers and their prolix laws did not secure property as
Sullivan suggested, but rather endangered it, through replevin actions,
foreclosures, and extortionate fees, including court costs. 212 Only
"fundamental principles of law" properly applied in a free republic, Austin
maintained, for only such principles remained accessible to all men
equally-"level with the common understanding."213
C. Custom Versus Law
For whom, and to whom, did Austin purport to speak? Austin claimed
to represent a very broad swath of post-Revolutionary society-pretty
much everyone except the lawyers. Austin characterized the lawyers'
pernicious practice as a "matter of general complaint," a threat to "every
individual in the community." References to the "people" and the
"publick" at large pervade Austin's and his supporters' writings.2 14 All
saw themselves as speaking both to and for the "people." 2 15 Certainly
209. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 325-30. Indeed, at the behest of a reader, the Independent
Chronicle reproduced this entire text on the front page on June 1, 1786. To Honestus, INDEP. CHRON.,
June 1, 1786, at 1.
210. Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. the Lawyer's Constitution: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 306
(2011).
211. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
212. Id.
213. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
214. See, e.g., Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2; Old Rock, INDEP. CHRON., May II,
1786, at 2.
215. See, e.g., Cousin German to Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1786, at 2; Truth, MASS.
CENTINEL, Apr. 1, 1786, at 1.
2013] 309
39
Knapp: Law's Revolution: Benjamin Austin and the Spirit of '86
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Austin empathized with the many poor or financially strapped farmers
sued on their mortgages and other debts. "How many debtors now
languish in prison," he wrote, "whose misfortunes are increased by Court
impositions?" 216 Court costs and the bar associations' self-legislated fee
structures put men of lesser means at a distinct disadvantage in litigation
matters. "Can the poor (who cannot pay any of this 'order')," Austin
queried, "receive the equal advantage with the rich, when such a body of
men exist, who stand ready to speak on any subject and like mercenary
troops can be hired to support any cause for the consideration of a large
reward?" Clearly, as it stood, the rich fellow could overpower the poor one
not by the soundness of his argument or the justice of his demands, but
"by the greatness of his gifts to lawyers." 217 In a justice system cleansed of
lawyers and their confusing laws, Austin concluded, rich and poor alike
would stand on a level playing field while "appealing to the JUSTICE of
their country. "218
But although he sometimes appealed to debtors and the poor, Austin
himself identified as a "mechanic"-albeit one quite unafraid to rock the
boat within the community2 19-and merchant.220 Austin directed
considerable intellectual energy into protecting the interests of merchants
and creditors from law and lawyers-an important aspect of his writings
that historians have too often overlooked and which challenges the
historiographical tendency to link the Austinites' hostilities toward
lawyers to class struggle.221 Austin felt that well-intentioned creditors
suffered the wrath of law and lawyers in unique ways. The "order" had
exploited "every accidental circumstance which an unprincipled person
[i.e., debtor] might have, by the lenity and indulgence of an honest
creditor," and stood ready "to strike up a bargain (after rendering the
property in a precarious state) to throw an honest man out of three
quarters of his property."222
As a class, particularly vis-A-vis farmers, merchants generally acted as
creditors. At the same time, the record suggests that we ought to exercise
caution in drawing bright-line distinctions between debtor and creditor
classes in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts. In Worcester county (one of
the busiest counties in the state223), for example, parties often found
216. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
217. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1786, at 1.
218. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
219. See A Mechanick, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 12, 1786, at 2; A Mechanick, MASS. CENTINEL,
Apr. 8, 1786, at 1. The term "mechanic" referred to artisans of all kinds.
220. See PASLEY, supra note 92, at 108. Austin apparently enjoyed considerable financial success
in his business endeavors. Id.
221. The historical record directly contradicts William Nelson's assertion that Austin "showed an
utter lack of respect for the vital economic interests" of creditors. NELSON, supra note 4, at 71.
222. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2.
223. GAWALT, supra note 27, at 29.
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themselves in webs of litigation wherein a debtor in one case might sue as
a creditor in others. Recent scholarship demonstrates that Massachusetts
litigants sued for recovery of debts did not necessarily constitute a "weak
yeomanry" but rather a "special class" of litigants caught between their
own creditors and debtors, often quite solvent on paper though without
sufficient specie or other tangible valuables to pay accounts.224 The
transformation of debt structures in the 1760s from book accounts to
promissory notes, which by the 1780s traded at a "dazzling and confusing
rate," meant that legal relations became increasingly impersonal as
litigation on these notes multiplied.225 Debtor-defendants short on cash
benefited from delay, as it gave them time to seek funds and put off the
payment of court costs due at the conclusion of a case. During the
pendency of a case, costs and fees remained manageable for many
defendants, who sat on the sidelines and routinely took default judgments.
Evidence suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers would often pay the appeal bond
to keep the case alive, for payment of their own fees depended on
obtaining some recovery.226 It appears, then, that lawyers and debtors had
something of a "symbiotic relationship" based on a shared interest in
prolonging the appeals process.227 The legal system about which Austin
complained actually tended to benefit debtors more than creditors,
particularly the debtors with wherewithal who sued as creditors in other
cases and thus, with their lawyers' help, might play the procedural
peculiarities in one case off the other. Because of such litigation
shenanigans, many creditors preferred to stay out of court.22 8
Bay State lawyers played on both sides of credit transactions, primarily
with a mind toward getting their own bills paid. But Austin maintained
that aggressive lawyers representing clients who indisputably owed money
or property had engaged in particularly objectionable tactics. He voiced
specific concerns about lawyers' use of replevin procedures, "arbitrarily
adopted, so as to render futile all attachment whatever." 229 Even after a
"legal seizure" based on undisputed debt and where the creditor attached
"the identical parcel of goods for which the person was indebted," the
"creditor stands exposed .. . to have his doors burst open and the property
224. Jonathan M. Chu, Debt Litigation and Shays 's Rebellion, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS 81, 82
(Robert A. Gross ed., 1993).
225. Id.; see also MANN, supra note 51 (analyzing this change in Connecticut).
226. Chu, supra note 224, at 93. Contingency fee arrangements, also known as "champerty," were
controversial and considered improper, if not altogether illegal. Austin's newspaper opponents denied
that respectable lawyers pursued such arrangements. But the temptation certainly existed and, if we
take Austin's word for it, the practice remained quite prevalent. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23,
1786, at 1.
227. Chu, supra note 224, at 93.
228. Id. at 96.
229. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2.
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torn from his possession without sufficient security." 230 In the lawyers'
hands the laws thus did not suffice to "protect a creditor in his legal
demands," and the replevin procedures "tend[ed] to increase greatly the
influence and authority of the lawyers." 23 ' Apparently, lawyers felt less
compunction employing the replevin procedures as against British
creditors than American ones. Emphasizing that Americans remained
essentially a "commercial people," Austin worried that the lawyers' unfair
property seizures would harm the nation's "commercial reputation" and
"mercantile character," souring transatlantic trade relations to the
detriment of all.232 The "mercantile part of the community," he
emphasized, "are much interested in this particular." 233
Austin's sympathies with mercantile interests extended well beyond his
opposition to replevins. His primary reform proposal-that parties submit
their disputes to mutually agreed-upon "referees" rather than courts-
seemed to have drawn on the arbitration procedures commonly adopted by
colonial merchants in the eighteenth century, of which Austin must have
had some awareness. Colonial merchants, particularly in New York, had
traditionally used informal arbitration procedures so as to avoid dilatory
court procedures, the "solemnities of the law," and, above all, lawyers. 2 34
Merchants eschewed the adversarialism that marked legal proceedings.
"All controversies," declared the New York Chamber of Commerce in
1768, "are antagonistic to commerce." 235 Merchants viewed the mutual
submission to binding arbitration as a matter of common courtesy and
decorum-a matter of good faith and fair dealing. As one put it, "it is
invariably lookd [sic] upon as a point of justice and propriety to submit to
the referees." The idea of challenging an arbitration award-an "appeal"
from a legitimate judgment by your neighbors-greatly offended
mercantile sensibilities. Merchants avoided all such litigiousness. No
merchant would "in decency" appeal the referees' disposition, as that
would run "contrary to all practice." Challenging "the award of people in
Commerce" in a court and thus throwing the matter into "Expensive
endless Law," epitomized "ill Grace." 2 36
In England, Lord Mansfield labored long and hard in efforts to bring the
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., June 1, 1786, at 2.
233. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2.
234. Charles Kerr, The Origin and Development of the Law Merchant, 15 VA. L. REV. 350, 355
(1928). Merchants were not the only group in colonial society that took advantage of arbitration. For
an extensive description of arbitration practices in pre-Revolutionary Connecticut, see Bruce Mann,
The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV.
443 (1984). For a recent, more comprehensive study on arbitration in early America, see James
Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. REv. 241 (2013).
235. Quoted in AUERBACH, supra note 38, at 33.
236. LETTER BOOK OF JOHN WATTS 284-85 (Dorothy Barck ed., 1928); see also William Jones,
Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York, WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 207 (1957).
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merchants' informal customary justice system into the folds of the
common law court system so as to exert some modicum of control over
it.237 At least in part, he succeeded. In the American colonies, however,
independent mercantile practices persisted longer. In New York during the
eighteenth century, for example, practicing merchants themselves "finally
decided the bulk of the mercantile cases with little, if any, control by the
courts."238 Merchants in other seaport cities presumably proceeded in like
fashion.239
Tensions between the lawyer-dominated legal system and the merchant
arbitration system intensified during the early part of the imperial crisis.
When John Morin Scott, a pillar of the New York legal profession, ran for
the New York assembly in 1768, merchants seized upon the occasion to
attack the legal profession in some revealing ways. They blamed the
lawyers, who had allied themselves with the landed gentry, for the rent
rebellions of 1766. The merchants' "[v]enomous broadsides," writes one
historian, "called the attention of the voters to the fact that New York was
a commercial city owing its prosperity to merchants and not to men of
law."240 Scott lost the election, a testament to the strength of the
mercantile appeal. But only a few years later, Isaac Low again called on
New Yorkers to choose between merchants and lawyers: "the Word of a
reputable Merchant is in all Places as good, and in this City will go much
further than that of a quibbling Lawyer, even if he had never been proved
to have departed from a sacred Regard to Truth."2 4 1
The modem alliance between the legal profession and commercial
concerns tends to obscure our understanding of their conflict-ridden
history, which appears to have intensified considerably in the decade after
the Revolution.2 42 Austin's writings suggest that the conflict extended into
post-Revolutionary Massachusetts, even as only a few years prior Bay
State lawyers had raised some of their great constitutional arguments
defending merchants against smuggling charges.2 43
237. See MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, 1760-1850, at
106-14 (1991).
238. William Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in
Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445,464 (1957).
239. See id; Oldham & Kim, supra note 234, at 245.
240. DILLON, supra note 59, at 101.
241. Quoted in id. at 116-17. Like Austin, the Empire State merchants linked lawyers to
aristocratic social elements, but for a different reason: New York's landholding aristocracy-the
manor "lords" and "patroons"-served as the lawyers' primary clientele. Merchants viewed the
lawyers' interests as antithetical to transatlantic commerce and did all they could to remove lawyers
from the assembly. BONOMI, supra note 121, at 242.
242. Morton Horwitz makes the claim that in the nineteenth century, merchants forged an alliance
with the legal profession with the result that both arbitration and special juries fell into disuse.
HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 140-59. For a critique of his view, see Eben Moglen, Commercial
Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the Transformation of American Law, 93 YALE
L.J. 135 (1983).
243. See Morris, supra note 62, at 211. Many merchants resisted the Revolution, seeking to
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Austin warned against placing mercantile disputes in "the hands of
lawyers," whom he deemed "unacquainted with the customs of
merchants." 2" Neither lawyers nor judges possessed the competence to
resolve merchant accounts. Rather a "body of merchants are ever
considered the most eligible to settle commercial disputes." 245 "[H]ow
many disputed accounts" tied up in the courts, Austin asked, could have
been promptly "settled by three merchants who are acquainted with
mercantile concerns"?246 Courts and lawyers served only to "throw the
[merchants'] most simple demands into confusion." 247 Austin aimed,
moreover, to extend the mercantile model of employing referees
intimately familiar with community-based customs and usages to other
sub-communities, such as farmers who could also "have most of theirs
settled in this manner." 248
Austin's opponents did not expressly object to offering litigants the
option of arbitration. But as to Austin's proposal that such arbitrations
have binding effect, "Twig of the Branch" and others rejoined that it
would deprive the people of their "most sacred right": a trial by jury.24 9
Austin himself did not directly answer Twig's allegation, except to deny
having ever "disputed" the trial by jury or urged "compulsory
references."2 5 0 It appears, however, that neither Austin nor his followers
clearly distinguished between arbitration referees and juries as a functional
matter. Thus even as Austin repeatedly proposed binding "reference"
procedures in lieu of litigation, "Old Rock" could claim that "[ilt is
manifestly the aim of that celebrated writer [Honestus]" to have all
disputes "equitably decided by that glorious tribunal, that grandest and
best birthright of Americans, a jury," so that lawyers could no more
"impede the course of justice, and notoriously cheat and delude the honest
citizen." 251 Both arbitral referees and juries, in the Austinites' view,
removed cases from the reach of common law doctrine, lawyers, and
resolve trade grievances through peaceful means and thereby preserve amicable commercial relations
with the mother country. See generally THOMAS M. DOERFLINGER, A VIGOROUS SPIRIT OF
ENTERPRISE: MERCHANTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN REVOLUTIONARY PHILADELPHIA
(1986); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COLONIAL MERCHANTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1763-1776 (1918).
244. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
245. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1.
246. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
247. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 1; see also Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20,
1786, at 1.
248. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
249. A Twig of the Branch, INDEP. CHRON., May 4, 1786, at 1.
250. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at 1.
251. Old Rock, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 2. These remarks seem to jibe with the findings
of recent historical scholarship, which suggest a more experimental approach to jury composition in
the eighteenth century, including more frequent use of merchant juries and "struck" juries. See JAMES
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courts, all of which unnecessarily perplexed and protracted legal
procedures, and instead tied dispute resolution to the common moral sense
of neighbors and brethren.
V. THE SPIRIT OF '86 IN THE FLOW OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
A. Law's Revolution
Austin published the final installment in his essay series assailing the
Massachusetts legal system on June 15, 1786 and, shortly thereafter, left
the country on an extended visit to England and Europe.2 52 In August
Shays's Rebellion broke out. Commentators in the papers immediately
began blaming Honestus-that "high and mighty promoter of disorders"-
for inciting the uprising.253 Austin's essays, wrote one commentator, had
"introduced" the disorder "against the sacred constitution of this State."
The writer likened Honestus to "Satan."254 Opponents imagined Austin in
England celebrating the "overthrow of civil liberty" with loyalist
defectors.255 Austin's absence surely enabled these damning perceptions to
grow unabated in the final months of 1786. But when Austin arrived home
at the turn of the year, he promptly began publishing essays in his own
defense, denouncing the rebellions and disclaiming any role in causing
them, but refusing to retract any of his previous contentions with regard to
the legal system and profession.256 The "people in general," he maintained,
had approved the movement to abolish lawyers and the common law.2 57
So did Austin's essays impel the Shaysites to wage what one historian
has called the "American Revolution's Final Battle"?258  The
Massachusetts rebellion in 1786 had many causes, and we do history no
favors by trying to lay the episode at the doorstep of one man. But clearly
Austin's widely disseminated writings ranked as one significant factor in
252. It is unclear when precisely Austin left the country. The possibility exists that he left after the
uprisings began in anticipation that he would be blamed. The timing of his travels, which coincide
almost perfectly with the most intense period of rebellion (returning right after Governor Bowdoin
dispersed the rebels), does seem conspicuous in this regard. See Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 11,
1787, at 2.
253. Markwell, MASS. CENTINEL, Sept. 9, 1786, at 2. Indeed, months before open rebellion broke
out, Austin's opponents worried about the inflammatory impact of his essays. Viewing Massachusetts
in a vulnerable condition, "in a state of political fever," "Lelius" accused Austin of "blow[ing] up the
coals of dissention" and "raising a civil war in the heart of our distracted Commonwealth," when the
duty of "every honest citizen" under these precarious circumstances was to "calm the minds of the
Publick, to promote industry and honesty, to pay off their own private debts." The writer feared a
coming "anarchy." Lelius, MASS. CENTINEL, May 10, 1786, at 2.
254. Of Satan and Honestus, MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 20, 1787, at 4; see also Suffolk, INDEP.
CHRON., Jan. 18, 1787, at 1.
255. Markwell, MASS. CENTINEL, Sept. 9, 1786, at 2.
256. See Honestus, INDFP. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1787, at 2; Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 25, 1787,
at 2; Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. I1, 1787, at 2.
257. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., July 31, 1788, at 2.
258. RICHARDS, supra note 68.
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the articulation of grievances that led to the uprisings. The Shaysites
certainly shared the Austinites' hostilities toward lawyers and the legal
system. They rioted at courthouses and loudly denounced lawyers. 25 9 The
lawyers actually experiencing the situation, moreover, did not clearly
distinguish between the Austinites and the Shaysites. They viewed the
events of '86 as one continuous rebellion against law and courts that
threatened to rend the society asunder. 260 Unfortunately the major
monographs on Shays's Rebellion either ignore or give short shrift to the
revealing connections between the Austinites and the Shaysites. 26 1 The
prevailing explanations for the rebellion instead rest chiefly on
materialistic premises: crushing debt and/or taxes primarily fueled the
rural discontent leading to the rebellion. Austin's involvement suggests
deeper ideological causes arising directly out of the revolutionary
experience for which historians have failed to account: namely, an inter-
class egalitarian hostility to lawyers and formal legal institutions
understood as unrepublican aristocracies. 26 2
Writing almost a half-century after Austin, Tocqueville famously
depicted American lawyers as the "connecting link between the great
classes of society." 263 They "belong to the people by birth and interest," he
wrote, "and to the aristocracy by habit and taste.",26 Tocqueville's
comments suggest that early American lawyers, while perhaps curbing the
excesses of democracy, also labored under divided loyalties. The history
of the Massachusetts legal profession in the eighteenth century bears the
point out. On the eve of the imperial crisis, the profession stood as one of
the most Anglicized and aristocratic-leaning classes of men in colonial
America. The Revolution split the profession into two camps-patriots
259. 1 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 306-09 (1927); see also The Spirit of the Times, MASS. CENTINEL,
Oct. 25, 1786, at 2.
260. See ADAMS, supra note 37, at 73-74; THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS
PARSONS 162 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1859).
261. The most recent interpretation is RICHARDS, supra note 68, which emphasizes burdensome
taxes imposed by a government bond-holding elite. Austin does not get so much as an index entry in
Richards's study. Nor does he receive any mention in Christian Fritz's recent examination of the
rebellion. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS 80-116 (2008); see also id. at 84-89 (discussing economic
grievances). For the traditional class-based interpretation, see SZATMARY, supra note 38. Szatmary
does mention Austin and hostilities toward lawyers among western farmers. Id. at 42-43. One short
article points out that "hatred against lawyers" played a major role in the rebellion. Matz, supra note
38, at 5, 7-8. William Nelson, who recognizes the link, does not seriously investigate its implications,
and incorrectly suggests that only "agrarian debtors" took issue with the legal profession. NELSON,
supra note 4, at 69, 5.
262. William Nelson vaguely asserts that the Shaysites rebelled based on the notion that "access
to justice was one of the rights of man for which the War for Independence had been fought," but
elaborates no further on the ideological component and otherwise spotlights class and economic
factors. NELSON, supra note 4, at 5, 69-71.
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and loyalists. 2 65 But even those lawyers who turned toward whiggery
could only go so far. James Otis's early lunges and reversals in response to
the Stamp Act crisis provide a revealing glimpse into the conflict-ridden
mind of the Massachusetts lawyer in the crucible of imperial resistance.266
As it happened, the Revolution divided not only the legal profession but
the American legal mind itself In the spring of 1786, the bar's divided
consciousness displayed itself for all to see-not primarily in courthouses
or law offices but in the Boston newspapers.
Eager to claim credit for American independence, Austin's lawyer
opponents nevertheless seemed unable to break their bands of dependence
with English legal culture. James Sullivan's near-verbatim reliance on
Blackstone illustrates the point. The lawyers of '86 fancied themselves
libertarian Whigs even as they enforced a Tory's jurisprudence. If
Lockean rights and liberties adorned the lawyers' rhetoric, the spirit of
Hobbes possessed their logic. Given man's "proneness to ambition and
avarice," as Sullivan argued, "coercive power must be lodged somewhere
to compel justice." 267 In the years after independence, Massachusetts
lawyers had come to fear the "spirit of '76"-in particular the idea of
unmediated popular sovereignty and the threat it posed to private property.
As early as 1778, Theophilus Parsons-a newly minted Bay State lawyer
and future Chief Justice-evidenced deep misgivings about the open-
ended conceptions of popular liberty flowing from the perceived
devolution of power to the people after independence. Parsons stressed the
need for positive legal constraints on natural liberty going forward and
advised entrusting only "men of education and fortune" with the
responsibilities of constitutional governance.2 68 "[W]e are to look further
than to the bulk of the people, for the greatest wisdom, firmness,
consistency and perseverance." 269 At the same time, Parsons, like so many
others in the profession, purported to cherish and protect the capacious
liberties for which radical revolutionary republicans, from Samuel Adams
to Benjamin Austin, had fought.270
265. See Charles McKirdy, A Bar Divided: The Lawyers of Massachusetts and the American
Revolution, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 205, 208 (1972).
266. Richard A. Samuelson, The Constitutional Sanity of James Otis: Resistance Leader and
Loyal Subject, 61 REV. POL. 493 (1999).
267. Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 27, 1786, at 1.
268. PARSONS, supra note 260, at 362, 369.
269. Id at 369.
270. See A Twig of the Branch, INDEP. CHRON., May 4, 1786, at 1. Later during the ratification
debates, Parsons assured his Antifederalist adversaries that juries, whose verdicts he emphasized did
not constitute "law," would retain discretion to check congressional "usurpation." 2 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 94 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1888). Parsons referred to John Dudley-the New Hampshire
farmer-turned-judge who instructed his juries to ignore the common law in favor of "common sense,"
see supra note 33-"the best judge I ever knew in New Hampshire," BLOOMFIELD, supra note 29, at
57 (quoting Parsons). A complicating factor here lay in the shifting definitions of "liberty" and
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The Austinites, of course, recognized no genuine divisions in the
American legal mind-only hypocrisy. To be sure, the lawyers' rhetoric
may have emitted a whiff of libertarianism, but their practices and laws
established them as aristocrats in fact. The lawyers employed a
republicanized vocabulary, Austin suggested, precisely in order to
perpetuate their professional monopoly and thereby subvert republican
values. Years later Tocqueville would observe a similar insidious tendency
in the profession. Through the courts, the Frenchman wrote, the lawyers,
even as they "belonged to the people," also "controlled democracy" and,
acting "imperceptibly" upon the legal system, finally "fashioned it to suit
[their] own purposes."27 1 The profession's capacity to exert legal power
seemingly independent of the people themselves led the Austinites to
conclude that it had grown into an aristocracy that, if not nipped in the
bud, would eventually destroy the republic.272
As a potent early expression of the anti-aristocratic idea, Austin's 1786
essays shed critical light on the origins of an ideological tradition that
would shape American politics straight through the Jacksonian period.2 73
Twenty years earlier, Austin's anti-aristocratic ideology would have
carried little appeal. But by the 1780s, when Austin wrote, a resistance to
all things "aristocratical" reached deep into the catacombs of the American
mind.2 74 That lawyers offended this new egalitarian sensibility tells us
something important about the sensibility itself. For Austin's anti-
aristocratic critique of lawyers, as we have seen, extended far beyond
robes, wigs, or other cultural conceits. The Austinites took particular
umbrage at the profession's claimed epistemological monopoly. The
"order of the black robe" represented, above all, an aristocracy of
knowledge. The sudden extension of post-Revolutionary egalitarianism
into matters of intellect and epistemology seems to mark something
peculiar about the historical moment in 1786.275 Indeed, we find at least
one of Austin's followers throwing in a critique of doctors and ministers,
both of whom this writer also considered knowledge monopolists, for
"freedom" among post-Revolutionary lawyers, who increasingly came to define these concepts in
terms of private property protections rather than political freedoms. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 4, at
126.
271. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 116, at 358.
272. See Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 9, 1786, at 2.
273. For an insightful analysis of how the Jacksonian politicians, particularly Van Buren,
employed the language of aristocracy to describe the Whig opposition, see GERALD LEONARD, THE
INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS 177-92 (2002).
274. WOOD, supra note 38, at 8, 241-42.
275. For a valuable work that views the "American revolution in the law" as an epistemological
revolution, see STIMSON, supra note 71. Stimson, however, does not explore its more radical
manifestations. This epistemological revolution also represents an important origin of an "anti-
intellectual" tradition in American life Richard Hofstadter masterfully traced. See RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963). Austin, however, does not get so
much as an index entry in Hofstadter's otherwise masterful volume.
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good measure.2 76 The lawyers, though, had struck a much deeper nerve,
for they had purported to monopolize a field of knowledge seemingly
integral to the young republic's identity.
The Revolution, if we take Thomas Paine's word for it, had made law
America's "king." And yet early in its reign, according to the Austinites,
America's new monarch had become something of a tyrant.2 77 The
emergence of this perception stands as one of the most fascinating and
historically seminal intellectual events to occur in post-Revolutionary
America and one too often overlooked by legal historians. In part this
Article has concerned itself with explaining how and why it happened.
Certainly, maneuvering lawyers had much to do with creating the popular
equation of law with tyranny. These "pernicious practitioners" had
"warp[ed] the laws to answer [their] particular purposes," introducing a
"multiplicity of needless and almost unintelligible words" and "mystical
phrases."2 78 But one key to understanding Austin's larger significance lies
in the recognition that the Austinites did not clearly distinguish between
the lawyers and the law on which they relied: the common law. The
common law not only made the lawyers' epistemological monopoly
possible; it embodied the monopoly. The Austinites wanted nothing to do
with its aristocratic "artificial reason," for it made a mockery of republican
common sense.
In evaluating the implications of Austin's ideas in their own time,
however, we cannot ignore the views espoused by the common law's
defenders-the throng of lawyers who rose up against Honestus in the
spring of '86. We learn something important about the Austinites' larger
historical significance by listening closely to their adversaries. And, as we
have seen, the lawyers of '86 believed that Austin and the movement he
spearheaded represented not merely a popular repudiation of the legal
profession or the common law but an underlying hostility to "the Law
itself "279 What can we make of this claim? When directly confronted with
it, Austin demurred. Passages in his writings-as well as the distinctly
anti-authoritarian spirit that animated the movement against courts,
lawyers, and the common law in 1786-lent support to the lawyers'
assertion.280 Yet we also must account for Austin's professed commitment
276. See Cousin German to Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 30, 1786, at 2; see also HATCH,
supra note 27, at 27-30. For the resistance to professionalism generally in the new republic, see
DANIEL H. CALHOUN, PROFESSIONAL LIVES IN AMERICA: STRUCTURE AND ASPIRATION, 1750-1850
(1965).
277. See, e.g., supra notes 41, 42, 43 and accompanying text.
278. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at 1; May II, 1786, at 1; Apr. 13, 1786, at 1.
279. Letter from Caleb Strong to Nathan Dane (June 24, 1786), in 16 SHIPTON & SIBLEY, supra
note 180, at 96, 96 (emphasis added); see also A Lawyer, MASS. CENTINEL, Apr. 26, 1786, at 1.
280. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. If James Sullivan's suggestion that law and
legal systems required lawyers in order to exist at all, see Zenas, INDEP. CHRON., May 11, 1786, at 2-
an assertion buttressed by Harold Berman's work on Western legal systems generally, see BERMAN,
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to an alternative justice system governed by so-called "fundamental
principles of law." The difficulty arises from Austin's equivocation on this
phrase, for he simultaneously pleaded these "fundamental principles" as
alternatives to law itself (that is, as a proxy for each individual's moral
constitution) and as a defense to the accusation of unqualified
antilegalism. Certainly, as a matter of optics, Austin would have had good
reason not to concede the lawyers' allegation in public, which might have
played right into the hands of his antagonists, who aimed to depict
Honestus as a dangerous anarchist. A deeper explanation for Austin's
apparent equivocation, however, may lie in the Janus-faced attitudes
toward "law" that prevailed among many post-Revolutionary Americans
who often seemed simultaneously to cling to and recoil from it.
A key passage in Paine's widely read Common Sense forecasted the
tension. Paine purported to make "the law" America's "king," placed a
"crown" thereon, and proclaimed that this new king would "reign above"
the people.28 ' But in the very next breath he urged that "lest any ill use
should afterwards arise," law's crown should "be demolished and
scattered among the people whose right it is."282 Paine thus first enthroned
"law" and then proceeded effectively to destroy it. To function
authoritatively, law had to "reign above" the people; but to comport with
republicanism, it had to remain at one with them. Along roughly similar
lines, Austin claimed to base his alternative regime on "fundamental
principles of law" and defended the people's right to "appeal with safety
to the laws of their country."283 But in substance the justice system he
imagined-bereft of common law, courts, and lawyers, relying only on
each individual's moral sense of "right and wrong" and perhaps a shifting
pluralistic overlay of unwritten community-specific customs unrecognized
at law-looked little like any legal system that post-Revolutionary
Americans could have known. The dispute resolution models that Austin
proposed, moreover, each rested on judgment by one's neighbors and
brethren-for Austin, the embodiment of pure "equity"-rather than on
courts or legal rules contrived by a professional elite, and each offered a
self-conscious alternative to legal process.
We have, then, rhetorical nods to "fundamental principles of law"
belying a substantive hostility to law itself. But if Austin did in fact harbor
hostility to legal systems as such, whence did it derive? The foregoing
supra note 179, at 8-then the Austinites' proposal to abolish lawyers implied a claim to abolish law
itself.
281. 1 PAINE, supra note 60, at 29. Historians who quote Paine's "law is king" statement too often
neglect Paine's subsequent statement. See supra note 13. But see Christopher Tomlins, Republican
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 540, 543 (Edward Gray & Jane
Kamensky eds., 2013).
282. 1 PAINE, supra note 60, at 29.
283. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., June 1, 1786, at 2; Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
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analysis has suggested a few of its intellectual sources: anti-aristocratic
ideology, Scottish common sense epistemology, a custom-based (rather
than rule-based) ethic, a nativistic rejection of the English legal heritage,
and a pragmatic assessment of how lawyers and legal systems adversely
affected the interests of ordinary people. Yet at the root of all these
factors, I think, lies a more critical ideological wellspring from which the
antilegalistic spirit of '86 ultimately flowed-a wellspring to which Paine
had previously gestured: Revolutionary republicanism's ideal of self-rule,
its fetishization of the people themselves as the only legitimate locus of
authority in matters of law and government.28 4 This utopian ideal of
republican self-rule purported to resolve the age-old conflict between
liberty and authority by merging the latter into the former, rendering each
person a "participant in the authority by which he was ruled." 2 85 At
bottom, the Austinites desired "laws" that not only derived from the
people, but remained with them inalienably.286 The explosion of town
meetings that accompanied the publication of Austin's writings as well as
the convention activity and court blockades that ensued during Shays's
Rebellion dramatically enacted and reified this desire. 287 In short, Austin
and his partisans envisioned a justice system in which the people held the
law in their own hands and literally ruled themselves.
The Austinites' resistance to the idea of representation, conceived as
delegating discretionary legal authority to a "few men" and deemed by
Austin himself the "aristocratical" party's peculiar machination, speaks
volumes about their underlying conceptions of republican self-rule.288
Historians have long observed that the American Revolution generated a
deep distrust of the representative mechanism in government that
intensified in the 1780s, as evidenced not only in the period's literature
(newspapers, pamphlets, sermons) but also in the people's persistent
appeals to alternative "extra-legal" bodies during this period-committees,
conventions, town meetings, and crowd action.289 The underlying desire
for "institutional immediacy," to exert self-rule in its most direct and
unadulterated form, resulted in what Gordon Wood calls a "disintegration
of representation" in the decade after 1776.290 Post-Revolutionary
284. See generally FRITZ, supra note 261.
285. POCOCK, supra note 53, at 43.
286. See Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at 1.
287. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. For the Shaysites, writes Christian Fritz,
"court closings did not overthrow the Massachusetts government but legitimately interposed the
authority of the people-as the ruler-to temporarily suspend policies that were inherently wrong if
not unconstitutional." FRITZ, supra note 261, at 101.
288. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 25, 1786, at 2.
289. WOOD, supra note 131, at 363-69; see also FRITZ, supra note 261, at 11-116.
290. WOOD, supra note 131, at 363. Brendan McConville uses the phrase "institutional
immediacy" to describe the impulse underlying revolutionary committees and conventions. Brendan
McConville, Assoc. Professor of History, Boston Univ., Keynote Address at the Warwick-Boston
University Atlantic World Conference: The Problem of the "People" in Revolutionary America (Mar.
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ideological understandings in this regard drew on a long republican
intellectual tradition from Aristotle to Harrington that operated with an
implied hostility toward representation. 291 The tradition received a modem
articulation in Rousseau, who in 1762 advanced the claim that
sovereignty, by its very nature, could not be represented. The moment a
people decided to "pay deputies and stay at home," Rousseau declared, "it
is no longer free; it no longer exists." Any law that "the people has not
ratified in person is void; it is not law at all." 29 2 In the years after
independence, it does appear that most Americans came to accept some
form of representation as a practical expedient in large, dispersed
communities. 2 9 3 But in at least two ways, Critical Period radicals, and the
Austinites in particular, conducted a kind of backdoor assault on the idea.
First, the Austinites sought to make elected representatives into mere
mouthpieces for the people through binding legislative "instructions."294
The "grand prerogative of the PEOPLE," Austin wrote, lay in the "right of
instructing" their representatives.295 Without the power directly to bind
representatives so that each did precisely as their constituents wished at all
times, the "aristocratic" impulse would soon obliterate "every shadow of
REPUBLICANISM."2 96 Yet instructions in the way Austin envisioned
them embodied something of a paradox: they presupposed the existence of
representation, while denying any independent authority to
24, 2011). Aspects of the pre-Revolutionary colonial heritage, in particular the New England town
meeting, provided important context for the post-Revolutionary longing for unmediated self-rule. See
MICHAEL ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY (1970); see also Reid, supra note 16 (examining crowd action in pre-Revolutionary
Massachusetts).
291. See POCOCK, supra note 53, at 270; WOOD, supra note 131, at 363; see also BAILYN, supra
note 53; J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975).
292. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 141 (Maurice Cranston ed., 1968)
(emphasis added). James Otis, Jr. and Josiah Quincy, Jr., among others, cited Rousseau. BAILYN,
supra note 53, at 27. The one monograph that explores Rousseau's influence in North America during
the imperial crisis and early nation period intimates that while Rousseau may not have been cited as
often as Coke, Locke, or Trenchard and Gordon, many Americans shared his assumptions about law
and government. PAUL SPURLIN, ROUSSEAU IN AMERICA, 1760-1809, at 67 (1976). Reflecting on the
heady post-Revolutionary period, Orestes Brownson suggested that Rousseau's radicalism had
fundamentally shaped American political ideology. See ORESTES BROWNSON, THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 46-47 (New York, P. O'Shea 1866).
293. See, e.g., [Anonymous], The People the Best Governors (New Hampshire, 1776), in I
AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 390, 391-92 (Charles S. Hyneman &
Donald Lutz eds., 1983).
294. As we have seen, the anti-lawyer agitation that surrounded Austin's writings resulted in
many towns issuing instructions to their representatives. The agitation in favor of rights to impose
such instructions shaped the political and constitutional debates in a number of states during the
Critical Period. See WOOD, supra note 131, at 363-90; see also FRITZ, supra note 261, at 125-27
(discussing debates over the right to instruct in Maryland in early 1787). For many Americans in the
1780s, "constitutional principles of the American revolution established the right to instruct . . . ." Id.
at 126. On the topic of legislative instructions generally, see Christopher Terranova, The
Constitutional Life of Legislative Instructions in America, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1335 (2009).
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representatives. Binding legislative instructions, stated one of Austin's
allies on this issue, enabled the people to exercise legislative authority at
once "personally" and "representationally."2 97
Second, the Austinites indirectly attacked the representative mechanism
itself by seeking to abolish the legal profession. As middlemen who had
inserted themselves between the people and the law, holding the former
for ransom, lawyers epitomized representation's most fearsome anti-
republican aspects. Austin seems to have viewed lawyers and legislative
representatives as one and the same, complaining about lawyer-dominated
legislatures and lobbying to cleanse the assemblies of all who ran among
that "order."298 Unable to attack the concept of representation directly due
to practical exigencies, the Austinites assailed representatives. In both of
these backdoor assaults on the representative mechanism, the ideal of
direct self-rule continued powerfully to shape American attitudes toward
the law in the post-Revolutionary period.2 99
Such anti-authoritarian ideals, however, also posed a grave threat to the
lawyers' whole enterprise. The Austinian challenge forced post-
Revolutionary legal establishmentarians to articulate new and revealing
defenses of the law in a republican society. From the perspective of law's
defenders in 1786, the agitation for instructions, for the "annihilation" of
legal representation, and the underlying republican desire for a legal
system predicated on direct self-rule, all rested upon a jurisprudential
fallacy. Coercive authority had to be lodged somewhere to compel
obedience to the law. If the lawyers of '76 had felt compelled to reject
Blackstone and instead embrace Locke in order to justify increasing
resistance and ultimately revolution, the lawyers of '86-Caleb Strong,
John Quincy Adams, James Sullivan, and many others-began to find
certain fundamental principles of law and government enunciated in the
Commentaries quite germane and useful.300 The idea of the people ruling
themselves directly, according to Blackstone, stood diametrically opposed
to law itself. "[T]his devolution of power, to the people at large," he
wrote, in reference to Locke, "repeals all positive laws whatsoever before
enacted." 301 No human laws could withstand this "devolution" for it would
ipso facto "destroy all law" and "render all legal provisions invalid."30 2
297. WOOD, supra note 131, at 372 (quoting William Paca, MD. J., Aug. 31, 1787).
298. See Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1786, at I ("Can we suppose the Republic to be free
from danger, while this 'order' are admitted so abundantly as members of our Legislature?").
299. See generally FRITZ, supra note 261. For an insightful essay exploring the deep tensions
between democracy and representation, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Representation and Democracy:
Uneasy Alliance, 27 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 335 (2004).
300. For the earlier rejection of Blackstone in favor of Locke, see James Wilson, Considerations
on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament (1774), in 2 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721-46 (Robert McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WILSON WORKS].
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Blackstone shared Hobbes's view that only authority made law and that
the people could not personally possess the requisite authority vis-A-vis
themselves without becoming ensnared in a jurisprudential contradiction.
The lawyers of '86 concurred.
Paine's casual identification of law itself with the "people whose right it
is" had obscured an underlying paradox that the debates between Austin
and his interlocutors in the Critical Period's eleventh hour thrust into the
light of day: Government by the people and government under law-self-
rule and law-rule-could not comfortably co-exist.303 In practical reality,
enthroning law as America's new "king" required the people's
subordination to legal authority. The American Revolution's humanized
ideal of "law" so enthusiastically embraced by the Austinites-popular
self-rule-actually took everything out of law that made law legal. Radical
post-Revolutionary republicans might purport to merge law with liberty, to
render the law coextensive with the people's will voluntarily given, but at
the moment of direct contact law self-destructed for want of an authority
properly constituted. It became revolution. The professional legal mind's
increasingly acute awareness of the legal paradox of self-rule resulting
from the radicals' provocations in 1786 goes to the heart of the Critical
Period crisis in its final phases and, as we shall see, sheds important light
on the motivations behind the movement for a new Constitution, which
began gathering steam shortly thereafter."
B. A Counterrevolution Contested
A minor backlash did apparently ensue against the Austinites in the
wake of Shays's Rebellion. But it would not last long.305 While it may
303. For an insightful discussion of this jurisprudential tension, see Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499-1501 (1988); see also FRITZ, supra note 261, at 291 (noting that
the idea of a "rule of law" is "inconsistent with the notion [held by many post-Revolutionary
Americans] that a sovereign people could not be bound even by a fundamental law of their own
making"). Christopher Tomlins' work is particularly alive to these and similar tensions. TOMLINS,
supra note 7 (noting conflicts between "legal discourse" and revolutionary republicanism's discourse
of "police" in the early republic); see also Christopher Tomlins, Republican Law, supra note 281, at
541. Recent scholarship treating "localized law" in the post-Revolutionary Carolinas as an expression
of popular sovereignty proceeds virtually untouched by this tension. See EDWARDS, supra note 7,
passim.
304. Bay State lawyer Fisher Ames evidenced his own awareness of the legal paradox of self-rule
in March of 1787. Revolutionary elites, he wrote, had "expected a government by laws, and not by
men" but were "chagrined to see that the feelings of the people were not only consulted in all
instances, but that in many they were allowed to legislate." I WORKS OF FISHER AMES 13 (Boston,
T.B. Wait & Co. 1809). The elites who had convinced themselves that law would be the "supreme
power" in the newly independent nation experienced "absolute despair when they found that not only
individuals, but conventions, and other bodies of men, unknown to the constitution, presumed to
revise, and in effect repeal, the acts of the legislature." Id. at 13-14.
305. By all appearances, only a small number of articulate lawyers and elite "friends of
government," rather than a broad cross-section of the citizenry, participated in this backlash. Indeed, in
May of 1787, Austin-whom it was generally known had written the anti-lawyer essays, see A
Mechanick, MASS. CENTINEL, April 8 1786, at I (referring to Honestus as "Ben")-found himself
elected to the state senate for the first time and a few months later had assumed a prominent role
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have temporarily put an end to the spirit of '86's physical manifestations,
Governor Bowdoin's militia left the underlying ideological dispute
between the Austinites and the lawyers untouched. By September of 1787,
moreover, anti-aristocratic revolutionary republicans in all the states faced
a new threat that compelled them to close ranks: the new Constitution. In
many respects, the ratification debates in 1787 and 1788 extended and
elaborated upon the exchanges that Austin and his lawyer-interlocutors
had begun in 1786. American historians have made much about the
emergence of popular sovereignty as the governing political paradigm in
lieu of parliamentary sovereignty during and after the Revolution.30
Actually the men spearheading the movement for a new national
constitutional framework proceeded on many of the same Blackstonian
premises employed by Austin's opponents a year prior. They responded to
the rebellious spirit of '86 and to the legal paradox of self-rule that it had
laid bare with the impulse toward law and not liberty. "[W]hat is to afford
us security against the violence of lawless men?" Henry Knox wrote to
George Washington in October 1786 referencing the Shaysites.307 "Our
government must be braced, changed or altered to secure our lives and
property."30 s Knox and others involved in the movement for a new
Constitution implicitly recognized the ideological underpinnings and
jurisprudential implications of the Massachusetts uprisings. After the
Revolution, Knox recollected, many Americans had entertained the idea
that "we were not as other nations requiring brutal force to support the
laws."309 The Bay State rebellions had disabused Knox and other "men of
reflection, & principle" in Massachusetts of this notion. Such men had
now become "determined to endeavor to establish a government which
shall have the power to protect them in their lawful pursuits . . . .
Benjamin Franklin put the matter in slightly different terms: "We have
been guarding against an evil that the old states are most liable to, excess
of power in the rulers, but our present danger seems to be the defect in
obedience in the subjects.""' The Massachusetts uprising, as George
opposing the proposed Constitution. On March 1, 1787, after the "suppression" of Shays's Rebellion,
a lengthy essay appeared in the Independent Chronicle criticizing Austin's earlier writings as
"subversive of all order and regularity" and setting out a point-by-point refutation of them. Tully,
INDEP. CHRON., March 1, 1787, at 1. The author's felt need to refute Austin almost a year after his
essays first appeared, and after Shays's Rebellion, demonstrates the continuing appeal of Austin's
writings. Around the same time, Fisher Ames noted that "the people" continued to "arraign . . . the
exactness and multiplicity of the laws, and the constitution itself." I WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra
note 304, at 12.
306. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 131, at 344-89.
307. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Oct. 23, 1786), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, CONFEDERATION SERIES 299, 300 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds.,
1995) (emphasis added).
308. Id. at 301.
309. Id. at 300.
3 10. Id.
311. 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 7 (A.H. Smyth ed., 1907).
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Washington concluded, had provided indisputable "proof' that "mankind
left to themselves are unfit for their own government. "312
For his part, James Madison believed that the "turbulent scene in
Massachusetts" had "done inexpressible injury to the republican character
in that part of the U. States." 3 13 In his "Vices of the Political System of the
United States," written days before he departed for Philadelphia in 1787,
Madison identified the core problem under the Articles of Confederation
requiring rectification: "want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in
the Government." For a sanction, Madison revealingly wrote, "is essential
to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Government."3 14 The impulse
toward law caused by the unsettling events in Massachusetts coincided
with a sharp turn in the intellectual tides among "men of reflection, &
principle" against popular sovereignty's more radical-and antilegal-
articulations. Madison attributed the problems infesting state government
lawmaking-including their excessive "mutability" and "injustice"-to
one chief cause: "the people themselves."3 15 "Here the ways divide," wrote
Bay State lawyer Fisher Ames in March of 1787: one path, rule by the
people, would lead to "anarchy"; "the other, by the wise and vigorous
assertion of lawful authority, will lead to permanent power and general
prosperity."31
In February of 1787, Pennsylvanian Benjamin Rush carefully qualified
the idea born of the revolutionary experience that "the sovereign and all
other power is seated in the people." Rush felt the idea "unhappily
expressed. It should be all power is derived from the people. They possess
it only on the days of election."3 17 Judge Alexander Contee Hanson of
Maryland made a similar point in June of 1787 as the secret convention
proceeded in Philadelphia. "All power indeed flows from the people," he
wrote in the Maryland Gazette, "but the doctrine that the power actually at
all times, resides in the people, is subversive of all government and
law.""'1 For law to serve its function, the people had to transfer authority
to the legislature until the next election so as to render themselves, in the
words of another Maryland writer, "bound by the laws that shall be so
312. Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee, Jr. (Oct. 31, 1786), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 307, at 318, 318 (emphasis added).
313. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 24, 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 316, 319 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900).
314. Id. at 363.
315. Id. at 366.
316. 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES, supra 304, at 17.
317. Horst Dippel, The Changing Idea of Popular Sovereignty in Early American
Constitutionalism, 16 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 21, 36-37 (1996) (quoting Rush). The belief in the people's
right to instruct representatives at any time contradicted Rush's assertion. See supra notes 294-297 and
accompanying text.
318. [Aristides], To The People of Maryland (June 9, 1787), in REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
AND THE REVOLUTION 118, 125 (Melvin Yazawa ed.,1975).
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made."3 19 Blackstone had not only survived the American Revolution. He
now found himself enlisted in a momentous effort to restrain its republican
aspirations.
And yet if the men of '87 waged a counterrevolution of sorts, it rested
on yet another impressive feat of rhetorical massage by the American legal
elite-this in large part necessitated by the formidable opposition that
appeared during the ratification debates.3 2 0 The law-minded Federalist
persuasion could not entirely ignore the revolutionary ideological heritage
and its appealing, if ultimately fallacious, conceptual identification of law
with the people. Hamilton, Madison, and their intellectual brethren thus
continued to sing the praises of republicanism-even as their
constitutional theory stretched the concept almost beyond recognition. The
legal paradox of self-rule created a puzzle for those constitutional lawyers
in 1787 committed to establishing a national government by law while
somehow assuaging resistant revolutionary republicans committed to
government by the people: How to create a government whose authority in
some way derived from the people-that is, that did not exist, in
Madison's words, like a despot entirely "independent of society itself'-
but which in fact precluded the people from ruling themselves? Or, again:
How to republicanize government by the few?32' Writing as Publius,
James Madison purported to offer a "republican remedy for the diseases
most incident to republican government."322 The "people," he insisted,
would by the ratification mechanism put their stamp of approval on the
constitutional framework and would thereafter elect representatives.
Lawmaking itself, however, could not authentically effectuate the people's
will or otherwise directly involve ordinary citizens without exposing the
national republic to systemic risk. In order to prevent liberty from
devouring itself, Publius famously declared, the American system of
government had ultimately to rest on the "total exclusion of the people in
their collective capacity from any share" in the lawmaking process.323
Who, then, would properly fashion and administer the law under the
new Constitution if not the people? "[T]he man of the learned profession,"
of course.324 Not the people themselves, argued Publius, but rather "some
temperate and respectable body of citizens" whose "wisdom may best
discern the true interest of the country" and who thus might "suspend the
319. WOOD, supra note 131, at 370 (quoting MD. J., Feb. 23, 1787).
320. See WOOD, supra note 131, at 562 (noting that Federalists employed "the most popular and
democratic rhetoric available to explain and justify their aristocratic system"). Other instances of
similar rhetorical manipulation occurred during the Revolutionary period. See ROEBER, supra note 49
(Virginia); Murrin, supra note 57 (Massachusetts).
321. See generally Gary Rosen, James Madison and the Problem ofFounding, 58 REV. POL., 561
(1996).
322. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 69, at 128 (James Madison).
323. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 69, at 373 (James Madison).
324. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 69, at 234 (James Madison).
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blow meditated by the people against themselves."325 The "public voice,"
Publius insisted, "pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for that purpose."3 26  Only laws made and
administered by a "small number" of men capable of refining, enlarging,
and, if necessary, contradicting the people's wishes could properly
"establish Justice" and "insure domestic Tranquility" in the new nation. 3 27
Publius thus made both lawyers and representation-the Austinites' two
bates noirs-essential components of the new Constitution. Madison's
transformative intellectual innovation, however, lay in the assertion that
the representative mechanism-that is, the alienation of legal authority-
served not as a mere practical expedient or "necessary evil," as men
possessed of the spirit of '86 might have conceded, but instead as the sine
qua non of American republicanism.32 8 One cannot overstate the
significance of this assertion. In the space of a few paragraphs, Madison
had coerced the concept of republicanism into a 180-degree turn. For
"there can be nothing further from the republican principle than the idea
that a select body of persons can represent, impersonate, or stand for a
body of autonomous citizens and claim that when it governs them, they
are governing themselves." 32 9
Madison's audacious reinvention of republicanism, however, did not go
unopposed and the Austinites' revolution against the law in 1786 points to
325. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 69, at 371 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
supra note 69, at 126 (James Madison).
326. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 69, at 126 (James Madison).
327. See U.S. CONST., pmbl. "Neo-federalist" constitutional scholars, including Bruce Ackerman
and Akhil Amar, departing from the Beardian view and inspired by Gordon Wood, have set out a more
optimistic reading of the Constitution's purportedly democratic aspirations. Ackerman suggests that
the Constitution envisions a "dual" or "two-track" democracy. One track has the people themselves, in
their "higher lawmaking" capacity, altering and amending the constitution as they wish, irrespective of
Article V. In the second track, the people act subject to Congress, which in turn operates subject to the
Constitution. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); AKHIL AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); Akhil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 64 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). Woody Holton,
however, has offered a convincing resurrection of the Beardian view. See WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY
AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007); see also Rosen, supra note 260; TERRY
BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY (2007). A Beardian revival may be in the offing.
328. Madison defined the term "republic" as a "government in which the scheme of
representation takes place." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 69, at 126 (James Madison).
329. POCOCK, supra note 53, at 270; see also Pitkin, supra note 299. Prior to the publication of
The Federalist No. 10, conventional understandings among Americans of the different forms of
government rested on the classical distinctions between monarchy (rule by one), aristocracy (rule by
the few), and democracy (rule by the people). Never used in the Constitution itself to describe the
federal government, the term "republican" had traditionally been equated with democracy in small
states and had very radical connotations within the English political tradition. Madison's audacious
rhetorical feat in The Federalist No. 10 lay in the assertion that republicanism, in fact, stood opposed
to democracy and, more importantly, far superior to it. See Isaac Kramnick, Editor's Introduction, in
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 69, at 40-41. In No. 14, Madison himself recognized the
"prevalence" of "confounding . .. a republic with a democracy." THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note
69, at 141 (James Madison).
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critical pre-Constitutional intellectual origins of Antifederalism for which
historians have failed to account.330 Indeed, Austin himself opposed
ratification with abundant energy, becoming a prominent figure in the
movement against the new Constitution in Massachusetts and leveraging
this prominence into a political career that extended straight through the
Jeffersonian period. In 1788, he published a number of essays in the
Chronicle under the pseudonym "Candidus," criticizing the proposed
Constitution."' Austin here emphasized the "old republican" themes that
marked many other Antifederalist writings.332 Americans, he contended,
had too quickly concluded that more "energy in government" would solve
its financial problems. Austin insisted that the country instead needed
"industry and frugality." It needed virtue, not law.333 Rejecting Publius's
rhetorical manipulations, Austin sought above all to keep alive the
authentic republicanism inherited from the Revolution on which his earlier
law reform essays had drawn.334 Along with other notables opposing
ratification, Austin suggested that the new Constitution's centralized
representative legal framework would destroy the people's inalienable
right to rule themselves.335
Indeed, it would not go too far wide of the mark to assert that the whole
thrust of the Antifederalist critique reflected an Austinian hostility to the
legal elite.336 Opponents of ratification demeaned the Constitution as the
"work of lawyers."33 7 "Beware of the lawyers," wrote one New York
Antifederalist editor. "Of the men who framed the monarchial, tyrannical,
330. Saul Cornell's important book on Antifederalism richly traces a tradition forward from 1788,
but spends precious little time analyzing its pre-Constitutional origins, all but ignores hostilities
toward the legal profession, and does not make mention of Austin's 1786 essays. See CORNELL, supra
note 77. Cornell's more recent work, however, does hint at Austin's significance in this regard.
Cornell, supra note 210, at 306-08.
331. See, e.g., Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 3, 1788, at 3; Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 20,
1787, at 2; Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1787, at 1. Austin's good friend Samuel Adams
probably also had a hand in these essays. See 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 123 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981).
332. 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 331, at 124.
333. Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 6, 1787, at 1; see also POCOCK, supra note 53, at 40-43,270
(distinguishing between virtue and law, republicanism and "jurisprudence," in eighteenth-century
Anglo-American political ideology).
334. See WOOD, supra note 131, at 520-24.
335. During the 1790s, under the name "Old South," Austin attacked the "aristocratical"
Federalist party in a number of essays later compiled in a pamphlet. See BENJAMIN AUSTIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLICANISM IN OPPOSITION To FALLACIOUS FEDERALISM 16, 20 (Boston,
Adams & Rhoades 1803).
336. For an insightful article that views the ratification debates in similar terms, see Cornell,
supra note 210; see also TOMLINS, supra note 7, at 60-98.
337. WARREN, supra note 24, at 218. 1 do not mean that none of those men opposing the
Constitution practiced law. A few did, though most were black sheep. Patrick Henry, for example, had
virtually no legal education and could only gain admission to the Virginia Bar after significant struggle
with his examiners. See ROBERT MEAD, PATRICK HENRY 96-97 (1957). The anti-lawyer sentiment
tended to emerge from the "middling" and "plebeian" ranks, which coalesced into the central driving
force behind the movement opposing the new Constitution. See generally CORNELL, supra note 77.
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diabolical system of slavery, the New Constitution, one half were lawyers
... to whose wicked arts we may chiefly attribute the adoption of the
abominable system."338 The same commitments to direct self-rule, local
customs, common sense, and community decision-making displayed in
Austin's writings animated much of the Antifederalist literature. Where
the Federalists sought to create a government of laws and not men, the
Antifederalists, fearful of distant rulers and abstract rules, sought to
protect local communities from law's reach.339 Antifederalists specifically
objected to Publius's attempts to alienate legal authority through
representation intended to refine and enlarge rather than faithfully reflect
the people's desires. While few Antifederalists argued in favor of
abolishing representation altogether, most envisioned an essential
equivalency between agent and principle. "Brutus," for example, asserted
that the very term "representative" meant that the person chosen for this
purpose "must be like the people." Proper representatives, by definition,
must strictly "declare the minds of the people," for "if they do not know,
or are not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people do
not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few."340 Antifederalists continued to
agitate in favor of the people's right to instruct their representatives, and
some insisted that the Constitution memorialize it.341 Opponents of
ratification also vigorously advocated for a specifically enumerated
constitutional guarantee to a jury trial in civil matters-a "jury trial of the
vicinage."342 For the Antifederalists, as for the Austinites before them, the
jury trial right amounted to a right to have one's case tried by equals based
on custom and common sense-that is, pure "equity"-rather than law.3 43
Most saw this as the only alternative consistent with republicansm. *
The foregoing analysis suggests an interpretation of America's
constitutional founding that departs from Charles Beard, the "neo-
Federalists" and the "neo-progressives" alike. 345 The Critical Period crisis
338. A True Antifederalist and No Lawyer, DAILY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Mar. 4, 1789, at 2. For
other examples of the Antifederalists' negative views of lawyers as a class, see 3 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 331, at 56 ("Montezuma"), 60 ("A Democratic Federalist"), 205
("Aristocrotis"); 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 331, at 85 ("A Countryman"); see
also Chroust, Dilemma, supra note 29, at 52.
339. See generally Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-
Federalism from the Attack on Monarchism to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74 (1989).
340. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 331, at 369, 379.
341. 3 id at 117 ("Philadelphiensis"); I ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 761
(Washington, Gales & Seaton, 1834); see also FRITZ, supra note 261, at 148.
342. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 331, at 148 ("Centinel"), 230-31 ("Federal
Farmer").
343. 3 id at 60 ("A Democratic Federalist").
344. See CORNELL, supra note 77, at 60, 66-67.
345. Beard's influential book, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913), argued that economic considerations-namely the desire by the political and
economic elite to protect their property interests-served as the primary motivation behind the
movement for the new Constitution in 1787. For the critical "neo-federalist" in constitutional
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culminated in a revolution against law itself that, in the period's eleventh
hour, suddenly exploded forth out of the volatile soils of revolutionary
republicanism, anti-English nativism, and common sense epistemology,
culminating in Shays's Rebellion. The American revolution against the
law, in turn, helped trigger the movement for a new Constitution whose
exponents aimed permanently to establish the rule of law and rule by the
few at the national level by, among other things, constitutionalizing
lawyers and representation. The Federalist persuasion, however, had to
contend with significant resistance, and the Antifederalist opposition to
ratification continued partially to embody the legally subversive spirit of
'86 to which Austin's writings had given voice.34 6
But if Critical Period antilegalism played some role in provoking a legal
counterrevolution and continued to find expression in the resistance to that
counterrevolution, then the question remains: Did the spirit of '86 survive
the triumph by unanimous ratification of Madison's new constitutional
regime? If we can plausibly link the Austinites' intellectual fate to the fate
of their Antifederalist successors-and the foregoing analysis suggests we
can-then glimpses of an affirmative answer begin to emerge. Historians
have ably refuted the idea that ratification represented the Federalists'
triumph over their adversaries.3 47 The Bill of Rights by itself stands as a
testament to enduring Antifederalist influence in American life and a
ringing refutation of the Federalists' assertion that they had spoken for
"We the People" in Philadelphia. In the twentieth century Americans have
come to consider the Bill of Rights a fundamental part of our
constitutional law. Seen from a different perspective, however, the
perspective from which Austin and certain Antifederalists viewed it, the
Bill of Rights marked out spaces where law could never go.348
The Antifederalists exerted influence in other ways. Partisans for the
Constitution wrote and acted as political animals, engaged simultaneously
scholarship, see ACKERMAN, supra note 266. For prominent recent "neo-progressive" works, see
BOULTON, supra note 327; HOLTON, supra note 327; and GARY NASH, THE UNKNOWN AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2006). See also CORNELL, supra note 77. As previously noted, against Beard's earlier
economic interpretation, neo-federalist scholarship essentially seeks to remake Madison and Hamilton
(writing as Publius) as democratic innovators, but ignores the discursive context-namely, that
Antifederalist opposition-in which each man wrote. See supra note 273. Neo-progressivism, on the
other hand, reasserts Beard's economic motivations behind the movement for a new Constitution and
emphasizes the historical agency of non-elites and opposition figures. The neo-progressives, however,
have not recognized the essentially antilegalistic dimensions of Shays's Rebellion and Antifederalism.
346. For an interpretation of the constitutional founding that resonates with parts of the foregoing
analysis, see TOMLINS, supra note 7, at 60-73.
347. See generally CORNELL, supra note 77; PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION (2010); JACK
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996);
HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
348. Writing as Candidus, Austin criticized the Constitution as "destitute of the basis of freedom,
A BILL OF RIGHTS .. .which exposes every man, within these states, to be dragged hundreds of miles,
to a Federal judicial court." Candidus, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 20, 1787, at 2. Austin contended in 1786
that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights required the abolition of lawyers. Honestus, INDEP.
CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
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in an act of constitutional creation and construction. 349 Publius knew he
had a formidable opposition, sculpting arguments and molding rhetoric
with Antifederalists in mind often to anticipate or preempt the opposition's
assertions.35 0 The result? The Federalist essays, together with James
Wilson's influential speeches in and after 1787, created a theoretical
architecture riddled with deep tensions-effectuating the people's "total
exclusion" from lawmaking while championing their irresistible and ever
salutary sovereign power; vesting supreme legislative power in the federal
government, while dividing it on so many levels as to render it virtually
nugatory; promising a firm and stable structure of national authority
subject to change only by orderly constitutional amendment procedures
under Article V, while invoking the people's revolutionary right to alter or
abolish the Constitution whenever they wished.35 ' In significant respects,
the voice and presence of the Antifederalists, including Austin, caused
these constitutional contradictions.35 2 The Antifederalists conceded at best
only a pyrrhic victory to law's partisans in and after 1787. They permitted
law to prevail only when they could understand it as (i) specifically
precluded from reaching certain areas of human life and subject to jury
review, (ii) sliced, diced, and set at war with itself (through federalism and
divided government) and (iii) rendered constitutionally provisional by
periodic electoral rejuvenation and continually vulnerable to revolutionary
amendment or revocation. "The people could stay loyal to the
Constitution," as one historian has put it, "only if they felt it was
structurally disloyal to itself."353
C. Jeffersonian Legal Radicalism
Recent works have capably mapped out the influence of Antifederalist
thought beyond ratification. 354 The historiographical focus on politics and
constitutionalism, however, means that existing scholarship largely elides
the peculiarly jurisprudential strains of post-ratification American
dissenting thought. The evidence suggests that the spirit of '86 made a
considerable imprint on American attitudes toward the law that would
349. For the seminal work on "constitutional construction" as a mechanism for constitutional
change, see KEITH WHITflNGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
350. See MAIER, supra note 347, at 468; RAKOVE, supra note 347, at 16-17; WOOD, supra note
131, at 563.
351. See Aaron Knapp, Law's Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of American
Jurisprudence, 28 J. L. & POL. - (forthcoming 2013) (analyzing tensions between Publius's and
James Wilson's respective views on sovereignty, representation, amendment, and revolution).
352. In this respect, we cannot forget that during the Philadelphia Convention, Federalists-to-be
had Antifederalists-to-be, such as George Mason and Elbridge Gerry, in their midst.
353. GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT
17(1999).
354. CORNELL, supra note 77.
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endure long after the constitutional founding.55
Our examination of the early national period in this regard must
acknowledge at the outset that Austin himself maintained a vigorous
public life throughout the period and continued to champion the
republican anti-authoritarian ideals that animated his earlier anti-lawyer
writings. For example, John Quincy Adams tells us of a 1792 Boston town
meeting wherein participants discussed a proposed police force for the
town.35 6 Serving as a state senator at the time, Austin took the floor and
argued that a police force would "destroy the liberties of the people" and
would constitute "a resignation of the sovereignty of the town . . . a link in
the chain of aristocratic influence."357 According to Adams, "seven
hundred men" supported Austin, all of whom "looked as if they had been
collected from all the jails on the continent, with Ben. Austin like another
Jack Cade at their head."" In a demonstration of Austin's continuing
influence, republican liberty prevailed over coercive legal authority at this
town meeting. Austin and his supporters decisively defeated the
measure-this despite the impressive "popular eloquence" displayed by
"Sullivan and Jarvis and Otis" (all preeminent Bay State lawyers) at this
meeting.35 9
Austin and his partisans in 1786 must also be counted as key forbears to
the popular law-reform movements that convulsed state politics in the
early national period. Radical Jeffersonian reformers continued to reject as
unrepublican the professional lawyer class, the common law, and formal
legal institutions, advocating instead for a regime of self-administered
arbitration without law, lawyers, or judges.36 o Jefferson's attack on the
federal judiciary in 1801 spurred the radicals to increasingly extreme
355. The two primary studies that explore these strains after 1787 are MILLER, supra note 38,
Book II; and ELLIS, supra note 32. Published posthumously, Miller's book remains provocative
though undocumented and underdeveloped, and it fails to recognize Austin's seminal significance.
Ellis's analysis confines itself to the Jeffersonian period.
356. 1 WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 113 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1913); see also
BOSTON, JANUARY 30, 1792. SPEECH OF THE HON. BENJAMIN AUSTIN, JUN. ESQ. AT FANEUIL-
HALL ... WITH RESPECT TO THE POLICE OF THE TOWN (Boston, B. Edes & Son 1792).
357. 1 WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 356, at 113.
358. Id.
359. Id
360. ELLIS, supra note 32 (Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania); REID, supra note 30
(New Hampshire); ROEBER, supra note 49, at 230-251 (Virginia); G.S. Rowe, Jesse Higgins and the
Failure of Legal Reform in Delaware, 1800-1810, 3 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 17 21-22 (1983); Jeffrey K
Sawyer, Distrust of the Legal Establishment in Perspective: Maryland During the Early National
Years, 2 GA. J. S. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1993). Massachusetts yeoman William Manning's unpublished
manuscript "The Key of Libberty" (1798) provides powerful evidence that the spirit of '86 continued
to possess Bay State farmers in the 1790s. See Samuel E. Morison, William Manning's The Key of
Libberty, 13 WM. & MARY Q. 202 (1956). An avid reader of the Independent Chronicle in the 1780s
and 1790s, Manning's pamphlet empathized with the Shaysites, criticized lawyers, bemoaned the
monopoly on knowledge wielded by "the few," and proposed to create a "Society of Laborers" to
combat the pernicious influence of the aristocratic Society of the Cincinnati, which he linked to the
Federalist party. Id. at 212, 221, 223-34, 227, 230, 242, 248.
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positions on jurisprudential questions. Not surprisingly, Austin himself
published some important essays during this period criticizing the federal
judiciary. He argued that it had "become too complex for the
comprehension of the citizens" giving "scope to a particular profession"
whose members made it their chief aim to put the people and their
property "under the control of that baneful, unqualified instrument
generally denominated Common-Law."36 1 If not promptly dismantled-
and here Austin directed his statements to President Jefferson-this
"extensive machine" would "reduce the people to the most abject state of
servitude" by generating lawyers "in tenfold proportion to other
professions."362
Comparable dissenting voices appeared in republican newspapers
outside of Massachusetts during Jefferson's presidency-in particular
William Duane's Philadelphia paper Aurora-and in jurist Hugh Henry
Brackenridge's popular satirical commentary.363 In the last political
pamphlet he wrote, published in the Aurora in 1805, Thomas Paine argued
in favor of arbitration over courts and lodged a nativistic attack on the
English common law that recalled Austin's earlier invectives. The
"tyrannical" Norman-imposed common law, Paine wrote, served only to
"waste time, embarrass causes and perplex juries," its Latin and French
jargon calculated "to mystify, by not being generally understood, and
therefore [to] serve the basic purpose of what is called law, whose
business is to perplex." 364
But Delawarian Jesse Higgins's widely disseminated 1805 pamphlet,
Samson Against the Philistines, also serially published in the Aurora,
361. Old-South, Reflections on the President's Message, INDEP. CHRON., Dec. 24, 1801, at 2.
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Feb. 9, 1805, at 2; Jan. 31, 1805, at 1; Jan. 30,
1805, at 1; and HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, MODERN CHIVALRY pt. 11 (Claude M. Newlin ed.,
1937). "Down with all law," one of Brackenridge's backcountry antilegalists cried, "and give us a free
government, 'That every man may do that which is right in his own eyes."' Id. at 386; see also supra
note 360. Brackenridge participated in a literary critique of the law within a post-Revolutionary
tradition masterfully explored by Robert Ferguson. See ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (1984). The preeminent Pennsylvania attorney, Horace Binney reported that
Brackenridge, who served on the Pennsylvania high court, in fact "despised the law, because he was
utterly ignorant of it, and affected to value himself solely upon his genius and taste for literature, both
of which were less valued by everyone else." "Talk of your Cokes and Littletons," Brackenridge
apparently stated to Binney one day in open court, "I had rather have one spark of the ethereal fire of
Milton than all of the learning of all the Cokes and Littletons that ever lived." CHARLES CHAUNCEY
BINNEY, THE LIFE OF HORACE BINNEY 40 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 1903). Reform sentiment
in Pennsylvania after reached a fever pitch midway through Jefferson's presidency over the case of
merchant Thomas Passmore. Passmore's insurer adversaries appealed his favorable arbitration award
to the state supreme court, whereupon Passmore publicly maligned the insurers. This incident led to a
contempt order against Passmore, as well as fines and prison time. This resulted in legislative attempts
to impeach the Passmore judges (including Brackenridge); these attempts ultimately failed but sparked
significant public debates regarding reform of the legal system, with Duane's Aurora playing a leading
role. See ELLIS, supra note 32, at 166-67; see also JEFFREY L. PASLEY, supra note 92, at 299-304
(2001).
364. 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, supra note 60, at 1003-04.
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stands as the period's key literary achievement. 6 The tract denounced the
legal profession-whom the author deemed a "national aristocracy"-
courts, legislators and the common law, all of which Higgins believed
only obstructed "free enquiry" into the true principles of justice. 6
Instantiating a trend among the Jeffersonians, Higgins reached back to
pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon customs for guidance, finding in the early
feudal system a "liberty and equality partaking in republicanism."36 7 In a
chapter entitled "Origin of Trial by Jury," Higgins made the historical
claim that law per se did not exist among the Saxons, only honest
judgment by one's equals. At the moment of decision, therefore, no
authority obtained in Saxon justice. The "rude unlettered men" of northern
Europe, the pamphlet emphasized, "submitted to no superior to judge
them."368 Cherished rights to property and personal security, Higgins
urged, did not ultimately rest on the exertions of learned lawyers or on
legal precedent. For such rights originally flowed from the "uniformity of
decisions of men acting as referees without judges or lawyers," men who
could "neither read nor write."3 69 True justice required neither lawyers nor
law but "equality," "character," and "honesty."370 The pamphlet displayed
unmistakable affinities with Austin's earlier writings.37 ' To render the
administration of justice "speedy, convenient and cheap," Higgins
proposed a system of arbitration without lawyers, judges, or common
law-a "mode of trial" wisely recommended by "the merchants of the
capital cities," and "most convenient among a free, enlightened and
commercial people."372
D. The Austinian Critique and the Birth ofAmerican Jurisprudence
The full extent of the spirit of '86's cultural legacy, however, cannot be
truly appreciated until we recognize the extent to which antebellum
American lawyers drew on the antilegalistic principles and ideals first
articulated by Austin. In contrast to the lawyers of '86 who went head-to-
head with the Austinites on all points, subsequent lawyers took their cue
from Publius's triangulations and increasingly began to assimilate aspects
365. JESSE HIGGINS, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES, OR, THE REFORMATION OF LAWSUITS
(Philadelphia, B. Graves 1805).
366. Id. at 67, 24.
367. Id at 5.
368. Id at 6.
369. Id. at 26.
370. HIGGINS, supra note 365, at iv, 6, 37.
371. It remains unclear whether Higgins or his publicist, William Duane, felt any conscious
connection with Benjamin Austin or "Honestus" in particular. Certainly Austin maintained political
prominence in Jeffersonian Massachusetts, and his writings circulated in Philadelphia. See supra notes
27, 361. Nearly every historian that mentions Austin's attack on lawyers in 1786 in the next breath
discusses Higgins's Jeffersonian-era writings. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 27, at 26-28; HORWITZ,
supra note 5, at 148-49; WARREN, supra note 24, at 219-22
372. HIGGINS, supra note 365, at iii, iv, 31, 32.
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of the Austinian critique. Indeed, whereas the lawyers of '86 sought to
legitimate legal complexity with reference to a complex society, early
national lawyers and legal writers came to eschew both legal complexity
and formalism with nearly as much vigor as the Austinites did. Perhaps
most striking in this regard are the ideas of America's first bona fide
jurisprudent, James Wilson, who delivered his seminal Lectures on Law in
Philadelphia in the early 1790s.
Once considered something of a forgotten founder, Wilson's
jurisprudence has received increased attention from constitutional
historians in recent years.3 73  Revolutionary pamphleteer, eminent
Pennsylvania lawyer, and one of Washington's first appointees to the
Supreme Court, Wilson had apparently felt the sting of post-Revolutionary
anti-lawyer sentiment on a very personal level. Because of his prominent
role defending Tories in treason cases, a militia of angry Pennsylvania
democrats famously attacked Wilson's home in 1779.374 Anti-law
agitation may have been experiencing an upsurge in Wilson's home state
at the time he delivered his law lectures.375 Wilson felt compelled to
spotlight in his lectures "the general prejudice against the professional
character of the bar" in post-Revolutionary America. 37 6
Remarkably, while he never expressly advocated abolishing the legal
profession (let alone law itself), Wilson incorporated into his
jurisprudential vision virtually every other principle that Austin had
enunciated in 1786, even appropriating some of the same phraseology. An
anti-Blackstonian streak marked nearly every aspect of Wilson's legal and
constitutional thinking, and his Revolutionary-era writings arguably gave
birth to American legal nativism.377 Like Austin, Wilson had a pronounced
aversion to legal complexity, lamenting "the obscure, and confused and
embarrassed periods of a mile, with which the statute books are loaded
and disgraced." "[S]implicity and plainness and precision should mark the
texture of the law," he wrote. "It claims the obedience-it should be level
373. For example, Akhil Reed Amar's books and articles rely heavily on Wilson's thought. See,
e.g., AMAR, supra note 327; Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1986);
Akhil Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 457, 471, 482 (1994); see also Nicholas Pedersen, Note, Lost Founder: James Wilson in
American Memory, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 318, 329 (2010) (observing that Amar remains "[tioday's
primary champion of Wilson.").
374. See C. Page Smith, The Attack on Fort Wilson, 78 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 177
(1954). John Fabian Witt characterizes the attack as "perhaps the most dramatic riot of the
revolutionary period." WITT, supra note 56, at 17.
375. Protests against Hamilton's excise tax had begun in western Pennsylvania. See STANLEY
ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 462 (1993).
376. 2 WILSON WORKS, supra note 300, at 559, 566.
377. See James Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of
the British Parliament (1774), in 2 WILSON WORKS, supra note 300, at 72146. No one before Wilson
took on the larger-than-life Blackstone with as much energy and effectiveness.
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to the understanding of all."378 In this connection, Wilson shared Austin's
goal of humanizing law by grounding it in a faculty belonging to all men,
a "common sense" or "conscience" that apprehended "right and wrong"
and thereby fixed the "rules of virtue." 379 Neither priests nor politicians,
nor lawyers or judges, could lay exclusive claim to Wilson's common
moral sense, for this common moral sense ultimately constituted "the
business of all men" diffusing itself "through every part of life".3"o
Without it society became "a fabric destitute of order."38'
Wilson extolled human custom as the most republican mode of law
creation, for custom organically imported voluntary personal consent-for
Wilson the sine qua non of any legitimate legal obligation-via
unmediated practical action, thus grounding rules in "experience as well as
opinion" and investing legal forms with human substance.3 82 Wilson
conceived custom as the "essential common law principle" in the
American context.8 3 English jurists from Coke to Blackstone had
previously posited a link between custom and common law but never
searchingly and never based on the humanistic republican rationales
employed by James Wilson. By recasting the common law as the "law of
experience" predicated on the "free and independent man" and thus
dissociating it from both authority traditionally conceived and from arcane
rules and formalities, Wilson helped rehabilitate it against the radicals'
attacks at a moment when it might have met its permanent demise on
American shores.3 84 Wilson's jurisprudence Americanized the common
law by accommodating rather than repudiating its critics.
Wilson's overriding jurisprudential aim lay in reconciling the American
"love of law" with its "love of liberty" and, indeed, rendering them
indistinguishable within American legal culture."' In both common sense
and custom Wilson believed he had effectuated this communion.8 And
yet he also acknowledged that a difference existed between customary
practices and law, for he shared Austin's belief that mercantile disputes
should be decided speedily in separate forums applying community-
378. 1 WILSON WORKS, supra note 300, at 62.
379. Id. at 136-37, 132, 212, 142. Born and educated in Scotland and highly influenced by the
Scottish enlightenment, Wilson had devoured Thomas Reid at university, and Reid's ethical influence
here remains quite transparent. Robert McCloskey, Introduction, in id. at 8, 33.
380. 1 WILSON WORKS, supra note 300, at 135, 136.
381. Id. at 136.
382. Id at 102 (emphasis added).
383. Stephen Conrad, James Wilson's Assimilation of the Common-Law Mind, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
186,201 (1989).
384. 2 WILSON WORKS, supra note 300, at 560; 1 id. at 81.
385. Id. at 72.
386. E.g., id. at 102 ("This mode of promulgation points to the strongest characteristick of liberty,
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specific customs and usages rather than the "niceties of the law." 387 The
question thus remained: How precisely did common sense and custom
exert their influence on the law and the legal system? Customs arose from
common practical action and personal consent in everyday experience, and
common sense diffused itself "through every part of life." 38 But how did
each, if not become law, then at least find legal expression? Doctrinal tests
existed to determine a custom's legal validity in a court of law, but Wilson
did not apparently find them relevant.38 9 Nor did Wilson trust judges or
lawyers to bring customary experiences and common sense to bear on
judicial and legislative proceedings, suggesting that both a "prejudice of
education" and an inflexible fixation on precedent often led the lawyers
astray.3 90 Rather, he saw the ordinary lay jury-"twelve men untutored in
the study of jurisprudence"-as the most appropriate conveyers of
common sense and custom into the justice system.39 1
Wilson conceived of the jury as the embodiment of pure self-rule-a
direct expression of the people's native sovereignty unmediated by
representation. When tried before one's neighbors, he wrote, a defendant
"might, with almost literal propriety, be said to try himself"3 92 As such,
juries retained discretion-"supreme, arbitrary, absolute,
uncontrollable"-to override law and lawyers in accordance with the
dictates of common sense and custom.3 93 The jury operated as an "abstract
of the people" moving within its own sovereign and independent sphere,
addressing itself not to law per se but to the "transactions of life."3 9 4
Where lawyers and judges cleaved closely to formal rules and precedents,
juries could legitimately disregard such legalities, for "[e]very verdict rests
on its own peculiar circumstances, without precedent and without
example."3 95 At the same time, legislative or judicial efforts to confine the
jury's "tremendous jurisdiction" would ultimately fail, for "[t]he native
uprightness of their sentiments will not be bent under the weight of
387. 2idat489
388. l id at 394, 135.
389. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 76-79. One suspects that Wilson would have found
Blackstone's test-which included the requirements that a custom be "reasonable," immemorial, and
"compulsory"-repugnant.
390. 1 WILSON WORKS, supra note 300, at 138; 2 id. at 564-65.
391. 2 id at 541.
392. Id at 509 (emphasis added).
393. Id. at 541 (Juries served as "the ultimate interpreters of the law" with the "power to overrule
the directions of the court."). Wilson noted that, in exceptional circumstances, a court "dissatisfied"
with a jury verdict could grant a new trial on motion of the losing party. On Wilson's view, however,
this did nothing to impair the jury's "tremendous jurisdiction" for another jury would still decide the
case as "the ultimate interpreters of the law" with the "power to overrule the directions of the court."
Id. at 541-42.
394. l id at 332.
395. 2 id at 527.
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precedent or authority." 396 The jury verdict as understood by Wilson thus
had a peculiar quality: it determined the outcome of legal proceedings but,
having neither precedential support nor prospective authoritative force, did
not constitute law. Hence, while Wilson did intimate that both custom and
common sense somehow "promulgated" the law and that juries formed a
"constituent part of courts" acting "according to the law," in vital respects
his jurisprudence ultimately rendered each legally unmanageable.397
In his jurisprudential configuration of common sense, custom, and
juries, James Wilson sought to preempt all further revolutions against the
law in America by integrating revolution into the law.398 This conclusion
rests only partly on inference from the evidence, for in his three-pronged
jurisprudential configuration Wilson expressly sought to incorporate what
he called "the revolution principle" into American law-to merge law
with liberty and thereby make revolution itself American law's
distinguishing feature. Analytical philosophers might question whether
Wilson actually accomplished this ambitious act of theoretical
communion. His own belief that he had done so, however, marked the
birth of American jurisprudence. 99
E. Law's Revolution in Antebellum America
Wilson helped spawn a peculiar jurisprudential style among early
national legal writers struggling to define the nation's legal identity-
including Nathanial Chipman, Zephaniah Swift, St. George Tucker, and
Hugh Henry Brackenridge, among others-whose jurisprudence also
absorbed parts of the radical critique.400 The spirit of '86's peculiar
impress on American attitudes toward the law, however, would extend its
influence far beyond the early national period. Significantly, in 1819
Austin himself republished his anti-lawyer essays,4 01 and over the next few
396. Id. at 541. Wilson might very well have conceived of the Supreme Court, in its reviewing
capacity, as occupying a "space" similar to the space occupied by juries, but on a national level-a
"jury of the country." STIMSON, supra note 71, at 132. The links Wilson invoked between jurors'
common moral sense and "Supreme" power, and his use of the term "constitutional" to describe both
the fundamental limitations applicable to American government and law, and the common person's
"power of moral perception," remain highly suggestive in this regard. I WILSON WORKS, supra note
300, at 103, 133. By this account, Austin, whose enunciation of an egalitarian ethical epistemology
embodied by juries preceded Wilson's own by over five years, may shed important light on the
intellectual origins ofjudicial review.
397. 1 WILsON WORKS, supra note 300, at 102; 2 id. at 542, 501. For a theoretical discussion of
custom as "anti-law," see DAVID BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 51-53 (2010).
398. See Knapp, supra note 351; George M. Dennison, The "Revolution Principle ": Ideology and
Constitutionalism in the Thought ofJames Wilson, 39 REV. POL. 157 (1977).
399. Knapp, supra note 351.
400. See Aaron Knapp, Antilegalism and the Origins of American Jurisprudence 34-73 (Sept. 25,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also ELLEN HOLMES PEARSON, REMAKING
CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2011); Aaron Knapp, Book
Review, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 290-92 (2012) (reviewing PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM (2011)).
401. Surrency, supra note 38.
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decades recognizable manifestations of the ideas set out therein appeared
both within the legal profession and, more powerfully, outside the
profession among radical Jacksonian reformers, writers, and intellectuals.
The latter strain has particular significance here because it establishes that
the idea of eradicating law itself-the very essence of the spirit of '86-
remained a live intellectual option in American life well into the late
antebellum period.
1. Reform from Within: Codification and Legal Science
Historians have credibly suggested that post-Revolutionary antilegalism
and the antebellum codification movement formed part of a single reform
tradition within American legal culture spanning the period from the
1780s to the Civil War.402 We must recognize at the outset, however, that
the codification movement began in something like a compromised
position relative to Benjamin Austin's or Jesse Higgins's earlier
thoroughgoing critiques. It appears that certain intellectual descendants of
the post-Revolutionary radicals became lawyers. 4 03 This had significant
implications for the codification movement's objectives and evolution
over time. First, none of the antebellum codifiers called for the total
abolition of the legal profession as an institution, as Austin had done.404
Calls for informal extra-legal arbitration or "referee" proceedings,
moreover, substantially declined among the codifiers, as did the fixation
on juries as mechanisms of popular resistance to law and legal
formalities-this at a time when lay juries found themselves increasingly
barred from passing on legal issues.40 5 Most reformers contented
402. See, e.g., COOK, supra note 38; Gordon, supra note 38; see also TOMLINS, supra note 7, at
196 (noting "rich veins of popular antilegalism within American culture" in the early republic). While
he did not emphasize the point, Austin did at one point in his essays suggest a "concise code of laws"
as an alternative to importing the "grand artillery" of confusing and complex English statutes and law
books. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May 18, 1786, at 1.
403. Jesse Higgins appears to have been a key transitional figure in this regard. While not a
lawyer himself, the great extent of Higgins's legal learning distinguished him from prior law
reformers. He recommended that all Americans read Blackstone, Wilson, and Tucker, so that every
man could become his own lawyer. HIGGINS, supra note 365, at 69-71. For another work emphasizing
a similar theme, see PUBLICOLA, NEW VADE MECUM, OR, A POCKET COMPANION FOR LAWYERS
(Concord, New Hampshire, Hews & Goss 1819). This "every man his own lawyer" literature grew
after the Civil War, though it apparently did little to slow the profession's growth. See, e.g., JOHN G.
WELLS, EVERY MAN His OWN LAWYER AND BUSINESS FORM BOOK (New York, B. W. Hitchcock
1867).
404. During the Jacksonian period, some state legislatures did abolish qualifying exams for
admission to the bar. See Maxwell Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codifiers: The Roots of
American Legal Reform, 1820-1830, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 234, 250 (1967).
405. According to one influential interpretation, in the early national and antebellum periods, the
merchant community forged an alliance with the legal profession pursuant to which the judiciary
would issue pro-commercial decisions so long as the merchants turned away from arbitration and
toward the courts to settle their disputes. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 144-55. On the narrowing ofjural
discretion in the nineteenth century, see generally NELSON, supra note 4. But see Millon, supra note
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themselves to regulate the law rather than dispense with it. Codes, in
short, seem to have presupposed a functioning legal system with courts,
lawyers, and legal rules-the very things that the Austinites had aimed to
annihilate.40 6 Yet particularly in the three decades after Irish 6migr6 and
labor lawyer William Sampson's address to the Historical Society of New
York in 1823, something akin to the spirit of '86 obviously possessed the
radical codifiers-in their strident invectives against the common law; in
their efforts to simplify law and legal knowledge so as to render them
"level to the understandings of all" (Sampson's words); and in their
preference for broad principles of natural justice over law's "useless forms
and obsolete maxims and rules." 407
The codification movement's goals and jurisprudential commitments,
however, experienced significant changes over time.408 Political and
intellectual currents in the age of Jackson, for example, moved prominent
codifiers in markedly more radical directions. Where pre-Jacksonian
codifiers such as Sampson had adopted the Napoleonic Code (which four
French lawyers had drafted 40 9) as their model and proposed to memorialize
in a "judicial code" immutable universal principles of natural justice, the
Jacksonians' enthusiasm for democracy and faith in the common man
produced a conceptual identification of law with popular will that shaped
the thinking of influential reformers. 4 10 "All American law," the fiery Bay
State codifier Robert Rantoul declared, "must be statute law," for only
"[s]tatutes enacted by the legislature, speak the public voice." 4 1 1
Jacksonian reformers carried forward an egalitarian republican ideal
within American legal culture, including an anti-aristocracy mantra (now
applied specifically to hidebound common lawyers rather than to the
profession as a whole) with a clear Austinian heritage.4 12 A professional
epistemological fortress built by and around intellectual aristocrats, the
common law, whether English or American, had no place in America for
Rantoul. Indeed, since unelected judges made it in the first instance, and
since no ordinary man could discern what it commanded until "after the
judge has decided," the common law did not qualify as law in the first
406. The leading study on the codification movement is COOK, supra note 38.
407. WILLIAM SAMPSON, SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE, AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH VARIOUS
LEARNED JURISTS, UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW 6, 7, 31, 87, 88 (New York, Gales & Seaton
1826); see also COOK, supra note 38, at 3-18, 106-07; ROBERT RANTOUL, MEMOIRS, SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. 279-81 (Boston, J. P. Jewett & Company 1854).
408. See Bloomfield, supra note 404.
409. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis, 43 TUL. L. REv. 762, 764 (1968).
410. This conceptual identification resulted in a largely successful movement for the popular
election ofjudges at the state level. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at I11, 323.
411. RANTOUL, supra note 407, at 281, 280.
412. The rhetoric of anti-aristocracy pervaded Rantoul's writings. See RANTOUL, supra note 407,
passim. It is conspicuously absent from Sampson's. See SAMPSON, supra note 407, passim.
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And yet after the Field Code's enactment in 1848, which itself dealt a
considerable blow to the common law tradition by abolishing the
distinction between suits at law and suits in equity, the codifying impulse
began moving further and further away from its revolutionary republican
roots. In part, this resulted from the significant intellectual cross-
fertilization that occurred between the common law's defenders and the
codifiers within the profession, so that eventually little daylight existed
between the two camps.414 As early as 1837, none other than Joseph
Story-the great judicial champion of the common law-had conceded
that some codification might benefit Massachusetts. 4 15 But where the early
Jacksonian reformers sought to codify the people's will in lieu of the
common law and in the process to abolish the latter, later codifiers-
apparently taking their cue from Story-now proposed to codify the
common law itself Consequently, while originally born out of the impulse
toward simplicity, the codifying project became much more complex,
formalistic, and comprehensive in scope as the antebellum period
proceeded.416
The preeminent late antebellum codifier David Dudley Field illustrates
the shift in its final phases. On the eve of the Civil War in 1859 we find
Field angling to codify not simply a "few and general principles" in a
pocketbook code as Sampson had, but fully "two million" common law
rules and promising countless more to accommodate modern society's
luxuriant foliage.417 In Field's hands, moreover, codes began taking on
some of the common law's essential attributes as articulated by its
American apologists. To answer the establishmentarians' allegation that a
fixed code could never foresee every future transaction and thus could not
adapt to changing conditions as the common law could, Field and others
emphasized that codes would remain open-ended works-in-progress, to be
periodically revisited, revised, and augmented to adapt to an expanding
commercial society.4 18 And who would draft and re-draft over and again
this massive new code, this "CODE AMERICAN"? 4 19 Not the people, nor
even their representatives-at least not primarily. As Field and his
413. RANTOUL, supra note 407, at 280.
414. See Gordon, supra note 38, at 456.
415. JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 698-734 (William Story
ed., Da Capo Press 1972) (1852).
416. So-called "partial" codification-treatises, hornbooks, and case reports-further expanded
the available legal literature as the nineteenth century proceeded. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at
538-49.
417. 1 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID
DUDLEY FIELD 528, 526-27 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton 1884); see also id. at 522-23
(contending that "[t]he more perfect the civilization, the more complete the law").
418. Id, at 511, 526-27.
419. Id. at 515.
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brethren saw it, only legal experts-the judges and lawyers themselves-
could properly accomplish this Herculean jurisprudential task, which Field
enthusiastically labeled "legal science."42 0 If all went as planned, the
legislature would simply rubberstamp the codes.4 2' Although the "instincts
of republicanism" favored codification, for Field the people themselves
apparently no longer embodied ultimate legal sovereignty in America.4 22
Instead, he confidently pronounced, "the law is our only sovereign."423
Historians have often conceptualized antebellum legal history in terms
of a conflict between two opposing camps within the profession-the
common law's defenders and the codifiers.424 This construct creates a
misleading impression, however, for as early as the 1840s these groups
had begun to converge around a shared commitment to law as a science.
This convergence rested not only on the codifiers becoming more
moderate over time but also on the common law's defenders becoming
somewhat more radicalized. To a considerable extent, antebellum legal
establishmentarians appropriated their opponents' simplifying
jurisprudential objectives and, in their digests, treatises, articles, and
speeches waxing on American law and legal science, arguably beat the
425codifiers at their own game. Indeed, no sooner had the first glimpses of
an authentically American common law started to take shape based on
native case decisions after the War of 1812 than establishmentarians such
as David Hoffman, Joseph Story, and James Kent rose up to attack it as
too complex and hence contrary to the premises of legal science.4 26
Antebellum legal science championed broad principles of law over rules
of law-a distinction that had significance for the Austinites.427 Science
literally replaced law itself as the jurists' guiding jurisprudential light.428
Joseph Story, for example, bemoaned the "ponderous volumes" on the
420. Id. 517, 529; see also id. at 499 ("Justice is attainable only through lawyers.").
421. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 352.
422. 1 FIELD, supra note 417, at 510.
423. Id. at 530.
424. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 258; MILLER, supra note 38, bk. 11.
425. See COOK, supra note 38, at 204, 209.
426. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, A LECTURE, INTRODUCTORY TO A COURSE OF LECTURES 16 (Baltimore,
J.D. Toy 1823); 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 442 (New York, 0. Halsted 1826);
WARREN, supra note 24, at 522. Hoffman carried on the Scottish common sense "anti-intellectual"
jurisprudential tradition inaugurated by Austin and further developed in Wilson. Id. at 15-17, 43. Kent
famously recalled that, when confronting cases in the early national period, "I saw where justice lay
and the moral sense decided the court half the time." MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, L.L.D.
159 (William Kent ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1898) [hereinafter KENT, MEMOIRS].
427. Austin himself rarely used the word "law" in a positive appraisal without the word
"principle" in front of it. See AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW,
supra note 94, passim. James Kent recollected, "I might once and a while be embarrassed by a
technical rule, but I most always found principles suited to my views of the case." KENT, MEMOIRS,
supra note 426, at 159.
428. James Gould, Law School at Litchfield, I U.S. L.J. 400, 402 (1822). Gould specifically
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"groaning shelves of jurists." 429 To avoid getting "buried alive . . . in the
labyrinths of the law" and to buck "rigid, severe, and uncompromising"
rules of law, Justice Story endorsed importing broad equitable
principles-"principles of universal or natural justice"-into common law
cases so as to adopt "the most enlarged and liberal principles of
decision."430 Where in England equity arose literally as the common law's
rival-in one historian's words, "a system of anti-law"-in America it
appears to have served as the conceptual foundation for the common law
and evolved as an integral part of it prior to the Civil War.43 ' This curious
intermingling of law with its historical rival within the solvent of legal
science reflected an assimilation of the radical post-Revolutionary
critique.432
This argument does require some restraint, however, for both the
establishmentarians and the codifiers within the profession ultimately
employed the antilegalistic ideals of simplicity and equity to advance
highly legalistic ends. Story and his brethren worried about the "popular
cast" of American institutions, which they believed produced "too warm a
zeal for untried theories."4 33 The law stood as "the last barrier between the
people and universal anarchy or despotism," and lawyers "sentinels upon
the outpost of the constitution," protecting the country against "visionary
legislators" and "artful leaders."434 Antebellum establishmentarians aimed
to make law into a "science" predicated on broad principles level with the
common comprehension, precisely in order to legitimate a professional
legal elite specially trained to discern those principles and thereby to
establish that law ultimately flowed not from the people but from reason.
Antebellum legal science as employed by both camps within the
429. STORY, supra note 415, at 237;
430. Id.; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 20 (W.E. Grigsby ed.,
London, Stevens & Haynes 1884).
431. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 22 (emphasis added); see also WOOD, supra note 131, at 291-
304. Many other early national and antebellum jurisprudents similarly collapsed the distinction
between law and equity in the name of legal science. See PEARSON, supra note 400, at 57-60. In a
similar vein, scholars have also noted that prominent early national and antebellum jurists rejected the
very idea that precedent should determine the outcome of legal disputes. See id. at 60-66; HORWITZ,
supra note 5, at 24-25. The retreat from precedent converged with the jurisprudential emphasis on
principle to form what Karl Llewellyn would later call the "Grand Style" of early nineteenth-century
legal reasoning, which had antebellum lawyers and judges justifying their opinions with reference to
broad considerations of "principle" and "policy," and deemphasizing precedential legal authority so as
to satisfy the "felt demands ofjustice." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 36 (1960).
432. Austin's earlier essays placed great emphasis on "equity" and "principles of equity." He
sought to abolish lawyers so as to clear the way for equity rather than law to ground decision-making.
Austin himself seems to have posed equity as an altemative to the English common law, but in at least
one respect-namely his depiction of the jury trial (a creature of the common law) as the embodiment
of pure equity-he forecasted the subsequent intellectual intermixture. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., May
18, 1786, at 1. Antifederalists and Jesse Higgins carried on this conceptual identification ofjury trials
with equity. See 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 331, at 60 ("A Democratic
Federalist"); HIGGINS, supra note 365, at 5, 6.
433. STORY, supra note 415, at 228, 229.
434. Id. at 230, 228.
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profession thus greatly contributed to the rise of legal formalism prior to
the Civil War-a trend that Austin, Wilson, and Higgins would have
vigorously opposed.435
2. Reform from Without: Antinomian Individualism in the Age of Jackson
To view the history of antebellum legal thought and culture through the
eyes of the lawyers only, however, unduly confines our scope of vision
and totally elides some of the most historically significant dissenting
voices with roots in the post-Revolutionary radical reform tradition to
appear during the antebellum era. These voices came generally from
outside the profession where the Jacksonian zeitgeist lifted anti-aristocracy
sentiment to its post-Revolutionary apex, generating a deep and sustained
criticism of the law in many ways more radical than anything that came
before. The individualistic spirit of the age sent many Americans looking
for new realms of individual liberty beyond law's reach. Over a century
before F.A. Hayek's writings, Jacksonians had begun to envision a
spontaneous, self-regulating social order bereft of law as their governing
normative paradigm. The first edition of The Democratic Review declared
that law stood opposed to democracy and championed instead the
"principle of FREEDOM" which would by itself produce "the best
possible general result of order and happiness from the chaos of
characters, ideas, notions and interests-human society."" 6 The judiciary
proved remarkably willing to ratify and even expand upon this idea in an
emerging laissez-faire jurisprudence that broadened the spaces in which
individuals could freely rule themselves without threat of extrinsic legal
intervention.437
The progressive faith in the sovereignty and perfectibility of the
individual that marked Jacksonian intellectual life spawned an
antilegalistic ideology capable of idealizing old Saxon justice in the
manner of Jesse Higgins; conceiving of lawyers and formal legal
institutions as contrary to the "tendency" of the times and therefore
moribund; and otherwise producing a self-conscious intellectual
opposition to law itself that, in many respects, outdid Austin himself.43 8
The "disorganizing, anarchical spirit" that filled the air in the 1830s led to
considerable popular rioting and popular convention activity in numerous
435. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 257.
436. Introduction, I U. S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 1, 6 (1837).
437. Justice Taney's opinion in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
marks one key moment in this judicial trend, which came to fruition in the late nineteenth century in
what legal scholars call Classical Legal Thought. See WIECEK, supra note 70. See infra Conclusion.
438. For an endorsement of old Saxon justice, see Trial by Jury, 6 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC
REV. 463 (1839). On the Jacksonians' hostility to law, see LAWRENCE KOHL, THE POLITICS OF
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states.439 Apparently without any sense of threatening the social order,
radical Jacksonians revolted against virtually every form of legal or
institutional restraint imposed upon them from without.440 While publicly
critical of such popular subversions of the legal order, Jackson himself
personified the subordination of law to individual character-an "anarchic
hero" who without compunction thrust ahead with his decisions unaffected
by popular support for a national bank, the Supreme Court's judgment in
favor of the Cherokees, or virtually any other legal norm or dictate
inconsistent with his instincts."'
The decline of Calvinism and the rise of perfectionism within
antebellum culture seemed to render law's traditional justifications-
human vice and depravity-entirely anachronistic and inapplicable. The
southern Jacksonian politician, ex-lawyer, and writer P.W. Grayson set out
one penetrating and influential critique of the law that reflected these
perfectionist currents in their early stages. Circulating widely within the
emergent labor organizations in the seaport cities, Grayson's Vice
Unmasked (1830) contended that the "MACHINERY OF LAW" degraded
man's true "moral essence"-that is, his natural inclination to make the
"good of others" the natural object of his own "self-love."" 2 Law severed
439. EVENING J. (Boston), Aug. 7, 1835, at 2. On Jacksonian rioting, see Grimsted, supra note
438. New York proved a hotbed for convention activity, particularly among the Loco-Focos. In his
call for a constitutional convention in 1837, John M. Hunt envisioned a "NEW CONSTITUTION,
based not upon compromise, not upon any narrow views of temporary expediency, but upon the broad
and eternal basis of RIGHT. We wish Law to become a mere echo of Conscience." F. BYRDSALL, THE
HISTORY OF THE Loco-FOCO, OR EQUAL RIGHTS PARTY 150 (New York, Clement & Packard 1842)
(emphasis added). On New York Democrats' movement for a new constitution in the 1840s against
the background of the Anti-Rent War, see SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 591-
93 (2005). On the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island (1841-42), see FRITZ, supra note 261, at 246-75;
GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL (1976). Jacksonians fully
supported Thomas Dorr and his followers' effort to set up a revolutionary government to secure
expanded suffrage. See Rhode Island-Its Rightful Governor and Unrighteous Government, 15 U.S.
MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 122 (1844). According to Lawrence Kohl, Jacksonians asserted "a kind of
'domesticated' right of revolution, a natural right to act outside the law which might be exercised in an
orderly way within society." KOHL, supra note 438, at 173-74.
440. KOHL, supra note 438, at 163 ("The party of Jackson, ignoring Whig cries that they were
seeking to subvert all law, attacked the American legal system throughout the 1830s and '40s.").
441. Grimsted, supra note 438, at 367. In diametric contrast to Europe, wrote one articulate
defender of Jacksonian vigilantism, "in America the individual is all and society nothing ... all
aspects of the law are subordinated to individual right, which is the basis and essence of the republic."
See id at 366. Such views, however, met with significant Whig opposition. Horace Greeley's New
York Tribune, for example, declared in 1842 that "the essence of freedom consists in the supremacy of
abstract law over personal will." See KOHL, supra note 438, at 165. For an insightful discussion of the
conflicts as well as the convergences between Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs as to the place of
law in a democratic society, see id at 145-85.
442. P.W. GRAYSON, VICE UNMASKED (New York, G. H. Evans 1830). The Workingman's
Advocate reviewed the book, calling it the "production of an amiable and talented mind" and
endorsing its conclusions. Review: Vice Unmasked, WORKINGMAN'S ADVOCATE, Mar. 6, 1830, at 19.
Much of the antilegalism in the Jacksonian period came out of the Working Men's movement. See
generally TOMLINS, supra note 7, at 99-179; see also SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW
YORK CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984) (observing in the
antebellum labor movement in the 1820s and 30s an artisan-based consciousness flowing from a
shared commitment to republican principles of virtue, equality, and independence).
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man's existential connection to others by cordoning off his property and
rights, subordinating him to rules and then instigating quarrels about the
application of those rules. The very existence of coercive legal authority,
Grayson maintained, implied "human infirmity" and, indeed, "vice in
almost all its forms."" In something like a self-fulfilling prophecy law
itself perpetuated those evils." Free individuals-particularly "here in
these free states of America"-instinctively resisted legal force no matter
the rectitude of purpose. 4 45 Authority extrinsically constituted, Grayson
wrote, had never in history succeeded in bending free human beings to its
dictates and usually produced just the opposite result-discontent,
resentment, and resistance. Indeed, Grayson emphasized that law
delivered its greatest insult to man's moral essence when it forced him to
act morally. Laws that "lashed" individuals into "the practice of the plain
principles of right" made humans into mere machines and alienated man
from his true moral self.446 In the instant of its coercive operation, law thus
denied man the capacity to rule himself.447 Grayson's solution? "The
repeal of all law. " Only then could humans truly rule themselves. Only
then could humans truly be themselves."
Grayson's secularized antinomianism anticipated Emerson and the
Transcendentalists whose widely read writings provided additional
philosophical grounding for Jacksonian antilegalism. Transcendental
philosophy and the reform sentiment it generated extolled individual
character, conscience, and self-reliance over legalism, collectivism, and all
other coercive (or potentially coercive) social institutions. "No law can be
sacred to me," Emerson wrote, "but that of my nature." 4 49 For Emerson
law imposed the collective "will" of representatives on one's own and
therefore violated the individual's divine right to dictate his own rules.
"Good men must not obey the laws too well."450 Individual character,
Emerson believed, superseded all law-the state existed as but a "shabby
imitation" of the individual.45 ' The wise man needed "no statute book, for
443. GRAYSON,supra note 442, at 21.
444. The idea recalls St. Paul's writings in the New Testament. See Jeremy Waldron, Dead to the
Law: Paul's Antinomianism, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 301 (2006). Grayson's analysis, however, does not
otherwise substantially draw on Christian religion.
445. GRAYSON, supra note 442, at 28.
446. Id. at 29.
447. GRAYSON, supra note 442, at 20, 15, 21, 28, 29.
448. Id. at 159. "That which must be done," Grayson revealingly wrote, "is to ... bid [Americans
to] no longer worship the cold prescriptions of policy, for the warm principles of justice-to free his
soul from the fetters of authority-to remit and exalt him to himself-to let him seek, by the light of
his conscience alone, in the joyous, genial climate of his own free spirit, for all the rules of his
conduct." Id. at 168.
449. 1 WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 47 (Boston, Houghton, Osgood & Co. 1880) (final
emphasis added).
450. Id. at 169.
451. Id. at 175.
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he has the lawgiver."4 5 2 The "appearance of the principal to supersede the
proxy" rendered all law, government, and therefore representation, alien
and irrelevant. 4 53 "The tendencies of the times," Emerson wrote, "favor the
idea of self-government, and leave the individual, for all code, to the
rewards and penalties of his own constitution."4 54
These anti-institutional intellectual orientations continued to find public
expression well into the 1840s. In 1846, the editors of The Democratic
Review confidently predicted that law and lawyers would soon wither
away forever in America. An article entitled "Prospects of the Legal
Profession in America" depicted legal institutions as obsolescent in a
progressive democratic society committed to individual freedom. 45 5 The
democratic faith's commitment to enlarging "the power of individuals"
and thereby leaving "every man, as far as possible, to his own discretion,"
had since Jefferson's presidency substantially narrowed the government's
ability legally to interfere in the individual's pursuits, the article
observed.456 The inverse relationship between the individual and the law,
and the whole "tendency" of American society toward the former's
ultimate supremacy, meant that over time the "sources of litigation"-
which could only "spring from a violation, alleged or real, of some
existing law"-would simply dry up.457 Addressing the laws of debtor-
creditor relations, the article contended that since the "instinct of
individual independence is fatal to any . .. extensive system of
commercial credit," a new system predicated on the "combined honesty
and sagacity" of borrowers would eventually emerge whereupon creditors
would never again have occasion to seek "legal protection or
assistance."4 8
As to the fate of lawyers in America, the editors wrote that the
"individualization of our people" had resulted in "an overthrow of the
ancient dignities and eminence of the legal profession," whose members
had therefore degenerated into mere "clerks."459 In a society where
"[e]veryman's love of his own rights makes him respect the rights of
others" and where "the people are denied no important rights," the lawyer
could never again boast a distinguished position.4 60 Indeed, "the great
mass of [the lawyer's] pure law learning might be erased from his mind
452. Id. at 176.
453. Id. at 175.
454. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
455. Prospects of the Legal Profession in America, 18 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 26
(1846).
456. Id at 27, 28.
457. Id. at 27.
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without materially impairing his interest as a companion, or his usefulness
and value as a citizen."4 6 1
The Review's unqualified faith that the sequence of events it
envisioned-including the extinction of all law and lawyers-would soon
enough come to fruition is quite remarkable. The editors equated the
emergence of the self-reliant individual to replace legal institutions with
the emergence of "Truth" itself, a manifest destiny. This irresistible
cultural tendency drawing Americans away from a society governed by
law and lawyers, the editors concluded, would "never quiet until it has
vindicated its entire and absolute supremacy. "462
CONCLUSION: THE LAW OF UNION AND THE DEATH OF RADICALISM
Benjamin Austin rose up in the revolutionary spring of 1786 to oppose
the legitimacy of law, lawyers, and legal institutions in a free republic, and
many Americans followed him. If Austin's proposals seemed radical to his
adversaries, Honestus did not deny the charge. To the contrary, he proudly
proclaimed, "The cure must be radical!"463 The temptation exists to write
the Austinites off as backward-looking agrarians, at best the "less
thoughtful reformers," and perhaps to tie their historical fates to the
Shaysites' and call it a day.464 We might conclude that the spirit of '86
produced a temporary outburst among discontented debtors whose
triggering conditions the Constitution subsequently cured or substantially
ameliorated; and that, in any event, after ratification American
government's increasing ability to "compel recalcitrant minorities to obey
rules of law they found objectionable" rendered the Critical Period's
radical spirits forevermore insignificant in American political and cultural
life.4 65 Alternatively, we might attempt to domesticate Austin's unsettling
critiques by postulating an alternative legal framework or consciousness
within which he operated.46 6 Apparently taking Thomas Paine's assertion
461. Id. at 29.
462. Id. at 28. In an article on the women's movement, Putnam's Magazine concluded that it was
"too late" for women to retrieve "dignity" by recourse to the "learned professions": "Democracy has
so shattered the dignity of the professions ... and laid them open to every undisciplined vagabond ...
that it is idle any longer to regard a man as respectable simply because he is a lawyer . . . ." I
PUTNAM'S MAG. 279 (1853). For other writings in The Democratic Review criticizing legal institutions
in the 1840s, see The Abuses of Law Courts, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 305 (1847); Law
Reform, 21 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 477 (1847).
463. Honestus, INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1786, at 1.
464. NELSON, supra note 4, at 69, 173.
465. Id. at 173; see also TOMLINS, supra note 7 (tracing the rise and triumph of "legal discourse"
over competing discourses in the early nineteenth century).
466. See Steven Wilf, The First Republican Revival: Virtue, Judging, and Rhetoric in the Early
Republic, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1675, 1687 (1999) (claiming that Post-Revolutionary antilegalism is
"better labeled popular legalism."); see also WILF, supra note 12, at 152 (explaining that Austin did
not represent "simple antilegalism" but rather a "critique concerned with the integrity of law that
focused on the openness of legal knowledge").
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that in America "the law is king" quite literally, an influential strain in the
legal historiography suggests that at precisely those moments in early
American history when authoritative legal institutions have come into
question, weakened, disintegrated, or disappeared-those exceptional
moments when existing governmental authority gets "scattered among the
people whose right it is"-Americans have nevertheless continued
positively to invest themselves in law and to find legitimate justifications
in it.467
But Austin and the popular movement for which he spoke in 1786
suggest that an orientation adverse to law itself did exist at a seminal
467. The chief progenitor of this approach, John Philip Reid has produced an immense body of
scholarship that conforms to this basic pattern. Reid argues in his influential study of revolutionary-era
Boston mobs, for example, that the rioters acted pursuant to so-called "whig law," whose legitimacy
derived from control of local legal and political institutions. John Phillip Reid, In a Defensive Rage:
The Uses ofthe Mob, the Justification in Law, and the Coming ofthe American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1043, 1090 (1974). Reid's argument reads like a legal brief defending the recalcitrant Bay
State whigs-probably, however, the losing brief. He applies something like a logarithm to endow
crowd action in revolutionary Boston with a "legal" sanction: "[W]hat was unlawful to the tory," he
categorically asserts, "was law for the whig." Id. at 1044. In the crucible of imperial resistance, law
apparently became "whatever could be plausibly argued and forcibly maintained." Id. at 1087. Reid
seems to equate the whigs' perception of "political necessity" with "whig law." REID, IN A DEFIANT
STANCE 99 (1977). A close reading of Reid's work, however, suggests that his use of the term "law"
here is seriously misleading. First, Reid's interest apparently lies only in whether the American whigs
sincerely thought their actions lawful as a subjective matter, not whether "whig law" was "truly
'law."' Id. at 92. Second, and more problematically, while Reid's work abounds with assertions that
the whigs did subjectively consider their mobs and riots lawful, Reid makes the remarkable admission
that in order to make these assertions he must "put words . . . into mouths that might not have
employed them." Id. at 163. Reid suggests, for example, that John Adams thought the Boston Tea
Party was lawful, even though Adams never used the terms "legal" or "lawful" or "law" to describe it;
he characterized it rather as "necessary." Id at 99. Indeed, sometimes the evidence directly contradicts
Reid's suggestion that revolutionary whigs thought they acted under positive legal sanction, such as
when Joseph Hawley argued that Lanesborough rioters had withdrawn from the "positive laws of
society" and acted pursuant to "the law of nature." Reid, In a Defensive Rage, at 1062. Reid states that
Hawley's state-of-nature theory "should not distract us" but never clearly explains why. Id. Laura
Edwards runs into similar problems in her own attempts to expand the definition of what constitutes
"law" in early American history. EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 12 (suggesting that social relations among
local Carolinians, as well as the non-legal "body of knowledge" on which they drew, including
religion, popular writings, and cultural traditions, "constituted localized law," even though Carolinians
themselves never apparently conceived it as such). For other works generally conforming to this trend
of finding law and legal justification in ostensibly extra-legal or political activity, see Hendrik Hartog,
Pigs and Positivism, WIs. L. REV. 899 (1985) (concluding that New York pig keepers had a legal right
to let their animals roam the streets despite court rulings criminalizing the practice); Reid, The
Irrelevance of the Declaration, in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE
LAW 46, 88 (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981) ("Far from being a statement of abstract, natural principles, the
Declaration [of Independence] is a document of peculiarly English constitutional dogmas [that is,
positive law]."); KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 24 (2004) (in a "political-legal" process in which
judges had no special role, jury nullification, customary practices, and popular crowd action
contributed to determining a "special category of law" in eighteenth-century America); J.P. REID, LAW
FOR THE ELEPHANT (1980) (arguing that travelers on the Overland Trail in the mid-nineteenth century
applied legitimate and sophisticated legal principles in resolving their disputes). Along comparable
lines, constitutional historian Bruce Ackerman has suggested that so-called "higher lawmaking"
outside Article V has come to acquire something of a constitutional sanction in America. ACKERMAN,
supra 327; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Akhil Amar has gone
so far as to suggest that post-Revolutionary Americans "legalized" the right to "alter or abolish" their
government. Amar, The Consent ofthe Governed, supra note 373, at 471, 482.
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moment in early American legal history. This Article has shown,
moreover, that this orientation arose not as a pre-modern colonial survival
or out of economic grievances alone, but as a legitimate jurisprudential
expression of revolutionary republican ideology. The foregoing analysis
suggests, furthermore, that the American revolution against the law in
1786 helped provoke the movement for a new Constitution in 1787,
problematized the Constitution's public meaning at ratification, shaped
early national jurisprudence, and accounts for antebellum legal and
political developments in provocative ways that suggest new directions for
future research. That legal historians have elided these formative
dimensions of early American legal culture is not altogether surprising.
For, as we have seen, post-Revolutionary antilegalism sometimes
masqueraded as law. Occasionally employed by Austin as a defensive
measure, the language of the law belied a deep-seated opposition to the
thing itself. As well, some unlikely suspects-namely, antebellum lawyers
and jurists: the very propagators of law and legalism whom the Austinites
had originally sought to "annihilate" forever-helped carry the spirit of
'86 forward into the nineteenth century, not by loudly denouncing courts
or the "pernicious practice of law" as Austin had done, but by weaving
antilegalistic ideals into the warp and woof of an otherwise formalistic
discourse of legal science.
The most profound expressions of post-Revolutionary antilegalism in
the antebellum period, however, came largely from outside the legal
profession in the popular consciousness, little if any evidence of which
exists within the institutional source materials on which legal historians
continue to focus. Here, however, at least political and intellectual
historians have taken notice.468 And how could they not? Jacksonian
antilegalists no longer felt any need to pay lip service to the law in their
attacks on law itself. Their writings thus gave expression to the
revolutionary spirit of '86 in American life with a directness and clarity
that, ironically, even its original spokesman could not quite match. But
where the Austinites believed the people had to take affirmative action to
protect their liberties from a creeping epistemological aristocracy, the
editors of the Democratic Review contemplated simply standing back and
watching the irresistible forces of American democracy follow themselves
through to their natural and inevitable conclusion-the permanent
extinction of all law and lawyers in America.
The great Perry Miller went to his grave grappling with the intellectual
implications of the post-Revolutionary radical law reform tradition in
antebellum America.469 But if Miller intended to pass the baton,
468. See Grimsted, supra note 438; KOHL, supra note 438; MILLER, supra note 38, bk. 11.
469. MILLER, supra note 38, bk. II.
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subsequent historians have declined to grab hold of it.4 70 Scholars
interested in the topic can probably agree that at some point around mid-
century the radical reform tradition that Austin had inaugurated, like so
many of the other heady American antebellum reform movements steeped
in the revolutionary heritage, went into decline.47 1 We have already
observed a few of the reasons for this. For one, antebellum lawyers-
establishmentarians and reformers alike-commandeered and ultimately
deradicalized the post-Revolutionary critique. Over time they moved it in
highly formalistic directions that separated the law from the people and
consolidated the profession's monopoly on law, legal knowledge, and
legal practice. This cannot, however, account for the profound critiques
that emerged from outside the profession in the Jacksonian era which, as
we have seen, generated probably the most subversive, self-conscious
attack on law itself ever to appear in American history, but which by all
appearances also vanished after the Civil War. How can we account for its
disappearance?
The Article's final pages can suggest only the broadest outlines of an
answer. As the era's defining political, ethical, and legal question, slavery
certainly figures into the analysis. The slavery question provided an
unprecedented political outlet for the expression of the post-Revolutionary
resistance to law with which we have been concerned here. Anti-slavery
thinkers in the North leveraged the age's antinomian faith in the supreme
authority of the individual conscience into a thoroughgoing moral attack
on the peculiar institution and on any law, lawyer, or politician that even
implicitly tolerated or supported it.4 72 Southern Jacksonians, meanwhile,
adopted their own forms of antilegalism. The Southern mind's peculiar
resistance to law derived from an ideological admixture of revolutionary
republicanism;4 73 the belief that "slave relationships should be regulated
by sentiment, not law";4 74 the concept of "herrenvolk democracy," which
contemplated for the white masters total equality, independence, and
freedom from all forms of dependence or "slavery," legal or otherwise;4 75
470. One important work running in Miller's line, however, is ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
471. See, e.g., John L. Thomas, Romantic Reform in America, 1815-1865, 17 AM. Q. 656, 680-81
(1965).
472. See generally AGAINST SLAVERY: AN ABOLITIONIST READER (Mason 1. Lowance ed., 2000);
see also Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in THE SELECTED ESSAYS OF HENRY DAVID
THOREAU 103-21 (Wilder Publications 2008).
473. See, e.g., MICHAEL HOLT, THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE 1850s, at 238-39 (1978).
474. MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860, at 230 (1981); see also
Morton Horwitz, Mark Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L.J. 131, 134 (2001) (noting in Tushnet's
The American Law of Slavery a basic "conflict between the antilegalism and informalism of a slave
society and the more formal-law characteristic of bourgeois society").
475. See GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 61-68, 90-94 (1971);
KENNETH S. GREENBERG, MASTERS AND STATESMEN 85-88 (1985); HOLT, supra note 473, at 241; see
also EDMUND MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975); LARRY E. TISE,
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and a programmatic anti-majoritarianism that would have paralyzed
federal lawmaking and which imagined "law" as almost entirely devoid of
476
any coercive dimension.
These sectional currents and crosscurrents of antilegalism, however,
found their conditions of possibility in deeper constitutional issues going
to the taproot of American attitudes toward law after the Revolution. The
slavery debates turned on underlying conflicts over where sovereignty
itself resided in the American constitutional system, conflicts that the
Constitution of 1787 left unresolved and which transcended the specific
issue of slavery. In the years after the Revolution, these conflicts played
out in debates over where the nullification power properly lay. Who, if
anyone, had the power to exempt themselves from law in the American
republic? What person or group could legitimately step outside the law
within the American constitutional system? Certainly juries possessed this
power in the colonial and revolutionary periods. In 1776 revolutionary
republicans began enacting state constitutions that purported to lodge the
power of nullification in the "people" of the individual states and Publius
(with James Wilson's help) subsequently converted this into an effective
rhetorical strategy to legitimate the national Constitution. On the national
scale, however, Publius's Constitution made the people's sovereignty
difficult, if not impossible, to exercise directly. A truly collective national
popular sovereign could exist only as an appealing idea.477 Competing
ideas as to the proper locus for popular sovereignty's practical exercise
quickly appeared in the post-Revolutionary decades, doing battle in the
controversies over Hamilton's financial overhaul, the Alien and Sedition
Acts, the Hartford Convention, South Carolina's attempt to nullify federal
tariffs, the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island and, of course, the slavery
question and slavery-related legislation. 478 Generally these years saw
Americans positioning to locate the nullification power in progressively
smaller units within American society-in sections, states, parties,
"interests," and juries. 479 At last, in Emerson and Thoreau's influential
PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, 1701-1840, at 347-62 (1987);
William Harris, Last of the Classical Republicans: An Interpretation of John C. Calhoun, 20 CIVIL
WAR HIST. 255 (1984).
476. For the classic articulation of Southern anti-majoritarianism, see JOHN C. CALHOUN, A
DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (Richard Cralle ed., Charleston, Walker & James 185 1); see also HOLT, supra note
475, at 242 ("Repeatedly, southern extremists denounced the very idea of majority rule as subversive
of republicanism."). See generally Lacy K. Ford Jr., Inventing the Concurrent Majority: Madison,
Calhoun, and the Problem ofMajoritarianism in American Political Thought, 60 J.S. HIST. 19 (1994).
For additional works discussing southern white culture's resistance to law and legal process, see
CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER (1998); EDWARD AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE
(1984); and PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY (1993).
477. See EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988).
478. On all these controversies (except slavery), see FRITZ, supra note 261.
479. Particularly on issues relating to slavery, antebellum constitutional politics seemed
effectively to place the nullification power in each of the sections. See MARK GRABER, DRED ScoTr
2013] 353
83
Knapp: Law's Revolution: Benjamin Austin and the Spirit of '86
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
formulations, the power to step outside the law came to rest in the
"imperial self'-the individual mind and conscience. 48 0 This final move
seemed to render sovereignty in the American constitutional system
essentially independent of society itself.481
Each attempt to circumscribe more narrowly the nullification power's
proper locus degraded the law's integrity, authority, and clarity in
American life. The growing refusal to accept the sanctity of law that
marked the antebellum politics of nullification culminated in the 1840s
and 1850s, when more and more Americans began allocating to the
sections, states and individuals the power to nullify the law that, from one
vantage point, made all others possible, the law that bound the American
people together: the law of union.482
The idea of disunion as a real possibility for many Americans in the
years approaching the Civil War unraveled the nation's legal, political,
and constitutional fabrics in the profoundest of ways.483 And perhaps for
this very reason, its emergence may simultaneously mark the dramatic
climax of the post-Revolutionary "disposition unfriendly to the law itself'
explored in this Article and the beginning of its end in American history.
For no sooner had the subversive secessionary impulse exploded forth into
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in
1798, as well as South Carolina's tariff ordinance in 1832, suggested that the power lay in the states.
See WILENTZ, supra note 439, at 79, 379-88. (Drafter of the Virginia Resolution, James Madison
would later argue, though not very convincingly, that neither the Virginia Resolution nor the Kentucky
Resolution supported state nullification. See Kenneth Stampp, The Concept ofa Perpetual Union, 65
J. AM. HIST. 5, 30 (1978).) In the late 1840s, John C. Calhoun effectively located the nullification
power in "interests." CALHOUN, supra note 476. As the antebellum era proceeded and the slavery
debates intensified, renewed efforts to locate the nullification power in the jury emerged. See
LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 8-9 (Boston, John P. Jewett & Co. 1852);
Trial by Jury, 6 U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 463 (1839). Jury nullification experienced a notable
revival in connection with Fugitive Slave Act cases in the 1850s. See H. Robert Baker, The Fugitive
Slave Clause and the Antebellum Constitution, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 1131, 1170 (2012).
480. SELECTED ESSAYS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU, supra note 472, at 121 ("[Law] can have no
pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it."). On Emerson's anti-social
tendencies, see QUENTIN ANDERSON, THE IMPERIAL SELF 3-58 (1971). Antebellum spiritualists also
embraced the principle of individual sovereignty, as did many in the emerging women's movement.
See ANN BRAUDE, RADICAL SPIRITS: SPIRITUALISM AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1989). For the dilemma between law and conscience which sharpened in the 1850s largely
due to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, see HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 141-52
(Penguin Classics 1986) (1852).
481. Recall here one of James Madison's minimum requirements for a "republican" government:
it could not exist totally "independent of the society itself." THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 69, at
322 (James Madison).
482. No sooner had Southerners begun to consider secession than Northern abolitionists in the
American Anti-Slavery Society, following William Lloyd Garrison's public burning of the United
States Constitution in 1844, took on the motto, "No Union with Slaveholders" and began agitating for
Northern secession. ANTI-SLAVERY POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1833-1860, at 230 (C. Bradley Thompson
ed., 2004); see also Wendell Phillips, The Philosophy of the Abolition Movement, in SPEECHES,
LECTURES, AND LET-rERS 98-153 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1884). The Missouri crisis seems to have
produced the first forceful articulations of the states' right to secede. See Stampp, supra note 479, at
25.
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practical fruition, rending the union asunder, than Abraham Lincoln rose
up decisively to contain and suppress it forever: "[I]n legal
contemplation," Lincoln declared in his first inaugural, "the Union is
perpetual."484 Andrew Jackson had made a similar claim during the
nullification crisis in 1832.485 But in and after 1861 the idea of a perpetual
union, "in legal contemplation," took on a whole new meaning and
significance. In putting the law of union outside of the reformer's reach,
Lincoln had in essential respects placed the law itself beyond his reach.
For it followed from the inviolable law of perpetual national union that
states and citizens had an absolute duty to obey laws constitutionally
enacted, no matter how objectionable, unless and until constitutionally
revoked or overruled. As Lincoln viewed matters, the legally corrosive
cultural politics of nullification in post-Revolutionary America had
produced a stark existential choice for Americans in 1861: law or anarchy.
For "[p]lainly the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy."486
The sixteenth president chose law, and the North followed him.
Partisans for a new Constitution thought America faced the same choice
in 1787. They also chose law. But countless post-Revolutionary
Americans in both sections did not follow them, at least not in spirit, and
the Janus-faced Constitution ratified thereafter did little finally to resolve
the matter. Law's defenders in 1865, however, had more than an internally
conflicted constitutional vision to show for their efforts. They had a
decisive victory in a bloody Civil War that had claimed hundreds of
thousands of American lives. If, as Madison had written in 1787, "[a]
sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of
Government," then the Civil War arguably established the first national
government by law in American history.487
Lincoln's commitment to the fundamental law of American union, the
North's willingness physically to enforce it, and their ultimate success in
doing so, together represented a significant moment of decline for all
forms of radicalism and reform in post-Revolutionary America, including
Austinian antilegalism. 488 "The extreme individualism of the antebellum
reformers," writes one historian, "was swallowed up in a Northern war
effort that made private conscience less important than saving the
Union."489 In essential ways, the citizenry that emerged from the war,
particularly in the North, looked almost nothing like its antebellum
484. ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 582 (Roy Prentice Basler ed., 1946).
485. See Stampp, supra note 479, at 31.
486. Id. at 585. As to the Dred Scott decision, which Lincoln himself found highly repugnant, the
President recommended that it be obeyed until overruled or otherwise revoked: "[T]he evil effect
following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never
become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice." Id.
487. 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 313, at 363.
488. See Thomas, supra note 471, at 680-81.
489. Id. at 680.
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predecessor with respect to its attitudes toward law, government and
authority. By rendering the very idea of revolution or rebellion
"anathema" to Northerners, the Civil War dramatically "widened the gulf
that separated nineteenth-century Americans from their revolutionary
heritage."4 90
In The American Republic (1866), the influential former
Transcendentalist Orestes Brownson offered some revealing insights on
the nature of the post-war intellectual transformation. Brownson argued
that the war experience had operated to discredit the country's erstwhile
"political tradition." Following Locke and Rousseau, that tradition had
held that "the people" inalienably possessed the unconditional right of
revolution: "Individuals create civil society and may uncreate it whenever
they judge it advisable."49 ' Stitched into the nation's DNA in 1776, this
radical ideology had produced a uniquely recalcitrant citizenry in both
sections that reveled in their revolutionary ways. "Prior to the Southern
Rebellion," Brownson wrote, "nearly every American asserted. . . 'the
sacred right of insurrection' or revolution, and sympathized with
insurrectionists, rebels and revolutionists .... [T]reason was regarded as a
virtue, and traitors were honored, feasted and eulogized as patriots." 4 92
Possessed of such antiauthoritarian ideals, pro-slavery southern democrats,
anti-slavery northerners and many other post-Revolutionary Americans
had effectively conflated the distinction between governor and governed.
After the Revolution, Brownson wrote, Americans therefore could not
quite bring themselves to recognize a "state" or "civil authority" as
such.493
The "fearful struggle of the nation against a rebellion which threatened
its very existence," however, seemed to Brownson to have put an end to
these legally subversive impulses in American life. Americans had now
finally recognized that for government to exist at all, there must be "a
power, force or will that governs distinct from that which is governed."494
Authority had to be established and accepted so that governments could do
their job. For "to make the controller and the controlled the same, is
precisely to deny all control." America's post-war mission, Brownson
concluded, would lay less in promoting "liberty" that in finally realizing
"the true ideal of the state." 495
490. GEORGE FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE
CRISIS OF UNION 187 (1965); see also LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF
IDEAS IN AMERICA x (2001) ("The Civil War discredited the beliefs and assumptions of the era that
preceded it .. .. [It] swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it swept away almost the whole
intellectual culture of the North along with it.").
491. BROWNSON, supra note 292, at 47 (emphasis added).
492. Id. at 47-48.
493. Id. at 20, 353-54.
494. Id. at 48, 20.
495. Id. at 20, 54.
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Perhaps even Brownson, who passed away in 1876, would have looked
with amazement at the breathtaking transformations in ideology, politics,
and legal attitudes that took place in the postbellum decades. The rhetoric
of anti-aristocracy mysteriously disappeared in American political life
after the Civil War. Social Darwinism permitted corporations, their
lawyers, the courts, and many others to contort the pre-war doctrine of
individual self-reliance into a "weapon against reform." 49 6 For post-war
reformers the whole idea of law as it related to individuals took on a
radically different meaning in this new environment. To counteract a
paternalistic judiciary, overreaching railroad corporations, and corrupt
political machines, Gilded Age reformers wanted more law, not less.
Contrast, for example, the Jacksonian P.W. Grayson to the late nineteenth-
century social reformer Henry Demarest Lloyd: Where Grayson had held
that law alienated the individual from his true moral self and ipso facto
precluded true self-rule, Lloyd felt certain that law, and only law, made
the individual real. "We can become individual," Lloyd wrote, "only by
submitting to be bound to others. We extend our freedom only by finding
new laws to obey. Life outside the law is slavery on as many sides as there
are disregarded laws."4 97
The decades after the Civil War marked the true "golden age" for
American law and lawyers. Law schools and bar associations sprang up in
abundance.498 Forging a lasting and lucrative alliance with corporate
America, the legal profession consolidated its monopoly and grew in
power.4 9 9 Langdell's Harvard established the supremacy of common law
and formalism over common sense and custom."oo A discerning eye might
detect traces of the earlier reform tradition in what historians have called
"Classical Legal Thought."s'o Constitutional classicists believed that a
natural order governed by principles of moral justice and individual
responsibility existed prior to government and did everything in their
power to protect this pre-legal order from legislative law's coercive
496. Thomas, supra note 471, at 680.
497. HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 527 (New York, Harper &
Brothers 1902) (1894).
498. See, e.g., EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS
WORK (1953).
499. See THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (Gerard Gawalt ed.,
1984); CALHOUN, supra note 276, at 178-97; SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND
HONOR IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at 91-116 (1991); see also WILLIAM G. THOMAS,
LAWYERING FOR THE RAILROAD: BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH (1999).
500. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C.
LANGDELL, 1826-1906 (2009); see also Kunal M. Parker, Context in History and Law: A Study of the
Late Nineteenth-Century American Jurisprudence of Custom, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 473, 482, 496
(2006) (suggesting that in the late nineteenth century law and custom became analytically distinct
phenomena).
501. WIECEK, supra note 70; MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-32 (1992).
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encroachments. But if classicists employed ideas with intellectual roots in
the post-Revolutionary reform tradition, their exertions now had the effect
of erecting an enormous jurisprudential bulwark around the legal status
quo. Formalistic to their core, classicists feared disorder, exerted judicial
power in highly coercive ways, and believed in a strict rule of law
separable from and superior to the popular will.502 In due course, the anti-
formalist and sociological revolts would make their appearances and begin
dismantling the massive intellectual architecture in which the classicists
had labored.50 3 But here we risk running afield. Suffice it to say that after
Appomattox the American legal mind often enough confronted the
question of what law is, and later what courts do, but never again whether
either-or both-should be.
502. See WIECEK, supra note 70, at 3-15, 98-102; see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
(1993).
503. See HORWITZ, supra note 501, at 33-192; G. EDWARD WHITE, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 99-135 (1978); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT
AGAINST FORMALISM (1957); WIECEK,supra note 70, at 175-244.
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